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ABSTRACT 
Fragmented speech, the discovery of which forms the basis of this dissertation, provides 
the aim and direction of our thesis. The aim is to clarify precisely what fragmented 
speech is, and subsequently define its application. In this thesis, we begin by providing 
the historical background to the initial collision between psychoanalysis and literature. 
This broad base provides the impetus needed in order to formulate certain conclusions 
regarding the unconscious and the dialogic. Our methodology involves a combination of 
Freudo-Lacanian theory and Bakhtinian linguistics. As we approach an understanding of 
our subject, it becomes increasingly necessary to develop the issues surrounding the 
significance of fragmented speech. 
The significance of our work becomes focused when we provide an analysis of a 
`psychotic discourse', namely, the Memoirs of My Nervous Illness, by President Schreber 
- using the methodology described. In the final stages of our thesis fragmented speech 
becomes a symptom of psychosis. Under pressure from the unconscious, the image of 
speech may fragment. It is the interaction between the body image and the speech image 
that provides us with a speech complex. Consequently, this dissertation discovers 
fragmented speech at the very heart of the psychoanalytic session. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In his landmark essay on The Mirror Stage. Lacan discovered in the child, prior to the 
consolidation of the rudimentary ego at the mirror stage, the fragmented body as the 
child's own introduction to its later development of a supposed whole body image. In 
this dissertation, we have taken as our major thesis and organizing principle, this idea of 
the fragmented body, which. according to Lacan, returns to the analysand in the course of 
psychoanalytic treatment, and asked ourselves a simple question. If the child has a 
fragmented body image, prior to the whole body image inaugurated at the mirror stage. 
why is it not equally possible that the child also has an image of . speecch that 
is similarly 
fragmented? Whilst this appears to have been overlooked as a possibility by Lacan, this 
dissertation sets out to argue that the fragmented body and fragmented speech are both 
repressed at the mirror stage, taking up residence in the Unconscious, where they continue 
to haunt consciousness. 
Before, however, we proceed any further a brief word of explanation is required. Lacan 
did not refer at all to the image of language or the image of the word. Mikhail 
Mikhailovich Bakhtin, hmtiever, did and we shall refer to his extensive oeuvre throe-hoot 
this dissertation. In order to substantiate this thesis. our work explores the function, 
impact and value of the discovery of fragmented speech within psychoanalysis and 
linguistic theory. This is achieved through the dialogic interpenetration of the work of 
Freud, Lacan and the Russian linguist, Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin. Why Bakhtin? 
The answer to this is simple: to discover the dialogic activity of fragmented speech, the 
Structuralist project will not suffice. There is not, and will not be, any attempt to detect a 
code or system in this dissertation. Did Bakhtin not say that the code is the death of 
context? 
If fragmented speech exists, and it is our intention to prove, as far as possible, that it 
does, then its discovery is rooted in the two disciplines of psychoanalysis on one hand, 
and literary/linguistic theory on the other hand. We begin by tracing a line of this 
interface between the two. Before we proceed any further I think we should point out 
that fragmented speech exists as an unconscious potential, it is not a conscious 
phenomenon, unless, in the case of mental illness, consciousness is swamped by the 
unconscious. 
In order to develop this thesis, we have studied the work of Bakhtin, who provides a rich 
linguistic harvest capable of sustaining our concept of fragmented speech. Certainly, I 
can think of no other philosopher of language whose work could provide a context or 
conceptual horizon for fragmented speech (or the fragmented body for that matter) other 
than Bakhtin. Hopefully, in the course of this dissertation we may discover why this 
should be so. This proves to be our starting point then, fragmented speech. During our 
dissertation we shall provide evidence of the possibility of the existence in the 
unconscious of fragmented speech and take the necessary steps to clarify both its 
existence and its nature. We shall explore the possible correlation between the 
fragmented body and the image of fragmented speech and/or the collision that may ensue. 
The \\ hole process is complicated by the necessity of an approach to the partial drives, or 
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fragmented drives, and their connection with the image of fragmentation of the body and 
word. Likewise, we shall develop the collision in terms of the meconnaissance of the 
whole body image and the whole system of speech - as image. 
So it is that we have, to borrow a phrase from Bakhtin, set a dialogic or dialogizing 
background in the first instance, of the dialogic atmosphere in which psychoanalysis and 
literary theory first collided in the `marketplace' of 19, Bergasse. The psychoanalytic 
(and dialogic) atmosphere in Vienna at the turn of the nineteenth century was, one might 
imagine, vibrant with ideas. So how have we tried to achieve our objective? By creating 
an exploratory genre potential at the birth of the psychoanalytic movement, and placing it 
at an angle of interpenetration with the literary field. In this, we have tried to penetrate 
the voice zones present in those early dialogues, creating a backdrop and dialogic 
threshold, in which we set the tone and scene for the rest of our dissertation. Perhaps we 
could say that we re-accentuate it for our own purposes and attempt to tune in to the 
apperceptive background. 
In our opening chapter, we hear the voice zones of both Freud and his disciple Otto Rank, 
where, in those early days, an absence of psychoanalytic case studies led to the vast field 
of literature being psychoanalysed upon the couch, as it were. This early dialogic angle 
sets the opening chapter in the time and space of those early days, where the overlap 
between psychoanalysis and literature first took shape. At the very opening meeting of 
the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, Otto Rank was in a hurry and excited at the prospect 
of reading his extensive work based on Freud's discovery of the core and model of 
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psychoanalysis, Oedipus Rex. This core complex of psychoanalysis provides our 
opening model of psychoanalytic thought provided by Freud. By opening our first 
chapter at the interface between literature (Sophocles' Oedipus Rex) and Freud's 
discovery of the incest complex provides the initial graft binding the two together. This 
chapter then opens up the field of the Freudian unconscious and the rest of the 
dissertation. The concept of fragmented speech had to be carefully contextualized against 
the backdrop of psychoanalysis and linguistic theory, those early days provided the 
impetus necessary to formulate our hypothesis and led us on to the Freudian unconscious 
and Lacan's Mirror Stage. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
OEDIPUS REX: SIGMUND FREUD AND OTTO RANK 
Introduction 
In this opening chapter, we outline our major argument and then contextualize it within a 
certain historical background and finally draw out the implications. Our major 
hypothesis states that: the formation of the ego entails the creation of fragmented speech 
in the unconscious. Having thus stated our hypothesis, we now set about contextualizing 
it within certain basic parameters. The discovery of fragmented speech is, in fact, the 
child of two disciplines, namely psychoanalysis and literary theory. In order to ascertain 
the historical background, however, we begin with the work of Otto Rank, for many 
years a disciple of Sigmund Freud, and continue with the work of the father of 
psychoanalysis, Freud himself. We do not wish to be accused as Rank was: `Freud was 
always disturbed by Rank's impetuous way of breaking into the middle of a problem, 
taking the historical or scientific underpinning for granted, never hesitating to apply any 
conclusion in universal terms' (Taft, 1958: 55). Sensitive to the possibility of any such 
accusation, we have unfolded our blueprint in the early days of the psychoanalytic 
movement. 
We create also in this chapter an argument that underlines aspects of Rank's 
methodology and its weaknesses, in his application of psychoanalysis to literature, and 
suggest a counterpoint score of Freud's application of his own thought to Jensen's 
Gradiva (SE. IX: 7-95). In this way we tackle two problems simultaneously, first, an 
initial incursion into both fields, and secondly we check the methodology and manner of 
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attempting to psychoanalyse texts in those early days. Thereby, hopefully, we avoid the 
accusation directed against Rank, namely of entering the problem half way through. 
Early days and early ways 
On February 15,1905, Otto Rank, who had recently discovered the work of Sigmund 
Freud, wrote in his diary: `A medically proven artist' (Lieberman, 1985: 36). Rank 
produces this interesting comment in his diary and this description doubtless would have 
pleased the father of psychoanalysis, who spoke in similar terms of Charcot. This early 
entry, however, seems to contain an immanent ambiguity. What, we may think, is a 
medically proven (or constituted) artist? Obviously the comment has a certain lightness 
of touch, but this apparently casual comment by Rank contains two propositions that 
interest us in this dissertation, namely, the scientific and the artistic and their 
juxtaposition and interpenetration. 
In the Minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic group, we have the early interpenetration of 
the two disciplines so far discussed on one hand, and the activation of conscious and 
unconscious forces within that group on the other hand. `The year 1905, when Rank met 
Freud' (Lieberman, 1985: 67) becomes crucial for us in this chapter. For, following that 
meeting, Rank was to develop a psychoanalytic theory of literary criticism, which 
embraced much of Freud's early thought. We see, for example, that: `Rank had served as 
Secretary of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society and Freud's closest colleague from 1906- 
1924' (Lieberman, 1985, xxviii). Freud himself was born on May 6,1856, at Freiberg, in 
Moravia, Czechoslovakia, (SE: XX: 7). By 1896, he had developed a theory that held 
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'traumatic sexual events in a person's childhood were the cause of psychoneurosis' 
(Lieberman, 1985: 51). Freud had discovered in the infant's life, the part played by 
childhood sexual trauma. On October 15,1897, in a letter to Fliess he was to say: 
To be completely honest with oneself is good practice. One single thought of general 
value has been revealed to me. I have found, in my own case too, falling in love with the 
mother and jealousy of the father, and I now regard it as a universal event of early 
childhood, even if not so early as in children who have been made hysterical (Similarly 
with the romance of parentage in paranoia - heroes, founders of religions. ). 
If that is so, we can understand the riveting power of Oedipus Rex, in spite of all 
objections raised against its presupposition of destiny ... the 
Greek legend seizes on a 
compulsion which everyone recognizes because he feels its existence within himself. 
(SE: I: 265). 
Freud, however, in 1925 was to state: `the ubiquity of the Oedipus complex gradually 
dawned on me' (SE: XX: 23). So, by the fin de siecle the former nuclear complex 
discovered by Freud had, it seems, metamorphosed into the Oedipus complex. Freud 
discovered the earlier nuclear complex to be neurosis based upon the incest fantasy. 
As early as 1902, however, one Wilhelm Stekel `suggested a weekly meeting of a few 
Viennese colleagues to discuss psychoanalysis' (Lieberman, 1985: 61). In the Minutes of 
those early meetings (Nunberg, 1962), the opening papers concern the work of Otto Rank 
and outline his theme of incest in literature. The minutes are remarkable, because in the 
first few pages it is quite apparent that only Freud grasps the relationship between the 
conscious and the unconscious, and the other members are even uncertain of the contents 
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of the unconscious. Notwithstanding this, the first papers presented are those of Otto 
Rank. It is fascinating to see in these minutes that as Freud's psychoanalytic theories 
gradually emerged, Rank seized upon them and incorporated them into his work on the 
incest theme in literature. 
We see that Rank probably first attended sessions in 1905. They met at 19, Berggasse. 
The group were a devoted band that followed the professor [Freud] in awe (Lieberman, 
1985, variously). By October 1906, Rank presented to the group a major topic `Incest 
Theme in Literature and Legend'. Rank read three papers on the subject successively 
over three Wednesdays. Criticized by the members, including Freud, they formed the 
basis for Rank's later published work. 
It is worth remembering that this early dialogic activity, in the presence of Freud, is the 
first attempt to apply psychoanalytic principles directly to literature, at least in a dialogic 
setting. That is, apart from Freud himself who wrote a full psychological analysis of a 
literary work - Jensen's Gradiva (SE: IX; 7-95) and also separate from his early 
comments on Oedipus Rex and Hamlet in The Interpretation of Dreams (SE: IV-V: 
variously) and finally his comments on Die Richterin ['The Woman Judge']. The early 
problems with Rank's paper were formed, in part, around the sibling element in the incest 
motif. In the discussion of sibling love, we have the following comment: 
From the field of literature, Freud mentions C. F. Myers short novel Die Richterin where 
the theme is sibling love; at the end of the story it turns out that the two main characters 
are not really brother and sister, whereupon they marry. This mechanism, which has the 
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purpose of annulling painful conditions in one's own generation, is frequently operative 
in the family romances of neurotics (Nunberg, 1962: 20) 
Freud's first commentary upon Die Richterin is contained in his letter to Fliess of 20th 
June, 1898 (Freud, 1954: Letter 91: 256). This is Freud's first application of analysis to a 
work of literature. 
The Minutes are, in themselves, a specific literary genre and perhaps one may add that 
their interpretation is also a genre activity. We can see in this activity, the developing 
theories of Freud impinge, in a particular dialogic psychoanalytic space, upon the world 
of literature and literary theory. However, so that we understand the image of conscious 
and unconscious forces more clearly at this point in Vienna, we look at a comment from 
the Introduction of those minutes by Herman Nunberg: 
Indeed, some members of the Society could not face the Unconscious as revealed by 
psychoanalysis. As Freud once, after a paper given by Paul Schilder, remarked, they 
could not breathe in the sticky atmosphere of the dark background, of the "sewers", as it 
were, but longed to bask in the bright sunshine on the surface. 
Also on the same page in the Minutes is another important consideration that affects our 
purpose. We shall engage in an analysis of Rank's methodology (and its weaknesses) in 
his approach to literary criticism and literary theory; and later in the chapter we shall also 
analyse Freud's methodology in his work on Jensen's Gradiva. In the interim, however, 
xe should note from the Minutes the following: 
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In those early days it was difficult to obtain suitable case material for psychoanalytic 
study. But this material was easily available from non-clinical sources. This may explain 
the striking fact that at the outset, and even later, problems of art, literature, mythology, 
religion, education, were discussed more than problems of psychiatry (Nunberg, 1962: 
xxiii) 
In this comment we are able to visualize that it was the absence of case studies, of a 
dearth of patients, which primarily led to an engagement with literature. To avoid 
confusion, we must add that Freud did indeed weave certain psychoanalytic motifs 
through literary texts, but the analysis of a text was primarily because of this dearth of 
patients and their case studies, as the above comment from Nunberg shows. In those 
meetings, however, according to the Minutes, Rank was accused of attempting to force 
Freudian theory to fit the literature discussed and Freud, who was present, did not seem 
to feel the need to interject. 
The question of whether or not the literary product may in fact be psychoanalysed does 
not seem to have been posed, at least directly. If, however, one analyses a literary text 
immediately it poses the problem of `the other'. One further comment that arises from 
these Minutes is Freud's remark concerning the psychoanalytic patient when he says: 
He is ill only to the extent that he suffers. 
(Nunberg, 1962: 100). 
So, for Freud, it is not the normativization of the psychoanalytic patient that appears to be 
important but rather that the patient does not suffer. Returning to Rank, it is perhaps 
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worth noticing along the way, that although chronologically it appears that Rank's book 
on the incest theme follows on from the earlier Myth of the Birth of the Hero, in fact, that 
is not the case. In Lieberman, we have the following: 
Rank already had achieved something remarkable. His forthcoming monograph The 
Artist [Der Kunstler] was the first psychoanalytic book to be published by a member of 
the group other than Freud. His massive book The Incest Motif in Poetry and Legend 
(1912) was essentially written before his presentation in 1906; although he delayed 
publication of the 685-page tome, he was eager to talk about it with the Wednesday 
Group. (Lieberman, 1985: 70) 
By this point, Freud had discovered through his clinical practice the possibility of an 
inherent incestual impulse within the child. This incestual impulse became the core of 
the nuclear complex and subsequently Freud had observed the ubiquitous nature of this 
incest motif in the Greek tragedy by Sophocles entitled, Oedipus Rex (Sophocles, 1982). 
So in this first period Freud, who by this time was well acquainted with Otto Rank, had 
developed a theory concerning a core complex of neurosis based upon Oedipal conflict. 
Otto Rank's intellectual development was paralleled in some ways with Freud's, and 
Rank was keeping abreast of Freud's ever-increasing discoveries. Freud had discovered 
the Oedipal triangle of father-mother-child as a dominant metaphor and key of 
psychoanalysis. Rank took the Oedipal model of Freud, and the mechanism of 
repression, and along with Freud's revolutionary discovery of the unconscious, 
transposed elements of Freud's work into the field of literary criticism. 
Repression 
As we shall not progress too well without a working hypothesis of Freud's theory of 
repression, we now look at some basic elements of this expression in Freud's work. 
When Freud teaches: `The oldest word in our psychoanalytic interpretative terminology, 
"repression" ' 
... (SE. xxi: 153) we need to take note. Prior to moving any further in this 
text, we dwell momentarily upon this very early concept of Freud. It will figure largely 
in our later assessment of fragmented speech. In his `History of the Psycho-Analytic 
Movement (1914)', Freud declared that `the theory of repression is the corner-stone on 
which the whole structure of psychoanalysis rests'. The earliest reference to it is in 
Breuer and Freud: `Preliminary Communication' of 1893 (SE. II: 10). The concept of 
repression was suggested to Freud by the phenomenon of resistance, which `in turn was 
brought to light by a technical innovation - namely, the abandonment of hypnosis in the 
cathartic treatment of hysteria'. (SE. XIV: 144). And it is with the term hysteria in 
mind, initially, that we use the term repression. We now check Freud's own comment: 
`Psycho-analytic observation of the transference neuroses, moreover, leads us to conclude 
that repression is not a defensive mechanism which is present from the very beginning , 
and that it cannot arise until a sharp cleavage has occurred between conscious and 
unconscious mental activity - that the essence of repression lies simply in turning 
something away, and keeping it at a distance, from the conscious. (SE. XIV: 147) . 
Freud also teaches that 'repression does not hinder the instinctual representation from 
continuing to exist in the unconscious'... (SE. XIV: 149). And finally, Freud says: 
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`Repression in fact interferes only with the relation of the instinctual representative to one 
psychical system, namely to that of the conscious'. (SE. XIV: 149). 
The repressed thought situated in the Ucs. is not stationary, however, but is re-arranged 
and altered by a continuous influx of new material. It is often re-accentuated as the result 
of deferred-action, whereby material is encapsulated at a certain point, and remains in a 
relatively static state until a newer stage of development is reached. This allows the 
previously encapsulated information to be re-accentuated in the light of this subsequent 
newer stage. For an example of this we may think of repressed oedipal material in 
childhood, subsequently resurrected and re-accentuated at the pubertal stage, thereby 
triggering the family romance, to be discussed shortly. We may also understand the 
newer concept of time involved in this. The correlation of time and space are discussed 
in the final chapters. So, with the onset of puberty, unconscious oedipal material may be 
re-accentuated, brandishing new hatred for the father, and sexual rivalry for the attentions 
of the mother, for example. We shall, however, discuss Freud's theory of Repression 
again later. 
By 1912, Rank had published his major work on the theme of incest and oedipal conflict 
in literature, and it is a fundamentally important discourse of psychoanalytic literary 
criticism. It is also tinged everywhere with the outcome of discussions based in those 
early days of the Wednesday meetings. It was well known in those early days that Freud 
considered Rank's exhaustive work on the theme of incest to take first place as a 
scientific application of psychoanalysis to literature. 
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It is perhaps worth noting the exact title of Otto Rank's work: The Incest Theme in 
Literature and Legend, Fundamentals of a Psychology of Literary Creation (Rank, 1912). 
We note this because when we embark upon the work of Jensen's Gradiva by Freud, we 
shall see that Freud himself does not in fact, other than in a general sense perhaps, seek to 
discover the literary creative matrix, as in fact we find in Rank's work. However, this is 
the first major attempt to apply psychoanalytic practice to literature other than by Freud 
himself. 
Rank's Literary Criticism and Theory 
It is important to note, however, that Rank produces a psychology of literary creation, not 
literary effect. Rank is tracing a line of the literary creative matrix, in which ultimately 
he discovers the Freudian Oedipus complex existing as a core and model of the creative 
process itself. We may recall here that Freud had outlined as much in his criticisms of 
Rank's early papers in the Minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society (Nunberg, 
1962, variously). So it is that by presenting Oedipus as the core and model, as Freud 
recommended, Rank is able to position the horizon of world literature to it. Rank, 
although tracing oedipal conflict at the root of the literary creative process, in effect 
analyses the whole field of literature and poetry on the psychoanalytic couch. So, we 
may ask, precisely how does Rank achieve this? 
First, he traces much incestual and oedipal material within the literary creative matrix 
itself. We may of course ask ourselves the question, where precisely is the literary 
creative matrix positioned in the mental space, in the conscious or the unconscious? 
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Presumably one would think that it arises from the unconscious. Notwithstanding this, 
however, he detects in the need to express one's self in literature, poetry, or drama, as, in 
itself, an attempted resolution of incestual impulses deriving from early childhood. As 
Rank himself states ... `Thus the author is led to seek gratification in his unconscious 
fantasy' (Rank, 1912: 94). 
Secondly, Rank traces psychobiographical detail in the corresponding lives of many of 
the authors he analyses. As an example of this let us take a comment by Rank concerning 
the poet Byron: 
Typical of the mother's neurotic character is the way, often mentioned by Byron, his 
mother was wont to upbraid him for the slightest offence - out of proportion to the 
nature of the infraction. This displacement of psychic intensity (Freud) from an 
affectionate relationship to an indifferent one is a basic principle of the psychology of 
neurosis (Rank, 1912: 109) 
In this way, Rank is able to detect the oedipal tensions in the writer's work either as a 
process of catharsis or as unresolved repression. Wish-fulfilment, always present in 
dream material is, in literature, expressed by the authors in their work. 
It is as well to remember that the incest configuration may operate either way, as 
repressed desire from the point of view of the child or the adult, depending upon the 
viewpoint of the author. Rank cites biographical detail of authors' personal lives to 
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corroborate his theory of the emergence of incest in their work. Let us again see what 
Rank seems to have in mind when he makes the following observation: 
The regular appearance of the childhood incest fantasy, its content - soon felt to be 
distasteful (leading to the expression of the fantasy) - and finally the powerful after 
effects of the fantasy that arise from the unconscious to play a role in the emotional and 
fantasy life of the adult, all lead us to see that the universal dramatic effectiveness of the 
incest theme is quite understandable (Rank, 1912: 34). 
In this comment Rank discovers Freud's core and model of the Oedipus complex to be at 
the heart of the literary creative matrix and much of his book on the Incest Theme is his 
justification for this hypothesis. Even if we accept this as true, which is not likely, we 
may still ask: in any triad of writer/ plot/ reader, where would the position of the reader 
be in this assumption? 
Literary Resistance and Disguise 
Rank finds in literature that in some instances unconscious repression is still in force, and 
consequently an unconscious disguise of the incest theme takes place. There is evidence, 
in more than one place in the Vienna Minutes (Nunberg, 1962), that Freud encouraged 
Rank in the pursuit of disguised material in literature. Of course this corresponds with 
the consulting room dialectic, whereby the analysand presents the analyst with a screen 
discourse. In literature, according to Rank, this occurs in the following way: (i) The 
authors may devise screen discourses, or disguises of the incest configuration through 
displacement activity. or the dampening down of unacceptable incestual material. Or (ii) 
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they are aware of the oedipal material but disguise it because the current social milieu is 
unable to accept incest undisguised. 
So we have, on one hand, deliberate disguise because of the social mores of a particular 
epoch and unintentional disguise because the repressed unconscious material has failed to 
cross the threshold of consciousness. We have outlined a few of the methods whereby 
Rank uses psychoanalysis to derive from the author's own life psychobiographical 
material that leads the way to incest in the author's text itself, either as still-repressed 
material, catharsis, as disguise, or through displacement activity. However, Rank 
considers that there is a progressive epochal elaboration of the need to disguise oedipal 
material. Rank's example is that whilst Oedipus directly murders his father and marries 
his mother, from the plays of the Greek tragedian onward it became increasingly 
necessary - because of social taboos - to disguise and displace oedipal material and 
this, according to Rank, continues to the present day. 
But is this not all similar to the consulting room technique and psychoanalytic session 
itself, and is it possible to treat the authors and their heroes and the readers of literary 
creation as candidates for analysis? To define the literary field in general as an 
analysand has, to say the least, its problems. Without at this point moving away from 
Rank's work, we may in passing consider the following. If one places the writer and hero 
on the psychoanalytic couch as Rank does, one also needs to involve, in some form, the 
reader. For example, does the reader collude with the author? 
17 
Is there, for example, an incestual pact between the writer and reader? Rank does not 
really answer this but he does detect an evolutionary progressive theory of repression and 
defence. It seems repression and defence - from the age of Sophocles onward - are 
progressively disguised, as it becomes increasingly necessary to conceal or leave incest 
or incestual impulses behind, both on a personal and on a cultural level. 
Repression is the mechanism through which the ego tries to maintain its integrity against 
the continuous return of the repressed. Repression, as a mechanism, guards the 
conscious mind from the invasion of forces from the unconscious that, it is felt, may 
overwhelm the psyche. Repression in literature takes the shape of disguises, screen 
discourses, displacements and rescue fantasies. In fact a whole gamut of devices and 
tricks are installed to ensure that oedipal material cannot be recognised consciously. It 
becomes, however, quite difficult one would think to analyse the literary `product' and 
bring the whole family along, so to speak. Freud's discovery of Oedipus, may throw the 
whole family romance into disarray, but may we apply this directly to a text? This direct 
application of psychoanalysis to a literary text is fraught with difficulty. However, if we 
outline the more specific areas that Rank deals with, we can perhaps begin to understand 
the setting for his application of Freudian theory to literary creativity. 
Incestual Mist 
So it appears that the reader likewise receives a cathartic release from oedipal tensions. 
Again, it is difficult to see how this operates if Rank does not install the reader within the 
triangulated wi-itei4 plot reader relationship. However, according to Rank, this the author 
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achieves, both for himself and for the reader. The concept that the author and reader 
share an incestual mist, a vapour that hovers around the text has a point, if the motif is 
universal. But the interrelatedness of the writer, plot, reader, is a complex interaction 
that, as stated earlier, cannot just be given a gloss of assumed knowledge of incestual 
interaction, unless, of course, this interrelatedness itself is analysed to tease out these 
incestual interconnections. 
This could take one into the realm of psychoanalytic transference in the interrelationship 
of writer/plot/reader, but it takes us too far from our theme. If this were attempted, we 
would in fact attempt to cross too many thresholds. If, however, this is not achieved then 
the whole dialogic intertextuality of writer/plot/reader has been ignored and we cannot 
accept that as a possibility. In other words, Rank approaches the writer, plot and reader 
monologically, whereas, in fact, they constitute a multiplicity of voice zones and dialogic 
stratification of differing intensity. Therefore, they would have to be analysed on that 
basis and as we have seen possibly on the basis of transference. As this chapter is a 
spring board of preliminary exercises into a dialogic pool, we cannot follow every lead, 
but we have engaged both disciplines on to a similar plane. 
Sophocles and Shakespeare 
Clearly, Rank believes that in many cases, the author designs some form of screen 
discourse, so that the precise nature of the oedipal material is not immediately 
comprehended. According to Rank, a certain dampening down of the material takes 
place, as direct incest with the mother and murder of the father, has to be displaced 
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through a 'progression' through the centuries of cultural taboos. This displacement 
occurs through various literary devices. For example, Rank continuously returns to the 
theme of the stepmother or mother-in-law (or step/ father-in-law, if we accept a similar 
complex in women) as the replacement or stand-in for the incestual object of desire. We 
shall see further examples of these literary devices in our discussion of Oedipus Rex and 
Hamlet. Rank makes the following observation that perhaps clarifies the thought: 
With increasing repression, a second psychic process arises, and a knowledge of it is 
extremely important to understanding literary production. It corresponds to long-known 
laws of the psychology of consciousness: directly similar thoughts and series of mental 
images are closely associated not only with each other, but also with opposing thoughts 
and images. It now appears that similar laws hold for unconscious psychic processes as 
well. (Rank, 1912: 40-41). 
Rank himself speaks of the `psychic x-ray' (Rank, 1912: 17), the ability to trace the 
incestual core and model that may be detected throughout history in the literary text. He 
builds a picture of various devices employed to disguise these incestual impulses. It is 
important to note that these concepts, utilized by Rank, are based on evidence that Freud 
discovered through his clinical practice. Freud only gradually became aware of oedipal 
material, through his own self-analysis and dream analysis of his patients. He found, 
through an analysis of patients' dreams, a repetition of certain fundamental motifs. He 
observed that the incestuous emotions in the child's psyche, repressed into the 
unconscious, are in fact satisfied later in the dream world of the adult, containing in the 
male child the death wish for the father and sexual union with the mother. 
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Things of course are never this simple, and Rank considers that the child's erotic feelings 
toward the father or mother are unconscious, concealed beneath the child's love for the 
parent, which is permitted and encouraged. This allows for a perception that seems to 
confirm that the incestual material is also an admixture of the child's love for the parents. 
Rank acknowledges also in his work the incestual impulses of the parent. The author 
may see the incestual provocation coming from any quarter. Sometimes, as Samuels 
(1985) points out variously, the failure (at some level) to acknowledge the incestual 
impulse on either the side of the child, or on the side of the parent, can be perceived in 
adulthood as a cruel deprivation. 
Hamlet 
So it now appears that this incestual motif, this filigree of oedipal phantoms dominating 
the unconscious as a thought, and consciousness as an affect, is traceable, according to 
Freud and his follower Rank, to the child's first love -a parent. If we now check an 
example of this, we may see the practice of the theory, so to speak. We take as an 
example, Freud's comments on Shakespeare's Hamlet: 
A fleeting idea had passed through my head of whether the same thing [incestual 
impulses] may not lie at the bottom of Hamlet as well. I am not thinking of 
Shakespeare's conscious intention, but I believe rather that here some real event 
instigated the poet to his representation, in that the unconscious in him understood the 
unconscious in his hero. (SE: 1: 265-266). 
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In Freud, we see that he develops his argument still further, by building upon the line 
'Thus conscience does make cowards of us all'. Freud is able to handle subtly the 
question of Hamlet's inability to avenge his father by killing the king. Freud says that 
Hamlet `who sends his courtiers to their death without a scruple, hesitates in the murder 
of his uncle'. Freud explains this by saying: `How better could he justify himself than by 
the torment he suffers from the obscure memory that he himself had meditated the same 
deed against his father from passion for his mother' (SE. I: 266). And Freud's coup de 
grace in letter 71 to Fliess states: `And does he not in the end, in the same remarkable 
way as my hysterical patients, bring down punishment on himself by suffering the same 
fate as his father of being poisoned by the same rival? ' (SE: I: 266). 
Let us then centre ourselves upon this incestual theme in Shakespeare's Hamlet, briefly. 
It is an important development from Sophocles' Oedipus myth, according to Rank 
himself. He follows on from Freud's earlier comments, by an elaboration of the incest 
motif in Hamlet. The tragic hero Hamlet, `stabs the listener behind the curtain and sends 
his two friends to the death intended for Hamlet himself (Rank, 1912: 35). The direct 
murder of the father (in Oedipus Rex) is transposed in Hamlet to the stepfather, thereby 
setting up a screen discourse, disguising the true wish of Hamlet to murder the father. 
The incest motif is now, as it were, once removed. It is no longer direct murder of the 
father that is contemplated but the 'indirect' murder of the father, replaced in this 
instance by the stepfather. This allows Hamlet (and perhaps a desire Shakespeare 
harboured, as Freud suggested variously) to project his unconscious desire to kill his own 
22 
father, on to the king. Subsequently, this allows Hamlet at once to disguise one motive 
with another. Now he has the righteous cause of killing his father's murderer. 
Thus, having the scene set for us psychoanalytically by Freud and Rank, the opening 
dialogue takes place with Shakespeare's use of the `ghost' of Hamlet's father. Hamlet 
himself is the reluctant revenger, sworn to avenge his father's murder. But Hamlet too, 
has designs upon his father's wife. Cruelly murdered, the `ghost' of Hamlet's father 
requires revenge. If, however, we understand Hamlet's oedipal desire for his mother, 
then the impossibility of his situation becomes clear. 
The event of his father's murder demands action from Hamlet. Claudius, Hamlet's uncle, 
who has murdered Hamlet's father and married his mother, deserves swift retribution but 
our hero hesitates. Why? Because Hamlet can accomplish everything but the revenge 
upon the man who has killed his father and taken his father's place beside his mother 
the man who shows him the realization of his repressed childhood wishes. 
Oedipus Rex 
At this point we can reflect on our theme thus far, of oedipal material. In the case of the 
Greek tragedy by Sophocles, Oedipus Rex, Oedipus kills his father and marries his 
mother. So this is of course direct incest, unlike Hamlet. Oedipus himself is unaware 
that the man he killed is his father, or that the woman he marries is his mother. Much is 
made contemporaneously of Oedipus' lack of knowledge of his father's murder and his 
marriage to his mother. It is almost as if certain voices consider Freud mistaken in 
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locating incest in Oedipus Rex, because Oedipus did not know - that which he did. Let 
us take up a point by Rank: 
That the Oedipus legend sprang from prehistoric dream material dealing with the painful 
disturbance that arises in the relationship with the parents at the first sexual feelings is 
unmistakably clear from a hint in the text of the Sophoclean tragedy itself. Jocasta 
comforts Oedipus, who has not yet discovered the truth but is disturbed by the memory of 
the oracle's words, by mentioning a dream dreamed by many persons, yet in Jocasta's 
opinion a meaningful one: `For many men have seen themselves joined with the mother 
in dreams. But he who disregards all of this bears life's burden lightly'. (Rank, 1912: 45) 
We can perhaps detect the meaning stressed by Freud himself: that the oedipal material is 
in fact dream material of the adult's repressed childhood incestual fantasies. Truly, this is 
the return of the repressed. This is an important axis in the psychoanalytic justification 
by Rank of his work. In Sophocles' Oedipus Rex we see the pedigree of Freud's directly 
incestual material; that is why its universality is important to Freud. It is an original 
motif, in its direct use of incest with the mother and the murder of the father. The father 
is killed by Oedipus, thereby allowing him to marry his mother, Jocasta. But, as Rank 
points out: that both acts occur without recognition of the parents' identity merely 
reflects the psychological repression of these infantile wishes' (Rank, 1912: 139). 
Oedipus does not know that he kills his father and marries his mother. But in the light of 
Freud's discovery of the unconscious, can we be sure that Oedipus does not know - in 
the other place? Freud's unconscious surely teaches us quite firmly that we are not in 
charge in our oNvn house? With the primal hordes and patricide, releasing the tribal 
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females for the sons, constituting the mythical and dialogic background to Oedipus Rex 
does Oedipus, with this incestual contextualized backdrop, slay the father for another 
purpose? Here, in Oedipus Rex, we are presented by Sophocles with the direct spectacle 
of incest with the mother and the murder of the father. With increasing repression 
through the centuries, apparently necessary throughout successive generations, the 
evolutionary process becomes quite sophisticated and advanced by the Renaissance and 
the earlier mentioned Shakespearean plays. 
A Fine Web of Intrigue 
The direct incest and murder of the father had developed intricate and elegant disguise 
mechanisms by the time Shakespeare dramatized his plays. The fine web of intrigue had 
been spun, screen discourses, displacement, disguises, tricks and devices and the incest 
motif were no longer directly discernible, as in the plays of Sophocles. We interrupted 
our narrative upon Shakespeare's Hamlet, to cast the first stone of incest (not counting 
Adam of course) against Sophocles' Oedipus, but now we return to Hamlet - unable to 
kill his uncle, the king. In Hamlet, due to greater disguised defence than in the Oedipus 
play, we have thus far seen the carefully structured screen discourse and displacement 
involving the murder of the father. 
The incestual discourse, being carefully concealed in Hamlet, requires further 
elaboration. Rank says: in Hamlet, owing to greater repression, only the reverse side of 
love for the mother appears -jealous hatred' (Rank, 1912: 36). This greater repression 
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referred to by Rank is contrasted with Oedipus, where incestual fulfilment with the 
mother is achieved. So Rank becomes bound to say: 
Just as the erotic affection for the mother is expressed less naively than in Oedipus, the 
same is true of the wish for the father's removal. It finds gratification only behind a 
double disguise created by defence mechanisms.... The playwright lets Claudius, the 
king's brother, murder the king, thus apparently removing the need for Hamlet to 
experience the painful desire to murder his father (Rank, 1912: 38) 
In our analysis of Rank's literary theory and criticism we have described various 
Freudian techniques utilized by Rank to discover Freud's core and model of the Oedipus 
fantasy at the heart of literary creation. We have pencilled in the problem of the reader, 
the problem of `the other' not present in Rank's text, and this will allow us to think more 
carefully of the reader in the distillation of our discourse on fragmented speech. As 
Freud came to understand the interaction of mechanisms, operating at the level of the 
psyche, discovering them practically daily, he applied his theories to his patients that he 
treated in those early days. Rank as we see, is busy taking the relations involved in these 
mechanisms and applying them directly to the writer, the hero, and the literary text. 
However, the reader does not `triangulate' the relationship with the writer and the plot in 
Rank, hence he misses the problem of `the other'. 
Rank's analysis of the author and hero and the literary text act together as the 
protagonists for the author's repressed desires. As we can see, this forces an inner 
complex to be projected into the external plot of the author's story and characterization. 
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Although we may refuse Rank's offer of the psychoanalytic couch for the literary 
`product', because of the complexity of dialogic interpenetrations on too many planes and 
too many levels involved in this, it is necessary to acknowledge the importance of the 
Oedipus complex and its interrelationship with literature. 
Family Romance: The Birth of a Myth 
In 1907-1908 Rank wrote The Myth of the Birth of the Hero. Freud again assists Rank, 
providing Rank with ideas from Freud's paper on the Family Romance (SE: XIV: 236) 
for his book. In the Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (SE. VII: 226. f 1) the 
following describes the Family Romance: ... `and the so-called "Family Romance", 
in 
which he [the subject] reacts to the difference between his attitude towards his parents 
now [pubertal period] and in his childhood'. This occurs because the `phantasies of the 
pubertal period have as their starting point the infantile sexual researches that were 
abandoned in childhood' (SE. VII: 226. f 1). And, `The close relations existing between 
these phantasies and myths has been demonstrated in the last instance by Otto Rank 
(1909)' (ibid. ). 
Rank, in The Myth of the Birth of the Hero, is able to interpret and understand that there 
was a deepening and resurgent echo of the oedipal motif by Freud in the Family 
Romance. Oedipus is now to be writ large on the mythic and family imagoes, 
reaccentuated in puberty. This time, however, Rank deals directly with the hero 
configuration, following his work on Oedipus and incest, transposed now to the level of 
the birth of the hero, the mythic birth of the hero and the symbolization that it entails. 
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Having led us through the labyrinthine passages of oedipal and incestual motivation, 
Rank now leads the way to the myth creators and myth interpreters. If Freud and Rank 
are correct and the repression of oedipal material into the unconscious sphere exists, then 
we must surely assume that myth makers and myth interpreters, may likewise have 
repressed material. They may, in terms of Freudian psychoanalysis, have repressed 
material and installed defence mechanisms of resistance against its acceptance on the 
plane of consciousness. 
Freud himself elevated the family to the level of myth. So we may see in Rank at this 
point, that he allows the shift from the oedipal conflictual plane to the plane of the 
derivation myths of the birth of the hero and, with the help of Freud, discovers them in 
the Family Romance. We may perhaps, even at this early stage, wonder at the image of 
the hero and its close proximity to the ego, and the relationship of the author to the hero. 
As we have discovered, through Freud, the Oedipus complex has relevance for at least 
two literary texts that we have examined: Oedipus Rex and Hamlet. We now need to 
trace this motif in an extension of the previous material. The Family Romance is a key 
Freudian text. The paper deals with the child's revolt against the parents. Elements of 
this paper by Freud appeared in Rank's Myth of the Birth of the Hero (Rank, 1907-1908) 
bearing no heading. Perhaps we should note that this was not used as a formal 
Introduction by Rank, but was, `simply introduced into the course of Rank's argument 
with a few words of acknowledgement' (SE. IX: 236). 
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If we now consider Freud's paper on the Family Romance we can see that the oedipal 
jewel discovered by Freud, is simply one stone set in a crown amongst many other 
incestual gems. Oedipus is set within the Family Romance and Freud, as we have said, 
intuitively raises the family to the level of myth. If Oedipus is the jewel and the Family 
Romance is the incestual crown, then it appears to have a firmness of setting holding 
things together. The filigree patterning of incest weaves the Oedipus jewel and crown, 
inextricably entwined in this early development of Freud's discovery of the Oedipus 
complex. Freud, in Family Romance, discusses the painful necessity of the child's 
movement away from the authority of the parents, thereby allowing the child individual 
stature and liberation. In this Family Romance, the early childhood sexual experiences 
and phantasies are now re-accentuated in puberty around the setting of the Family 
Romance. 
In the Family Romance of Freud, separation of the child from the parent is a task in later 
life for the child. In this task to be accomplished, Freud points out: ' ... there is a class 
of neurotics whose condition is recognizably determined by their having failed in this 
task' [separation] (SE: XIV: 237). Freud reminds us that separation from the parents is by 
no means automatic. He describes for us the child's early years, where children wish to 
be like their parents. As Freud says: `to be like his parents ... to 
be big like their father 
and mother' (SE: XIV: 236). In time, however, the child gets to know other parents and 
compares them with his or her own. So the child, according to Freud, begins to criticize 
the parents, using material based upon fault-finding episodes and using the knowledge 
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thus gained to assume that other parents are in some respects preferable to the child's 
own 
As we have seen in our previous discussion of the Oedipus complex, these feelings are 
intensified by the impulses of sexual rivalry. Freud goes on to say that the child feels 
slighted, does not believe it has the whole of the parents love and resents and regrets 
having to share love with siblings. This often leads, says Freud, to the later recollection 
of being a stepchild or an adopted child. So in puberty, we see the re-writing of the incest 
'script' of the early sexual experiences and phantasies now `elevated' to the plane of 
pubertal phantasy of `another' Family Romance. Here we find the `essence' of myths. It 
is important to note that in Freud this would hardly be remembered consciously by the 
child but could later often be revealed by psychoanalysis. But if, however, these mental 
impulses of childhood are remembered, then they embody the factor that enables us to 
understand the nature of myths. 
The Myth of the Birth of the Hero 
We may perhaps agree with Lieberman that Rank's book The Myth of the Birth of the 
Hero (Rank, (1964) [1914]) is no more than: `in large part like an encylopaedia of myths' 
(Lieberman, 1985: 89). This is true, but notwithstanding Lieberman's comments, Rank 
makes a significant contribution to the myths surrounding the birth of the hero by 
developing Freud's paper on the family romance. For example, Lieberman understands 
that the hero myth, with royal and humble parents, is the family romance played 
backwards. Instead of being cut off from good parents and brought up by bad ones, the 
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hero is cruelly exposed at birth and then rescued (Lieberman, 1985). Without 
multiplying the emblematic of incest any further than necessary, Rank does point out that 
the rescue theme, as a disguise for incestual phantasy, involves the actual `rescue' of the 
parent, acting as a disguise for the act of incest. 
Lieberman describes the use of a standard myth pattern for the myth of the birth of the 
hero and this is used extensively and in a variety of forms by Rank in The Myth of the 
Birth of the Hero. It provides a template that together with the Oedipus complex creates 
a psychoanalytic base of motivation in early childhood and later in adolescence. This 
skeletal outline is paraphrased as follows. The hero is the child of distinguished parents, 
usually royal. His origins begin with great difficulties. However, during or before the 
pregnancy there is some form of prophecy -a dream or oracle. This is always a 
warning against the child's birth, and threatening danger to the father or his 
representative. The child is cast into water in a box of some kind. Then he is rescued by 
animals or shepherds and is weaned by humble folk. After he attains adulthood he 
`discovers' distinguished parents. He takes revenge on his father and is himself declared 
king (Lieberman, 1985). 
This is the skeletal outline found by Rank in a variety of myths in his Myth of the Birth of 
the Hero. In this, we detect the core myth upon which so many birth myths are based. 
But do we not also detect Freud's Family Romance as the core and motivation of this 
birth myth? Cannot we detect in this core myth, early myth makers around a camp fire, 
creating for young and old a myth that encapsulates their own youth, with the nuclear 
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complex of Oedipus and the Family Romance stitched in to the fabric of their mythic 
narrative? In other words, their epic structure is based upon their own oedipal material 
re-accentuated at the level of phantasy in puberty. If we take on one hand Freud's 
Oedipus complex and on the other hand his Family Romance which constellates the 
pattern, then it is possible, in the myth makers, to detect the retroactive return of the 
repressed, in the skeletal outline of the core birth myth of the hero. Once Freud's latency 
period of childhood is over, the earlier sexual experiences and phantasies of early 
childhood are re-cast in another mould. As Freud said variously, like a nation, the child 
re-vamps its past in epic proportions in the unconscious. 
Thus it is we discover, glistening, Freud's oedipal crown. The gem of the individual 
Oedipus, set in the crown of the re-accentuated family complex, underlines the 
motivation of the myth makers of antiquity, as well as the individual, all dominated by 
oedipal tensions and the family romance. The individual and the myth are steeped in 
these oedipal tensions. By commencing with the Freudian Oedipus complex, and 
developing ideas concerning his complex of the myth of the family romance, we can 
begin to locate the basic elements of Freud's thought on a psychoanalytic plane that 
involved Rank's transposition of them on to the literary plane. 
We begin to understand that all of this is not simple in the collision between the oceans of 
psychoanalysis on one hand, and literature on the other. The swirling torrents and 
churned up matter that are involved have one struggling against the deeper currents on 
one hand and surface waves on the other. However, before we get caught in these peaks 
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and troughs of experience, we may observe another comment by Freud that seems to 
position both ideas concerning Oedipus and relating to the family complex. Freud said: 
We forget how high are the intellectual achievements and how complicated the emotional 
impulses of which a child of some four years is capable, and we ought to be positively 
astonished that the memory of later years has as a rule preserved so little of these mental 
processes, especially as we have every reason to suppose that these same forgotten 
childhood achievements have not, as might be thought, slipped away without leaving 
their mark on the subject's development, but have exercised a determining influence for 
the whole of his later life. And in spite of this unique efficacy they have been forgotten! 
(SE VI: 46) 
Jensen's Gradiva and Freud 
We turn our attention now to Freud's own work: Delusions and Dreams in Jensen's 
Gradiva. (SE. IX: 3-95). In the summer of 1906, Freud was writing a study of Jensen's 
Gradiva. Wilhelm Jensen, (1837-1911) was a North German playwright and novelist. In 
the October of the same year, Otto Rank presented papers on the `Incest Theme' to the 
Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. Freud's study was published in May, 1907, and soon 
after its publication, Freud sent a copy to Jensen. Delusions and Dreams in Jensen's 
Gradiva (SE. IX: 3-95) was, in fact, Freud's first published analysis of a work of 
literature, apart, of course, from his comments on Oedipus Rex and Hamlet in The 
Interpretation of Dreams. As part of the background to Freud's analysis of the Gradiva 
we note the following: 
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Apart from the deeper significance which Freud saw in Jensen's work, there is no doubt 
that he must have been specially attracted by the scene in which it was laid. His interest 
in Pompeii [scene in the Gradiva] was an old-established one. It appears more than once 
in his correspondence with Fliess. 
Above all, Freud was fascinated by the analogy between the historical fate of Pompeii 
(its burial and subsequent excavation) and the mental events with which he was so 
familiar - burial by repression and excavation by analysis. (SE. IX [Editor's Note] 4-5). 
In this comment we see that Freud finds the analogy intriguing, his fascination with 
Pompeii, and its obvious connection with the process of excavation that takes place when 
one explores the dark continent of the unconscious. Prior to Freud of course it was the 
`Heart of Darkness'. Did not Freud numerously describe himself also as a conquistador? 
This setting a scene, a space for the unconscious, is of course in itself intriguing. And it 
does leave one wondering about the space and shape of the unconscious. Consider also 
the following: 
Embedded in the discussion of the Gradiva, indeed, there lies not only a summary of 
Freud's explanation of dreams but also what is perhaps the first of his semi-popular 
accounts of his theory of the neuroses and of the therapeutic action of psychoanalysis. 
(SE. IX: Ibid. ) 
So what precisely is Freud's methodology in his analysis of the Gradiva and how does it 
differ from Rank's analysis? Freud wonders if the dreams, delusions, and phantasies 
created by Jensen submit to the construction of dreams, delusions, and phantasies 
outlined in 
his Tiw Interpretation of Dreams. In a sense, he wishes to test whether or not 
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Jensen has constructed the `reality' of dream and delusional formation. Freud finds that 
Jensen has, in fact, obeyed the `rules' outlined in The Interpretation of Dreams. We now 
check what Freud himself had to say about this: 
It is far from being generally believed that dreams have a meaning and can be interpreted. 
Science and the majority of educated people smile if they are set the task of interpreting a 
dream. Only the common people, who cling to superstitions and who on this point are 
carrying on the convictions of antiquity, continue to insist that dreams can be interpreted. 
The author of The Interpretation of Dreams has ventured, in the face of the reproaches of 
strict science, to become a partisan of antiquity and superstition. (SE. IX: 7) 
The Interpretation of Dreams 
From this we can see that Freud's methodology in Gradiva consists of `embedding' the 
Gradiva text within the frame of his Interpretation of Dreams. As we draw a certain 
subtlety from the Gradiva, we note Freud's own comment in the Gradiva study relating to 
its characters: 
My readers will no doubt have been puzzled to notice that so far I have treated Norbert 
Hanold [hero] and Zoe Bertgang [female hero], in all their mental manifestations and 
activities, as though they were real people and not the author's creations, as though the 
author's mind were an absolutely transparent medium and not a refractive or obscuring 
one. And my procedure must seem all the more puzzling since the author has expressly 
renounced the portrayal of reality by calling his story a `phantasy'. We have found, 
however, that all his descriptions are so faithfully copied from reality that we should not 
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object if Gradiva were described not as a phantasy but as a psychiatric study. (SE. IX: 
41). 
It is as well to point out, even at this early stage, that the problem of `I' and the `Other', 
in terms of the literary text, have to be understood in terms of their dialogic 
interrelationships. We understand that Rank and Freud have both missed the problem of 
`the other' in the literary text. It is not possible to ignore these interrelationships if one 
wishes to analyse any literary text and its contextualization. It is on the plane of their 
intersubjectivity that these relationships have to be understood. So it would not just be a 
problem of psychoanalytic motivation in the author or his hero, but all the levels of 
intersubjectivity that these relationships involve. We discuss these problems more fully 
in the next chapter, but hold them in one hand whilst exploring Freud's own text with the 
other. We check now Freud's own words on his methodology in his paper on the 
Gradiva. 
There are two methods that we might adopt for this enquiry. One would be to enter 
deeply into a particular case, into the dream-creations of our author in one of his works. 
The other would be to bring together all the examples that could be found of the use of 
dreams in the works of different authors. The second method would seem to be far more 
effective and perhaps the only justifiable one, for it frees us at once from the difficulties 
involved in adopting the artificial concept of `writers' as a class. (SE. IX: Ibid. ) 
Freud continues by telling us: ' In spite of this, however, these pages will be devoted to 
an enquiry of the first sort' (Ibid. ). It is possible, in the above comment by Freud, to infer 
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that Rank adopts the second method in his theory of literary criticism whereas, as we see, 
Freud himself prefers the category that involves `adopting the artificial concept of 
"writers" as a class'. This methodology frees Freud to analyse the text in terms of the 
interweaving of phantasies of the hero - based on premises made in The Interpretation 
of Dreams - on a plane constituting psychoanalytic `reality', without having to fulfil the 
need of empirism, which became the cross that Rank had to bear. 
In discussing Freud's methodology, we need to take note of the following. Freud's own 
original sortie into the field of literary criticism begins with his discovery of the incest 
theme in early childhood and he thus discovers the theme interwoven in Sophocles' 
Oedipus Rex. In Die Richterin, Freud interweaves the sibling incest theme as a form of 
the `Family Romance'. So thus far we have: the parental imago of incest in early 
childhood, re-accentuated as an adolescent or pubertal reflection of the earlier parental 
complex in Die Richterin. Shakespeare's Hamlet (analysis by Freud) interweaves the 
disguised form of incest. Gradiva, develops the theme of the brother/sister pair already 
established in Die Richterin. 
Conclusion 
Contrasting Rank's methodology with that of Freud enables us to now interpret certain 
characteristics of the work of both men. Rank identifies, through the use of 
psychoanalytic mechanisms, incest as the core and model of Freud's original schema at 
that particular time; thus he develops a theory of literary criticism, literary theory, and 
literary creativity as immersed and continuously implicated in Freud's incest motif. 
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Freud's methodology differs inasmuch as he never relies solely upon Freudian 
mechanisms himself. In other words, Rank relies upon `Freudian' mechanisms for his 
literary theory, whereas Freud himself does not just rely on his own mechanisms. He 
continuously extrapolates upon his own themes. 
So the difference is that Freud always picks up a loose thread from a previous motif and 
interweaves this thread into a new garment and so on. However, the two men do have the 
same methodological weaknesses in one very particular sense. And here we take up the 
previously mentioned problem of failing to `triangulate' the relationship between the 
writer, the plot, and the reader. In both Rank and Freud the finer-nuancing of the 
interrelationship between the writer, the text and the reader is an opportunity missed. 
These relationships appear to be, in Rank and Freud, welded together somehow with the 
flux of psychoanalytic theory. The weld will not hold. If one pursues it, any vibration 
will tear these relations apart. If we wish to understand this interrelationship of 
writer/text/ reader, then we must explore more deeply the field of literary theory, and 
these interrelationships. 
To achieve this, we contextualize these relationships within literary theory and 
philosophy of language developed by the Russian scholar and linguist Mikhail 
Mikhailovich Bakhtin. In the next chapter, the cross-currents of Freudian libido theory 
collide with the contra-currents of Bakhtinian language libido. And, just as Freud does 
not find one current flowing in one direction in the mind, so too, Bakhtin does not find 
one current flowing in one direction in language. So it is then that we have cast ourselves 
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into the swirling vortex of Freud's early discoveries. In this maelstrom of activity we 
have Freud's base, the core and model of incest and the character Oedipus. To which we 
now intend to add elements of the extensive oeuvre of Bakhtin. It is in this narrow 
corridor of dialogic interaction that we begin to build our case, and discuss the heavily 
guarded approaches to fragmented speech. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
FREUD AND BAKHTIN: COLLISION IN THE UNCONSCIOUS 
Introduction 
In our first chapter, we saw that the problem that Rank and Freud missed, in the 
literary text, but in fact Bakhtin lights upon, is the problem of `the other'. In this 
chapter we shall address the problem not only of the Freudian unconscious but 
also the problem of `the other' and its interrelationship with the Freudian 
unconscious, from certain key dialogic angles. In the first chapter, the rules of 
engagement paralleled the aims and purposes of Rank and Freud in some ways. 
Perhaps we should explain the use of the term rules of engagement here. The 
rules of engagement are self-imposed by us and are cast on the plane of the 
dialogic encounter between Freud and Bakhtin. 
In some ways, we allowed Rank and Freud to provide the impetus or drive-shaft 
for the first chapter. This was, in a sense, inevitable because we situated 
ourselves within the historical apperceptive background of our major aim - the 
discovery of fragmented speech in the unconscious. In this chapter, we shall deal 
with the problem that naturally arises as a result of the first, namely, the problem 
of the existence, nature, and `positionality' of the unconscious and the problem of 
the other' left vacant by Rank. Crucially, we shall deal with the Freudian 
unconscious, and its potential rules of engagement with the philosophy of 
language, and particularly the Bakhtinian philosophy of language. 
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Thus it is that we have two specific aims. First, we shall need a rough working 
hypothesis of the Freudian unconscious for the rest of this dissertation; so we 
outline some key elements of Freud's definition of the unconscious. In fact, what 
we have done is to give ourselves an angle of approach to the unconscious, rather 
than an interpretation of it. Secondly, we need to understand Bakhtin's possible 
interpretation of the Freudian unconscious, his response to it, and the possible 
existence of a `subtle polemic' in Bakhtin, as a possible counter-statement to the 
Freudian unconscious. 
The Freudian Unconscious 
Between April 4th - April 23rd, 1915, Freud produced a paper entitled: The 
Unconscious (SE. XIV: 161). In the Editor's Note written by James Strachey, we 
come to understand that: `The concept of there being unconscious mental 
processes is of course one that is fundamental to psycho-analytic theory' (SE. 
XIV: 161-162). Freud himself opened his paper with the observation: 
We have learnt from psycho-analysis that the essence of the process of 
repression, lies, not in putting an end to, in annihilating, the idea which 
represents an instinct, but in preventing it from becoming conscious. (SE. XIV: 
166. ). 
Freud said, and it is one of our first markers, a salient point: 
lt is necessary because the data of consciousness have a very large number of 
gaps in them; both in healthy and in sick people psychical acts often occur 
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which can be explained only by presupposing other acts, of which, nevertheless, 
consciousness affords no evidence. (Ibid. ). 
It is these gaps in the data of consciousness that intrigue Freud. In these gaps in 
the conscious discourse, Freud detects an underworld, a second discourse within, 
and external to, the conscious discourse. In The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud 
discovered his Royal Road to the unconscious, through his analysis of manifest 
and latent dream content, and his discovery of the underlying dream thought. 
Most importantly, Freud discovered that the unconscious speaks, this was Freud's 
great discovery in The Interpretation of Dreams. The dream is the utterance of 
the unconscious and we shall later develop this idea to discover a newer meaning 
of utterance, thanks to the work of the Russian linguist, Mikhail Mikhailovich 
Bakhtin. At any rate, the discovery that the unconscious speaks, is, Freud's great 
achievement. 
We must, I think, be quite clear on some of these points, if we are to discover a 
`Freudian Bakhtin' or for that matter a `Bakhtinian Freud' in the initial stages of 
our search for fragmented speech. We hypothesize that it is by no means certain 
that Bakhtin rejected the Freudian unconscious out of hand, as we shall argue 
later. However, this next statement, by Freud, is quite crucial for our 
understanding of the dialogization of the unconscious and its later application to 
our dissertation. Also in the following statements, Freud leads us to his 
conceptualization of a `second consciousness' and it is thus that we interconnect 
\vith aspects of the Bakhtinian conceptualization of the `second consciousness' or 
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the problem of `the other'. We now trace the path followed by Freud heading 
toward his concept of the 'second consciousness'. 
First, however, it needs to be noted that we do not necessarily imply that the 
concept of the `second consciousness' draws Freud and Bakhtin, in terms of 
psychoanalysis on the one hand, and Bakhtin's philosophy of language on the 
other hand, on to the same plane. However, the move does allow us to develop an 
idea of the `second consciousness' of the Subject and the possible inference of the 
`second consciousness', namely of `the other', as it were entwined through 
Freud's conceptualisation of the conscious and unconscious forces. In other 
words it allows us to think of the `positionality' of the unconscious and its 
interrelationship with the problem of the 'other'. We need to recall that any 
incursion into the field of literary theory, in fact requires a conceptualisation of 
the other'. We check now where this is heading, again with Freud: 
The assumption of an unconscious is, moreover, a perfectly legitimate one, 
inasmuch as in postulating it we are not departing a single step from our 
customary and generally accepted mode of thinking. Consciousness makes each 
of us aware only of his own states of mind; that other people too, possess a 
consciousness is an inference which we draw by analogy from their observable 
utterances and actions, in order to make this behaviour of theirs intelligible to 
us. (SE. XIV: 169). 
Here we see where Freud is heading, that `I' possess a consciousness may be a 
fact to myself, or I, for-m. iself, but that someone else possesses a consciousness 
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similar to mine is problematic. Freud now explains quite clearly, precisely what 
this implies for the concept of consciousness. He says: 
But even where the original inclination to identification has withstood 
criticism -that is, when the `others' are our fellow men -the assumption of a 
consciousness in them rests upon an inference and cannot share the immediate 
certainty which we have of our own consciousness. 
Psychoanalysis demands nothing more than that we should apply this process of 
inference to ourselves also -a proceeding to which, it is true, we are not 
constitutionally inclined. If we do this we must say: all the acts and 
manifestations which I notice in myself and do not know how to link up with the 
rest of my mental life must be judged as if they belonged to someone else: they 
are to be explained by a mental life ascribed to this other person. (SE. XIV: 
169). 
Freud makes it clear that one's recognition that the other too may have a 
consciousness similar to one's own is an inference one draws, by analogy, from 
the other's utterances and actions. However, as Freud stresses `I' can have no 
`immediate certainty' that the other too possesses a consciousness. It is by 
inference that `I' do this. Freud leads us to understand that if `I' am prepared, 
through inference, to accept that the other has a consciousness similar to my own, 
which is nevertheless an assumption, then why cannot `I' apply the same principle 
to myself? May I not infer that 1' too may have a `second consciousness'? 
Freud, clarifies the situation again: 
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This process of inference, when applied to oneself in spite of internal opposition, 
does not, however, lead to the disclosure of an unconscious; it leads logically to 
the assumption of another, second consciousness which is united in one's self 
with the consciousness one knows. But at this point, certain criticisms may 
fairly be made. In the first place, a consciousness of which its own possessor 
knows nothing is something very different from a consciousness belonging to 
another person, and it is questionable whether such a consciousness, lacking, as 
it does, its most important characteristic, deserves any discussion at all. (SE. 
XIV: 170). 
We take especial note here of Freud's comment of a `second consciousness', 
which is `united in one's self. No mention here of the duality of the Cs. and the 
Ucs. Freud clearly states that there is a second consciousness. However, 
presumably in order to placate the scientific establishment, he has to follow-up by 
saying that we cannot say that it is a second consciousness because how can one 
speak of a consciousness of which one is unaware? Obviously, it is a 
contradiction in terms. However, Freud, at least it seems to us, is in no doubt that 
we have a `second consciousness'. And, as he says, a consciousness of which I 
am unaware is hardly likely to be a consciousness at all. 
Hence the unfortunate term sun' conscious. The second consciousness is 
hampered considerably by the term `un', which does not adequately describe the 
second consciousness. Hopefully, by this point we have grasped an outline of 
Freud's concept of the unconscious. Enough at least to provide us with the earlier 
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mentioned working hypothesis of the Freudian unconscious, an angle of approach 
on the unconscious allowing us to position the fragmented speech image and 
fragmented body image as a correlate, in due course. 
Repression - Revisited 
It is impossible to ignite the Freudian Ucs. without simultaneously linking in his 
mechanism of repression. In his paper on Repression (SE. XIV: 143). Freud 
provides us with another working hypothesis, at least another approach, thus 
enabling us later to detect fragmented speech and the fragmented word, in the 
unconscious. Freud's concept of repression, lighted upon in the first chapter, was 
initially comprehended through the clinical phenomenon of resistance, which in 
its own turn was discovered through Freud's own technical innovation, which 
included the abandonment of hypnosis in the cathartic treatment of hysteria. As 
so often occurs, Freud's opening lines sear the page. His paper on repression is 
no exception. We have: 
One of the vicissitudes an instinctual impulse may undergo is to meet resistances 
which seek to make it inoperative. Under certain conditions ... the 
impulse then 
passes into the state of `repression'. (SE. XIV: 146). 
He continues: `At some later period, rejection based on judgement 
(condemnation) will be found to be a good method to adopt against an instinctual 
impulse'. (Ibid. ). And importantly he adds: `A necessary condition of its 
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happening must clearly be that the instincts attainment of its aim should produce 
unpleasure instead of pleasure' (Ibid. ). 
Freud teaches that the satisfaction of an instinct under repression is possible but 
that it is irreconcilable with other claims and intentions. As our claim for the 
existence in the unconscious of a fragmented body and fragmented word image 
rests upon an assumption of a psychic mechanism of repression, we identify the 
outline of the concept. To reinforce this point Freud says: ' Under the influence 
of the study of the psychoneuroses, which brings before us the important effects 
of repression, we are inclined to overvalue their psychological bearing and to 
forget too readily that repression does not hinder the instinctual representative 
from continuing to exist in the unconscious'. (SE. XIV: 148-149). With these 
short comments upon the Freudian theory of repression, hopefully we have 
installed the basic parameters that we need to outline, providing us with, up to this 
point, a basic working hypothesis of the Freudian unconscious, or as we say at 
least an angle of approach upon it. With these outlines in place we turn our 
attention now to Bakhtin's possible `subtle polemic' against the Freudian 
unconscious. 
Bakhtin's Ambiguity and Ambivalence 
In terms of Bakhtinian analysis, we seem immediately to stumble upon a problem. 
How did Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin view the Freudian unconscious? At first 
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sight the problem seems fairly straightforward. The book, Freudianism, by 
Volosinov (V. N. Volosinov, 1976) may have been largely written by Bakhtin. It 
is, however, quite easy to be seduced by the assumption that Freudianism 
provides a linchpin between Bakhtin and Freud, but does it? In the books that are 
known to be written by Bakhtin, is there any direct mention, let alone critique of 
Freud? Is it possible that Freudianism is a red herring - graveyard for the 
unwary. In pursuit of our enquiry we check a letter from Bakhtin himself to 
Kozhinov. The letter, dated 10 January, 1961, reads: 
The books The Formal Method and Marxism and the Philosophy of Language 
are very well known to me. V. N. Volosinov and P. N. Medvedev were my 
friends; in the period when these books were being written we worked in the 
closest creative contact. Furthermore, these books and my book on Dostoevsky 
are based on a shared conception of language and speech. In this respect V. V. 
Vinogradov [the source of the information for Kozhinov] is completely right. I 
should point out that the presence of a shared conception and contact in work 
does not diminish the self-sufficiency and originality of any of these books. As 
for the other works of P. N. Medvedev and V. N. Voloshinov, they lie on a 
different plane and do not reflect our shared conception, and I did not play any 
part in their creation. (Hirschkop, 1999: 129). 
This comment by Bakhtin himself would seem to indicate that Freudianism: A 
Marxist Critique by Volosinov is on `a different plane' to Bakhtin's thought and 
that he did not play any part in [its] creation'. Again, this would seem to indicate 
that Bakhtin himself played very little part in the authorship of Freudianism and 
48 
perhaps we need to look elsewhere to discover Bakhtin's attitude to Freud. If one 
dismisses Freudianism as a text written by Bakhtin it appears, initially at least, as 
if a vacuum is left in Bakhtin's point of view on Freud. Without the Freudianism 
book, there appears to be both ambiguity and ambivalence present in Bakhtin's 
scant references to Freud in his major signed works. If this ambiguity and 
ambivalence are taken into account, it is entirely possible that Bakhtin himself did 
not reject the Freudian unconscious out of hand. It is on this axis of ambiguity 
and ambivalence that we begin to build our case. 
Bakhtin's Resistance 
In The Problem of the Text by Bakhtin, we find the following relevant comment: 
The problem of the limits of the text. The text as utterance. The problem of the 
functions of the text and textual genres. 
Two aspects that define the text as an utterance: its plan (intention) and the 
realization of this plan. The dynamic interrelations of these aspects, their 
struggle, which determine the nature of the text. Their divergence can reveal a 
great deal ..... Freudian slips of the tongue and slips of the pen 
(expression of 
the unconscious). Change of the plan in the process of its realization. Failure to 
fulfil the phonetic intention. (Bakhtin, 1986: 104). 
Although of course the above comment by Bakhtin (taken from his notes, hence 
the fragmented style) do not provide justification that Bakhtin accepted the 
Freudian unconscious. They do at least indicate, however, that Bakhtin himself 
was prepared at that point to accept the possibility of the Freudian mental space 
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and its effect on dialogicality. To build an image of this ambiguity and 
ambivalence toward Freud in Bakhtin, we take note of a few scant references to 
Freud's extensive oeuvre in Bakhtin's major works. The first: 
Forces that lie outside consciousness, externally (mechanically) defining it: from 
environment and violence to miracle, mystery, and authentic freedom, and 
personality is destroyed. There among these forces, must one also consign the 
unconscious (the `id'). (Bakhtin, 1984b: Appendix 11: 297) 
In this comment, Bakhtin states clearly that the `unconscious (the "id") is a force 
that lies outside consciousness. And he counterposes to it `authentic freedom'. In 
the following quotes we shall be able to identify both Bakhtin's ambiguity and his 
ambivalence toward the unconscious. In order to float perception, however, at the 
level of unconscious and conscious forces, we need to examine more closely 
Bakhtin's relationship to the Freudian unconscious. In `The Bakhtin Circle's 
Freud: From Positivism to Hermeneutics', Pirog's opening lines allow us pause 
for thought. `Bakhtin's writings are at the centre of the two interrelated or 
perhaps parallel and still unsettled issues: the relation of the individual ego to 
intersubjectivity and the connection between thought and language' (Pirog, 1987: 
591). In this statement, Pirog allows for a certain speculation on our part. 
Following Pirog's own point, we may ask: To what extent is Freud's project, from 
the beginning, an example of intersubjectivity? In order, at least in part, to 
answer this, we check another comment by Pirog: 
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This same mutuality of understanding is the ideal goal which founds Bakhtin's 
anthropology and which precludes any concern for the private or subjective in so 
far as he considers them external to the `dialogic nature of language' (DN 273). 
More importantly, Bakhtin does not deny the existence of something like the 
unconscious but considers it destructive of a person's authentic freedom 
(Bakhtin, 1984b: 297) in so far as it separates him or her from a genuine dialogic 
relationship that could in fact constitute this freedom (Pirog, 1987: 603). 
So, according to Pirog, Bakhtin does not deny the existence of `something like the 
unconscious'. We have already noted the quotation from The Problems of 
Dostoevsky's Poetics, Appendix II, but we shall remind ourselves of it shortly. 
Meanwhile, we check another remark from Bakhtin: 
The attempt to understand the interaction with another's word by means of 
psychoanalysis and the `collective unconscious'. What psychologists (mainly 
psychiatrists) disclose existed at one time; it was retained in the unconscious (if 
only the collective unconscious) and was fixed in the memories of languages, 
genres, and rituals; from here it penetrates into the speech and dreams (related, 
consciously recalled) of people (who have a particular psychic constitution and 
are in a particular state). The role of psychology and of the so-called 
psychology of culture (Bakhtin, 1986: 144). 
The reference here to the `collective unconscious', is possibly (Bakhtin does not 
make the derivation clear) from Dostoevsky's Diary of a Writer. Caryl Emerson 
says, with reference to Dostoevsky: `... and several entries in Diary of a Writer 
profess sympathy not only for an unconscious but also a collective national 
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unconscious' (Emerson, 1991: 38). We assume this to be the case, rather than 
Jung's conceptualization of the collective unconscious. 
It is important to note Bakhtin's statement in From Notes Made in 1970-71 
(Bakhtin, 1986). If we compare this statement with Bakhtin's comments dated 
1961 we divine a substantial difference. In the Appendix II we have: `Forces that 
lie outside consciousness ... among these forces, must one also consign the 
unconscious (the `id')' - as we have seen. And then (written in 1971): `The 
attempt to understand the interaction with another's word by means of 
psychoanalysis and the `collective unconscious' ... Added to which we consider 
the previously recalled comment: `Freudian slips of the tongue and slips of the 
pen (expression of the unconscious)' (Bakhtin, 1986: 104). The earlier comments 
on the unconscious could of course conceivably have been based on non-Freudian 
assumptions concerning the unconscious, but the latter comment certainly could 
not 
Curiouser and curiouser. There is an intriguing ambiguity and ambivalence in all 
of these statements connected to a conception of the unconscious, but we still do 
not seem to have discovered Bakhtin's position vis-a-vis the unconscious. So is it 
external, is it internal, is it destructive of freedom, does it lie outside 
consciousness, what precisely is the dialogic angle on the unconscious in 
Bakhtin's works? Or perhaps he just objects to Freud's style of thought? 
Bakhtin, the fox, knew we think, precisely what he was doing. His cluster of 
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images surrounding the unconscious seems paradoxical, ambiguous and 
ambivalent. 
Bakhtinian Freud or Freudian Bakhtin? 
To discover the `Bakhtinian Freud', we must concur with Caryl Emerson when it 
is stated that: `It must be emphasized at the outset that this image of a `Bakhtinian 
Freud' has nothing to do with the well-known polemic against Freudianism 
written in 1927 by Bakhtin's friend and associate Valentin Voloshinov' 
(Emerson, 1991: 33). This statement assists our move away from the image of 
Freudianism, as somehow being the work of Bakhtin. We also find agreement 
with: `For Bakhtin, the problem of the self was not strictly a psychological 
problem but more broadly and loosely a philosophical one' (Morson and 
Emerson, 1990: 174). We counterpose this with a comment by Strachey: `It 
should be made clear at once, however, that Freud's interest in the assumption 
[the unconscious] was never a philosophical one - though, no doubt, 
philosophical problems inevitably lay just round the corner. His interest was a 
practical one' (SE. XIV: 162). However, some attempt will be made to 
hypothesize a psychoanalytic philosophic plane that, hopefully, will be of use, for 
this field of course is a genre in its own right. At any rate, we should also note: 
Beyond these differences in spirit and tone, we may note one other crucial 
difference between Bakhtin's and Freud's many approaches to the mind. 
Bakhtin's theories studiously avoid invoking an unconscious as Freud 
understood it (Morson and Emerson, 1990: 175). 
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We are not so sure of this, for the following reasons. (1) Bakhtin would have had 
considerable difficulty, ideologically, in the Soviet Union, justifying any 
validation of Freud's work, on whatever level. (2) There is `evidence' to suggest, 
we shall explain shortly, that Bakhtin did, at least unofficially, encompass and 
endorse the Freudian unconscious and Freud's various mechanisms. This 
evidence' is present in Bakhtin's Rabelais and His World (Bakhtin, 1984a) to be 
discussed in the next chapter. However, we may wish to note the following: 
Bakhtin's work on Rabelais was submitted for a degree at the Gorky Institute in 
1946. Hirschkop tells us that: 
The Zhdanovite ideological offensive of the late 1940s put paid to any lingering 
prospects of the higher award [degree of Doctor of Science] in 1947 an unsigned 
(and therefore editorially endorsed) article in the cultural press attacked the 
Gorky Institute in general, and Bakhtin's thesis in particular for its `anti- 
scientific' and `Freudian' orientation (Hirschkop, 1999: 185). 
Perhaps this criticism levelled against Bakhtin for his `Freudian orientation' was 
not, in fact, entirely unjustified. Apart from the often-considered socio- 
ideological levels of this work, we believe that Bakhtin also expresses the 
Freudian unconscious, and certain Freudian mechanisms. In addition to this, 
Rabelais and His World also expresses the nature of the problem of the ego and 
Freud's discovery of oral, anal, and genital phases within human development. It 
also expresses the problem of the Freudian censor and most importantly a 'theory' 
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of the instincts set against a cultural and artistic backdrop. However, continuing 
we find: 
When Freud describes a conflict between the conscious and the unconscious, 
Volosinov (in the 1920s) and Bakhtin (in the 1920s and 1930s) describe a 
complex dialogue among the numerous, diverse, socially heteroglot voices 
present in inner speech. Basically their contention is that thinkers turn to an 
unconscious when they have an extraordinarily impoverished idea of 
consciousness. (Morson and Emerson, 1990: 175). 
At this stage we merely hold on to the idea of `socially heteroglot voices present 
in inner speech' as a possible Bakhtinian counterstatement to the Freudian 
unconscious. Perhaps Freud's lost paper on Consciousness may have helped in 
clarifying some of these matters. It is not unimportant that Bakhtin himself was 
fascinated by Freud's work, which of course does not suggest compliance, or that 
he endorsed Freud's ideas. In Hirschkop's book, we have the following quote of 
an interview with Bakhtin: 
Bocharov has confirmed the first claim and added in his report of another 
conversation[with Bakhtin] from 1974: 
Bocharov. Mikhail Mikhailovich, may be at some time you were enthused by 
Marxism? 
Bakhtin. No, never. I was interested, as in many other things, in Freudianism, 
even spiritualism. But I was never a Marxist to any degree. (Hirschkop, 1999: 
132, note > 1). 
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We note this not because it validates a Freudian Bakhtin, but it does indicate a 
profound interest, if, under those particular circumstances and in that particular 
setting and context, Freud was the first name that arrived on his lips. It is a 
premise here that Bakhtin had a deep and enduring interest in the work of Freud, 
and it is compelling to understand that in spite of this he neither mentioned 
directly (other than our exceptions) nor directly critiqued Freud's extensive 
oeuvre in his major works. Again we note: `In the 1920s, Bakhtin did not engage 
in direct debate with psychologists and psychoanalysts - as did Volosinov - 
because, for him, the problem of the self was not strictly a psychological problem 
but more broadly a philosophical one .... Bakhtin detected something "non- 
evaluative" and "causal" about psychology - something, as he puts it, that was 
opposed to the "soul" which was individual and free'. (Emerson, 1991: 34) 
Although one notes with interest this observation by Bakhtin, we have to 
remember by way of counter-statement that Freud had devoted himself to the cure 
of mental illness. Continuing, so that we may further position ourselves with 
respect to the Freudian unconscious and the possible Bakhtinian response to it, we 
note another comment by Emerson: 
To be sure, Bakhtin - like his associate Voloshinov and like their 
contemporary, the developmental psychologist Lev Vygotsky - did not believe 
(and who ever has) that we are fully aware of the implications of our actions, 
and that everything we do emerges in a controlled fashion from the centre of our 
attention. But rather than invoke an unconscious, these Russian thinkers were 
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more likely to turn to the dynamics of memory and habit. Most important, they 
resisted the notion of a separate and inaccessible structure out of which our 
impulses, fears and surprises emerge, and argued for a richer and more varied 
picture of consciousness (Emerson, 1991: 35). 
The important point here is that, in fact, Freud divines gaps in the conscious 
discourse that clinical practice has to account for. There is certainly, in 
psychopathology, a lack in the conscious discourse. This is where Freud positions 
the unconscious, in the space, lack and gaps left blank in consciousness. Taking 
Emerson's last point, if it is true that `... they resisted the notion of a separate and 
inaccessible structure of which our impulses, fears and surprises emerge' then this 
would seem to be the end of the matter, but Bakhtin does not seem to have 
rejected the concept of the unconscious, and it is the significant `shape' of the 
unconscious where Bakhtin provides so much assistance. Bakhtin may help us to 
discover, consciously or unconsciously, the `positionality' of the unconscious. 
The Link: Freud with Bakhtin 
Before we move on to a possible Bakhtinian statement of the `second 
consciousness', we need to make the following, totally invaluable, comment by 
Freud himself that acts in our opinion as a link between Freud and Bakhtin: 
It is a general truth that our mental activity moves in two opposite directions: 
either it starts from the instincts and passes through the system Ucs. to conscious 
thought-activity; or, beginning with an instigation from outside, it passes 
57 
through the system Cs. And Pcs. till it reaches the Ucs. cathexes of the ego and 
objects. (SE. XIV: 204) 
If, for a moment, we ignore the abhorrence that Bakhtin may have felt for Freud's 
genre-specific use of the word system, there is a vital connection here between 
Freud and Bakhtin. If we refer, in the above, to Freud's phrase ' from outside', to 
what precisely does it relate? If the first thing this `instigation' from the `outside' 
reaches is the system Cs. then it would seemingly approach from the external 
world. So we have, on the one hand, mental activity that may derive from the 
instinctual field in the unconscious, or, on the other hand `instigated' from the 
outside it passes through the system Cs. and Pcs. and on through to the Ucs. In 
this quote from Freud, although it is nowhere explicitly stated, on the planes of 
the inner world and the outer world, we must surely assume certain facts? There 
has to be (a) an image of the body, in relation to the instinctual field and inner 
world and outer world experience; and (b) there has to be an image of language, 
however rudimentary, in relation to inner world and outer world, that is, at least, if 
one wishes to cross the threshold between inner and outer experience. 
Admittedly, we have made assumptions that Freud did not make, but it is, we 
think, a valuable hypothesis. We hypothesize this as a condition, but 
notwithstanding this remark, we may now refer back to our earlier comment about 
the Freudian unconscious and attempt to place it within the context of the image 
of the body and the image of language. For, it is undoubtedly true that the 
conceptualisation of the unconscious is, in Freud, the other. If we have in 
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Freud's work a `second consciousness', which he nominates as the unconscious, 
where do we locate a second consciousness, `the other' or its possibility in the 
work of Mikhail Mikhailovich? 
The Body - Crossing the Threshold 
In Bakhtin, the problem of the second consciousness is not the `double' internal 
voice of the unconscious (which, incidentally, is projected externally and crosses 
the threshold of the body) but rather the `second consciousness' of the other - 
whatever that `other' may be. This is the intersubjective field of the interplay 
between consciousnesses, at least on one level. The identification `of myself in 
Bakhtin's work requires an `echo' from the other. In Bakhtin, `I' requires an 
external image and echo of itself that can only be refracted through the prism 
provided by the other. It is in the dialogic intensity of intersubjectivity that `I' 
discover the relevance of the second consciousness, of `the other'. I must, in a 
sense, author myself from outside. We now check aspects of Mikhail 
Mikhailovich's possible reaction to a second consciousness to `the other'. 
Bakhtin sets the scene for us: 
The first matter we must consider is the exterior or outward appearance as the 
totality of all expressive, `speaking' features of the human body. How do we 
experience our exterior? And how do we experience outward appearance in the 
other? On what plane of lived experience does the aesthetic value of outward 
appearance lie? Such are the questions we shall now take up. 
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There can be no doubt, of course, that my own exterior is not part of the 
concrete, actual horizon of my seeing, except for those rare cases when, like 
Narcissus, I contemplate my own reflection in the water or in a mirror. My own 
exterior (that is, all of the expressive features of my body; without exception) is 
experienced by me from within myself. It is only in the form of scattered 
fragments, scraps, dangling on the string of my inner sensation of myself, that 
my own exterior enters the field of my outer senses, and, first of all the sense of 
vision. (Bakhtin, 1990: 27-28). 
Here we see clearly that Bakhtin tells us that `my own exterior ... 
is experienced 
by me from within myself. Bakhtin's early metaphor of the excess-of-seeing that 
`I' have concerning the `other' and the other has concerning me, is initially 
perceived through the sense of vision. My own exterior, however, is essentially 
perceived by me from within and then only as `scattered fragments', `scraps', 
`dangling on the string of my inner sensation of myself. The essential point we 
note, at least at this stage, is my inner experience and my outer experience and 
how - and this is the important point - these experiences cross the threshold of 
the body, as image. They cross the threshold of the body as image, and they cross 
the threshold of the inner and outer word as image. It is on this plane, although 
he never mentions it, that surely Freud wished us to experience the journey from 
the unconscious instinctual field through to the `outside' and also why he provides 
us with the return ticket? Freud too worked with threshold phenomena and border 
symbolism. 
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Returning to Bakhtin, however, he adds to the previous point by expressing: 
But the data provided by these outer senses do not represent an ultimate 
authority even for deciding the question of whether this body is or is not mine. 
That question is decided only by my inner self-sensation. And it is again my 
self-sensation that imparts unity to the scattered fragments of my outward 
expressedness, translating them into its own inner language. (Bakhtin, 1990: 28). 
Bakhtin clarifies this matter by adding: 
This is the case in actual perception: in the outwardly unified world that I see, 
hear and touch, I do not encounter my own outward expressedness in being as 
an outwardly unitary object among other objects, I am situated on the boundary, 
as it were, of the world I see... While my thought can place my body wholly 
into the outside world as an object among other objects, my actual seeing cannot 
do the same thing; my seeing that is, cannot come to the aid of thinking by 
providing it with an adequate outward image. (Bakhtin, 1990: 28). 
With these few comments, Bakhtin outlines a new plane of inner and outer 
dialogic potential, and casts the body as a peripheral zone of inner expressedness 
and its relationship to outward expressedness. It is in this intersubjective zone 
that Bakhtin eventually discovers the inner dialogized heteroglot voices, that 
some have seen as countermanding the Freudian unconscious. Let Bakhtin clarify 
another point, however, for us: 
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.. that is myself, I do not see at all: myself I experience from within myself. 
Even when I dream about the admiration that my exterior calls forth in others I 
do not have to represent it to myself; I represent to myself only the result of the 
impression it makes on others.... Here, too, the leading actor is not expressed 
outwardly and exists on a different plane from that of the other participants, 
while they are expressed outwardly, he is experienced from within. (Bakhtin, 
1990: 28-29). 
Even in this early philosophical work by Bakhtin, the intersubjective dialogic 
zone of intensity is apparent, and also the potential for the stratification of the 
centrifugal forces operative in language. We now check another comment by 
Mikhail Mikhailovich that, in part, simplifies the idea: 
One can of course, make the attempt to visualize one's own outward image in 
imagination, to `feel' oneself from outside, to translate oneself from the 
language of inner self-sensation into that outward expressedness in being. But 
this is far from easy to do. It requires a special and unusual effort; and this 
difficulty and effort are quite unlike those we experience when trying to recall 
the not-too-familiar and half-forgotten face of another person. What is involved 
is less a matter of having an insufficient memory of our outward appearance 
than it is a matter of a certain fundamental resistance exerted by our outward 
image. (Bakhtin, 1990: 29). 
In these introductory statements to Bakhtin's essay Author and Hero in Aesthetic 
Activity (Bakhtin, 1990), we can at least perceive the dialogic space potential of 
Bakhtin's intersubjectivity. We see, for example, how the inner and outer voice, 
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allow for inward and outward expressedness. We also see that the understanding 
of oneself involves the crossing of a threshold, and the other in fact has the excess 
of seeing that provides an `image' of ourselves. And, importantly, we have now 
involved ourselves in the world of the inner body and outer body as experience - 
and image, both on the plane of seeing and on the plane of the other, and we 
might add, on the level of the conscious and the unconscious. Later, in our work 
on Lacan, we shall have another view of the other and Other, in psychoanalytic 
terms. But at this point we are expressing the other as the problem in the 
relationship to the `text'. 
Crossing a Threshold 
However, inner speech and inward expressedness are not the unconscious. Outer 
speech and outward expressedness are not the conscious. The inner voice and the 
outer/external voice exist on a multiplicity of interpenetrating dialogic planes and 
they are internalized heteroglot voices, as Bakhtin discovered. But they are not 
the unconscious. They may be conscious phenomena of high intensity but they 
are not unconscious phenomena unless they cross a threshold. 
Paradoxically, however, they may become unconscious phenomena and maintain 
their status, if, they cross a threshold. The conscious speaks and the unconscious 
speaks but they are, to borrow from Bakhtin, not on the same drive-belt; they are 
not the same 'system', and we shall see why. They may appear as one belt in a 
figure-of-eight, but they are different drive belts nevertheless. It is suggested, that 
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as a preliminary stage to understanding this, we superimpose the images of the 
conscious and the unconscious, upon the inward and outward expressedness 
planes already outlined by Bakhtin. After all, Freud taught that the unconscious 
crosses the line, slips of the tongue, etc., and we bear in mind the Freudian 
transference. 
Bakhtin's Utterance - Initial Response 
This superimposition of images leaves inner and outer voice zones intact and the 
Freudian conscious and unconscious likewise intact but superimposed upon each 
other - as images. So that we gain some understanding of Bakhtin's work that is 
essential to this dissertation, we now outline briefly Bakhtin's use of the term 
utterance that will often `replace' aspects of the statuesque sentence in this piece. 
A clear idea of the nature of the utterance in general and of the peculiarities of 
the various types of utterances (primary and secondary), that is, of various 
speech genres, is necessary, we think, for research in any special area. To 
ignore the nature of the utterance or to fail to consider the peculiarities of 
generic subcategories of speech in any area of linguistic study leads to 
perfunctoriness and excessive abstraction, distorts the historicity of the research, 
and weakens the link between language and life. After all, language enters life 
through concrete utterances (which manifest language) and life enters language 
through concrete utterances as well. We shall approach certain areas and 
problems of the science of language in this context. (Bakhtin, 1986: 63). 
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Taking note of a further comment by Bakhtin we find: 
Each separate utterance is individual, of course, but each sphere in which 
language is used develops its own relatively stable types of these utterances. 
These we may well call speech genres. (Bakhtin, 1986: 60). 
The utterance is the basic unit of language for all the linguistic thinking of the 
Bakhtin School. The utterance is a unit of actual living speech grounded in the 
reality of a particular situation. Again we check a comment by Bakhtin: 
The difference between primary and secondary (ideological) genres is very great 
and fundamental, but this is precisely why the nature of the utterance should be 
revealed and defined through analysis of both types. Only then can the 
definition be adequate to the complex and profound nature of the utterance (and 
encompass its most important facets). A one-sided orientation toward primary 
genres inevitably leads to a vulgarisation of the entire problem (behaviourist 
linguistics is an extreme example). The very interrelations between primary and 
secondary genres and the process of the historical formation of the latter shed 
light on the nature of the utterance (and above all on the complex problem of the 
interrelations among languages, ideology, and world view). (Bakhtin, 1986: 62). 
In the above statements by Bakhtin, we have merely endorsed the Bakhtinian 
categories of the utterance and speech genres. Later we shall position ourselves 
more acutely in their concrete use. (In a fairly generalized Bakhtinian sense, we 
\vish to posit the primary genre as everyday dialogue and the secondary genre as 
literary formalised dialogic activity. Of course, this zone itself creates a dialogic 
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field of intensity). If we connect this information with the earlier mentioned 
Freudian slips of the tongue considered by Bakhtin, then we must understand that 
- and this is an early premise, the forces of the conscious and the unconscious 
must be part of the Bakhtinian utterance. 
The unconscious is not just active during sleep but operates throughout the day 
(see The Interpretation of Dreams). Of course the dream is itself an unconscious 
utterance, but obviously different inasmuch as its first pre-requisite is to withdraw 
action from the external world. In fact, as Freud never tires of mentioning 
throughout The Interpretation of Dreams, the unconscious only ever works with 
the speech act that existed in consciousness. It may use fragments and re-order 
them or regurgitate previous speeches, or symbolize them, but it will never initiate 
new dialogic interaction, it does not have the living event of speech at its disposal. 
Thus far then, we have defined a working hypothesis of Freud's forces of 
consciousness and the unconscious, and we have posited possible attitudes that 
Bakhtin may have adopted toward Freud. We have outlined a possible alternative 
to the Freudian unconscious seemingly indicated by Bakhtin, but we have retained 
the Freudian unconscious and Bakhtin's philosophy of language and ignited the 
pathway of Bakhtin's utterance and speech genres for possible future use in 
psychoanalysis and in our dissertation. In Bakhtinian terms, it is as well to 
remember perhaps that Bakhtin does not cut language as others do, he takes an 
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angle-grinding cutter to dialogic activity and cuts language at a totally new 
dialogic angle. 
The Battlefield 
It is crucial to note the unfolding of `I' and `Other' relationships present in the 
work of Bakhtin. It is the intersubjective field of dialogic intensity, where 
Bakhtin takes up arms. It is in the crossfire of dialogic arrows that he bravely 
places himself. And this, we might add, is not a structured battlefield, like real 
battle - it's a messy business. Following Bakhtin again we note: 
This difference in the experiencing of myself and the experiencing of the other 
is overcome by cognition, or, rather, cognition ignores this difference, just as it 
ignores the uniqueness of the cognising subiectum. In the unitary world of 
cognition, I cannot find a place for myself as a unique 1for-myself in distinction 
to all other human beings without exception - past, present, and future - as 
others for me. On the contrary, I know that I am just as limited a human being 
as all others, and that any other human being experiences himself essentially 
from within himself and is not embodied for himself in his own outward 
expressedness. Such cognition, however, does not provide those conditions 
which enable an actual seeing and experiencing of the once-occurrent concrete 
world of a once-occurrent subiectum. The correlation of the image-categories of 
I and the other is the form in which an actual human being is concretely 
experienced; this form of the I (the form in which I experience myself as the 
one-and-only me) is radically different from the form of the other (in which I 
experience all other human beings without exception). And the other person's I 
is also experienced by me in a manner which is completely different from the 
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manner in which I experience my own I: the other person's I is also subsumed 
under the category of the other as a constituent feature of him. (Bakhtin, 1990: 
37-38). 
In Bakhtin, as we have expressed, there is an excess-of-seeing that `I' have 
concerning the `other'. The same is true of course the other way round. This 
metaphor of Bakhtin's allows for the perception of outsideness. In the uniqueness 
of my `once-occurrent being' I cannot consummate myself from within. I must 
step outside myself and attempt to constitute myself, not on the plane of the `I' 
but on the plane of the other. The `secret' of my being is not constituted on the 
horizon of 1-for-Myself but in the environment of the other. In this very 
fundamental sense, I have to author myself and dialogize myself not upon the 
plane of `I-for-myself' but on the highly distinctive plane of `the other'. 
In the earlier quote by Freud, we saw the `experience' of the instinctual field 
crossing various thresholds through to consciousness, and we saw the `instigation 
from outside' (SE. XIV: 204), and also we saw the contra-movement through to 
the unconscious. Bakhtin operates on this plane too, but casts us upon the inner 
and outward image, crossing the threshold of the body on a plane of `seeing'. 
Bakhtin tells us that: 
One can easily ascertain by way of self-observation that the initial result of such 
an attempt will be the following: the visually expressed image of myself will 
begin to assume unsteady definition alongside myself as I experience myself 
from within, it will just barely detach itself from my inner self-sensation, in a 
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direction ahead of itself; it will shift slightly to the side and, like a bas-relief, 
separate from the surface of my inner self-sensation, without breaking away 
from it entirely. I shall become slightly `doubled', but shall not come apart 
completely: the umbilical cord of my self-sensation will continue to connect my 
outward expressedness in being with my inner experience of myself. A certain 
renewed effort is required in order to visualize myself distinctly en face and to 
break away completely from my inner self-sensation. (Bakhtin, 1990: 29-30). 
In this we see the `vision' that is necessary to author oneself; Bakhtin allows us to 
author ourselves and in this surely we constitute and are constituted by the 
problem of the other, missed by Rank and Freud. Here then we trace the elements 
of Bakhtin's `second consciousness', it is the move outside of oneself, it is the 
experience of oneself as an outward image, as well as an inward image, it is to 
cross a threshold. In Freud too, these perceptions are constantly present, 
although, it is to be sure, not cast in the same fashion. If we doubt this we only 
have to consider the psychoanalytic conceptualization of the transference. The 
transference crosses the threshold of inward and outward images of `oneself and 
the threshold of the image of the conscious and the unconscious forces in terms of 
`the other'. 
The Centripetal and the Centrifugal 
If, in the extensive oeuvre of Freud, we discover the force fields of the 
unconscious and the conscious, in Bakhtin, we discover other force fields in his 
philosophy of language. For example, we may think of the force fields of the 
centripetal and centrifugal in language. It will be a crucial aspect in the formation 
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of the concept of fragmented speech that we understand these forces - ever- 
present. Bakhtin's discovery of the centripetal and centrifugal drives in language 
needs some explanation. The centripetal is the tendency in any language, always 
present, to unify that language, to centralize. It is monologic in intention and 
always veers toward centrality. It is the ethos of `all roads lead to Rome'. It is 
BBC Received Pronunciation, centralized and centralizing grammar, it is all the 
forces that attempt to make language cohere, centrally. 
It is unification of the conceptualization of language. It is an image of language 
that, by its very nature, is unified. Also of course it is I-For-Myself as the 
encasement of the subject, which is itself formed monologically (and has 
resonance with the ego position that we shall discuss later). It is the withdrawal 
from crossing borders or thresholds. It is the single-voiced plane. In Bakhtin's 
work, the centripetal force of monologism in language is represented as 
monoglossia. So it is that we see monoglossia as normativization of language. 
Conversely, the centrifugal force of language drives outward toward the 
periphery, away from the centralizing influence of monoglossia. The centrifugal 
dialectical diversification is counterposed to, although simultaneous with, 
monoglossia, it is dialogical diversification and heteroglossia is the 
interpenetration of a multiplicity of voice planes colliding in the utterance. These 
two forces in language are stressed at this point because of their possible 
connection with the Freudian conscious and unconscious. 
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The forces in language of centripetality and centrifugality correspond with the 
Freudian concept of the Cs. and the Ucs. How? Centripetal forces have the 
quality of egocentricity and appear to cohere more on the level of consciousness. 
This will be explained in greater depth later. The unconscious is more connected 
to the centrifugal forces present in language. We may think of the Freudian 
dream work, for example, as an expression of the unconscious, which contains all 
the elements of dialectical diversification. There is no homeostasis in language, 
perhaps the original heteroglot voices within are the interplay between Cs. and 
Ucs., where value acts as the arbitrary axis. Next, we check the glossary in The 
Dialogic Imagination, carefully provided by Michael Holquist, and the translation 
of Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist. This Glossary remark describes 
heteroglossia in an accessible form. 
The base condition governing the operation of meaning in any utterance. It is 
that which insures the primacy of context over text. At any given time, in any 
given place, there will be a set of conditions -social, historical, meterological, 
physiological -that will insure that a word uttered in that place and at that time 
will have a meaning different than it would have under any other conditions; all 
utterances are heteroglot in that they are functions of a matrix of forces 
practically impossible to recoup, and therefore impossible to resolve. 
Heteroglossia is as close a conceptualisation as is possible of that locus where 
centripetal and centrifugal forces collide; as such, it is that which a systematic 
linguistics must always suppress. (Bakhtin, 1981: 428). 
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So that we understand this more fully, we cite another remark from Bakhtin that 
hopefully clarifies the situation: 
Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where 
centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear. The processes of 
centralization and decentralization, of unification and disunification, intersect in 
the utterance; the utterance not only answers the requirements of its own 
language as an individualized embodiment of a speech act, but it answers the 
requirements of heteroglossia as well; it is in fact an active participant in such 
diversity. And this active participation of every utterance in living heteroglossia 
determines the linguistic profile and style of the utterance to no less a degree 
than its inclusion in any normative-centralizing system of a unitary language. 
Every utterance participates in the `unitary language' (in its centripetal forces 
and tendencies) and at the same time partakes of social and historical 
heteroglossia (the centrifugal, stratifying forces). (Bakhtin, 1981: 272). 
It seems as if the utterance makes its appearance as the sea wall of monoglossia 
tries to repress the crashing waves of heteroglossia. The interaction of these 
forces is crucial in the assessments that we shall make. However, we must not 
run away with the idea that there is some philosophical match between Freud and 
Bakhtin. Answers will be needed in view of the relevance of action and 
answerabilitv in Bakhtin, presumably both on axiological and ethical planes of 
thought. In our search for fragmented speech, however, we do not consider the 
multiplication of each and every principle possible or desirable. 
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Conclusion 
In order to summarize and conclude this chapter, we note especially the discursive 
links between the forces of monoglossia and heteroglossia and the Freudian 
conceptualization of the conscious and the unconscious - for us, vital categories 
in the discovery of fragmented speech. In these concluding remarks that bring to 
a close this chapter, we have, hopefully, drawn Freud and Bakhtin on to a similar 
plane, even if we have cut-in certain concepts. We have attempted to activate an 
image of the body as a threshold of inner and outer experience and an image of 
the unconscious and stress their simultaneity of operation. In other words, we 
have attempted to address aspects of the problem of the other and the 
unconscious. 
Threshold phenomena, for example, the inner body as experience, or the external 
body as experience, or inward speech and outward speech, and the threshold of 
the conscious and the unconscious, need to be formulated around a concept of 
open unity rather than heavy structure. Therefore, I propose in the next chapter to 
provide a `container' for our concepts loose enough to express the unconscious 
and to offer some evidence of our early hypothesis, namely, that Bakhtin may 
have embraced the Freudian unconscious and certain Freudian mechanisms. In 
the next chapter, we shall analyse elements of Bakhtin's concept of Renaissance 
Carnival as, in our opinion, an expression of the unconscious in Bakhtin's work 
and investigate the Carnival system of images in terms of Freud's various 
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`mechanisms'. As a verbal bridge between the comments in this chapter and the 
next we check a remark: 
The medieval world is said to have viewed the body as licentious, crude, self- 
destructive, and to have divorced it from any meaningful relationship to human 
speech (Morson and Emerson, 1990: 437). 
The image of the body plays a crucial role in the development of our theory of 
fragmented speech within the unconscious. In the next chapter, we approach the 
problems of the image of the body and the image of speech and the image of 
conscious and unconscious forces. Luckily for us, Bakhtin rediscovered the 
public square, where all these forces intermingle. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
BAKHTIN, CARNIVAL, AND DISMEMBERMENT 
Prelude 
To suddenly introduce the concept of Carnival may seem a strange turn of events 
following our previous chapters. But carnival, particularly Bakhtinian 
Renaissance Carnival, will prove absolutely crucial to our project and we now 
begin to explain why. We shall explore carnival in terms of the idea of the market 
place, of the heteroglossia (multi-voicedness) occurring in the carnival town 
square. The market place or carnivaltown square acts as a dialogic crossroads of 
interpenetrating and differing voices and voice-zones connected to a stratification 
of many genres. The carnival backcloth draws all genres into the town square in 
an inmixing of subjectivity. Bakhtin's `fortuitous' use of carnival is ideal for our 
purposes concerning the images of the grotesque (fragmented) body and 
grotesque (fragmented) speech and the disparate (fragmented) drives that occur in 
carnival and particularly Bakhtinian carnival. 
The noisy bustle of the Renaissance carnival square may seem a far cry from the 
bourgeois containment of the psychoanalytic session - with its secrecy and 
privacy. When the analyst deliberately `sets up' his artificial discourse in the 
hushed chambers of, for example, 19, Bergasse. This assessment, however, might 
not have a natural line of demarcation so readily assumed. Does the merchant's 
sign of the psychoanalyst swing in a cobbled side street of the carnival square 
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after all? Lacan in fact makes a statement that might lead us to suspect that it 
does. He tells us: 
The establishment of a common discourse of a public discourse I would almost 
say, is an important factor in the specific functioning of the mechanism of 
repression. In itself repression stems from the impossibility of granting 
discourse to a certain past of the subject's speech which is linked, as Freud 
stressed, to the specific world of infantile relations (Lacan, 1993[1981]: 60). 
He mentions the all-important infantile relations, the working out of which is so 
prevalent and vital in carnival. Of course in this remark by Lacan, we can see that 
he does not quite draw the analysand and analyst into the public sphere, or the 
town square, nevertheless the meaning glimmers through. He does, however, 
appear to ask the question: to what extent is repression a reaction to, or response 
to, the crowd? 
The crowd of course is the essential ingredient of the carnival feast; the street 
cryer, the hawker, draw a heterogeneous contention of voices on to a similar 
plane. For our purposes we shall draw Bakhtin's depth of field in carnival on to a 
single plane of perception. We take carnival as a one-dimensional surface 
because later we shall superimpose the image of carnival over a map, a 
topography of our own making to see if it fits. We understand that Bakhtin 
discovers the depth of field vision in Rabelais and His World and of course 
Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics, but we borrow the concept and place it on to a 
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single plane of interpretation. In Rabelais and His World and Problems of 
Dostoevsky's Poetics, depth of field and the interpenetration of various planes are 
essential as Bakhtin works out theories of heteroglossia and polyphony. 
Introduction 
In this chapter we attempt to keep an overview of the unconscious as being 
synonymous, in some ways, with Carnival. One does not have to be a precise 
replica of the other for the similarities to be striking. And, we must immediately 
note the term dismemberment and its dialogic interconnection with our discourse. 
The image of dismemberment is fundamental to Bakhtinian carnival, either the 
dismemberment of the body or of speech, or the image of both. Fragmented 
speech requires the backdrop of carnival on a cultural and artistic plane, and we 
therefore introduce elements of Bakhtin's concept of carnival in this chapter. 
Hopefully, this will become plain later. If, however, Bakhtin did see carnival as 
somehow synonymous with the Freudian unconscious he is extremely unlikely to 
have said so. Let us check two interconnecting comments that Bakhtin makes in 
his critique of Kayser in Rabelais and His World. Bakhtin tells us: 
Another of Kayser's definitions is characteristic of the modernist 
interpretation: `the grotesque is a form expressing the id'. 
The id is understood by the author[Kayser] not so much in the Freudian as in the 
existentialist sense of this word. Id is an alien, inhuman power, governing the 
world, men, their life and behaviour. (Bakhtin, 1984a: 49). 
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In this comment Bakhtin floats the idea of the Freudian id, hastening to add of 
course, that Kayser is speaking of the existentialist form of the id; but surely the 
very mention of Freud, allows the reader unofficially to think of Freud? 
As this chapter is so distinctly connected with carnival, we need perhaps to 
remind ourselves of (a) centripetal forces in language; and (b) centrifugal forces 
in language; and their interconnection with Freud. We take as an example a 
footnote from The Interpretation of Dreams: 
The distinction between the primary and secondary systems and the hypothesis 
that psychical functioning operates differently in them, are among the most 
fundamental of Freud's concepts ... that psychical energy occurs in two forms: 
`free' or `mobile' (as it occurs in the system Ucs. ) and `bound' or quiescent' (as 
it occurs in the system Pcs. ). (Freud, 1991, [Editor's Note]: 761). 
It seems to us that the connection here with Bakhtin's conceptualisation of 
centripetal and centrifugal forces operating in language is quite clear. Following 
on from these fundamental points of contact, there is another comment, this time 
by Bakhtin, that is pertinent to ideas concerning the unconscious and carnival and 
we take note of this crucial point: 
"The unsaid" and its special nature and role are interesting from this standpoint. 
The early stages of verbal cognition. The "unconscious" can become a creative 
factor only on the threshold of consciousness and of the word (semiverbal/ 
sernisignifying consciousness). They are fraught with the word and the potential 
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word. "The unsaid" as a shifting boundary, as a `regulative idea (in the Kantian 
sense) of creative consciousness. (Bakhtin, 1986: 163). 
Again, we see the fragmented note-taking style of Bakhtin here that leaves us, in a 
sense, to fill in the spaces. I think, to start with, that the carnivalesque needs to be 
viewed against a backdrop of `the unsaid'. Carnival is always, to borrow 
Foucault's phrase, the anonymous murmur. 
Teasingly, Bakhtin leaves us with the phrase `the early stages of verbal cognition' 
by which presumably he means verbal cognition in the development of the child. 
The next phrase again ties Bakhtin and Freud in some ways `the unconscious can 
become a creative factor only on the threshold of consciousness and of the word'; 
so it seems here that Bakhtin dialogizes the unconscious on a dialogic threshold. 
We would make one further connection, however, at this point and add from 
Freud's The Interpretation of Dreams: `It [the dream] shows a preference for what 
is immoderate, exaggerated and monstrous' (Freud, 1991: 155). Quite clearly the 
dream itself - Royal Road to the unconscious - has a close connection with the 
carnival system of images. At this point we offer the premise that there is a 
distinct synonymity between the concept of the Freudian unconscious and 
Carnival. Of course this also includes the dream. Exaggeration and hyperpole 
play an essential role in carnival and have a distinctive role later in the 
development of our thesis concerning fragmented speech. 
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Rabelais' Shadow 
I am, I must admit, loathe to broach physiological ground in the shadow of the 
laughing Franciscan monk and Bachelor of Medicine Francois Rabelais, but there 
may be use in the following observations from Schilder and we note them 
regarding their possible serious relationship to Renaissance Carnival. The first is: 
Disease of any organ, is connected with a special psychic attitude. It may be 
said in a schematic way that the difference between psychogenic and organic is, 
among other things, a difference in the direction in which the process moves. In 
organ diseases the periphery is affected first, and the affection goes from the 
periphery to the centre; in psychogenic cases the change goes from the centre to 
the periphery (Schilder, 1950: 155). 
He goes on: 
I should like to emphasize the fact that the connotation of the prevalence of 
centrifugal tendencies in functional diseases and centripetal tendencies in organ 
diseases means not only physiological but psychological processes as well. 
(Ibid. ) 
And one more comment should clarify this matter for us. 
The mental problems and libidinous conflicts of the neurosis lie in the centre of 
the personality and flow from there to the periphery of the personality and into 
the postural model of the body. Psychogenic disturbance has necessarily a 
centrifugal character. It expresses itself in a nervous symptom, or even in an 
anatomical change which is created by a centrifugal psychic process. In organic 
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disease the process begins in the periphery of the experience and provokes the 
changes in the central attitude. The organic process is therefore centripetal from 
the point of view of the psychology of the central ego and postural model of the 
body. The difference between an organic and psychogenic disease is merely a 
difference in the psychic direction. (Ibid. 301). 
In a slightly different context we see: `There is also a general fear about the 
integrity of the body, or, as I have called it, a general dismembering motive and 
fear. In psychosis, especially this dismembering motive plays an important part'. 
(Ibid. 190). We hold on to these ideas in the first instance; the concept that the 
body is subject to these centripetal and centrifugal forces relates to our 
conceptualization of the Bakhtinian forces of the centripetal and centrifugal 
forces in language. At this stage we are not suggesting that there is direct 
correlation but we hold on to the thought nevertheless. So that we may link our 
thoughts later we also add the comment `... the tendency of the organism to self- 
defence reflects itself in the fear of castration and pre-genital castration in the fear 
of being dismembered'. (Ibid. 190). 
Body - As Image 
Popular-festive images, may seem a strange space to develop our thesis, but 
hopefully this will become clearer as we progress through this third chapter. Our 
dissertation is based upon the hypothesis that speech has an unconscious 
repressed base of fragmentation. To draw close to an image of fragmented speech 
requires that we must first generalize certain terms, certain parameters, so that we 
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may position ourselves quite distinctly in relation to them. The body in pieces has 
a direct correlation with our project in general. The image of the body, in our 
hypothesis, is directly related to the image of the word, so we shall need to 
delineate the image of the body in pieces. 
In his book, Schilder makes the following comment: `Is the postural model of the 
body a fixed static entity, or is it a changing, growing, and developing one? I hope 
to show that the postural model of the body is in perpetual inner self-construction 
and self-destruction' (Schilder, 1950: 15-16). In this we have a dynamic image of 
the body and its capability for construction and destruction as an image. It is 
certainly the case that the body has to be imaged. In the case of the amputation of 
a limb, for example, the body image has to be reformulated - here we may think 
of phantom limbs existing after an amputation - the body image has to adapt 
itself. Or Schilder tells us of the Japanese Illusion, which most children know, by 
twisting the fingers in a certain way, it becomes impossible to identify one of the 
fingers by sight. It is not parodic to imagine that the amputation of Bakhtin's leg 
affected his perception of the body image, as the inward and outward image of the 
body is so vital to his ideas. 
However, Schilder further tells us that: The original shape [postural model of the 
body] is based upon continual transformations from the postural model of the 
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child into the postural model of the adult. There is a long series of images' (Ibid. 
67). (We wish to postulate, as we shall see, that the speech image may well also 
be formed by a similar long series of images). Continuing, it is also likely that we 
have an image of the internal organs within and this is crucial in an understanding 
of Renaissance Carnival. If Schilder is correct, then there is a continuous process 
of building and demolishing images of the body. There is a continuous series of 
images. This of course applies equally to the image of the body of the other, 
which is internalized as an image and of course subject to variation in a series of 
images. We shall deal in more detail with this concept later in the dissertation. 
This all provides, initially, a brief sketch of the body as image. However, before 
we progress with these ideas, we need to make one point clear. We are here 
considering the carnivalesque, at least the Renaissance carnival, as, in some ways 
an image of the unconscious and the unconscious forces. Of course, there is 
interplay between the forces of the unconscious and consciousness, as there is 
interplay between the centripetal and centrifugal forces in language. 
Ego - as Image 
There is a connection, a tie, between the image of the body and the image of the 
ii'ord and we shall endeavour to justify our premise. Within Bakhtinian carnival 
we shall introduce the concept of the ego. At this stage, perhaps we need justify 
the concept no further than to ascertain that the ego appears to be - and is often 
83 
thought to be -a centralizing agency within the psyche that provides the unity of 
consciousness, as it acts as the headquarters of incoming and outgoing stimuli. 
The fact that the image of the ego is itself a meconnaissance will be dealt with 
later 
It is on this Bakhtinian plane of Carnival that the image of the body, the image of 
the word and the image of the ego have an open unity on the same plane, and this 
will prove invaluable to us. Undoubtedly, the ego is the crowned king or queen of 
the Subject. But is the king only a pretender to the throne? Is this monarch a 
usurper? The crowning and uncrowning of the ego is crucial to this chapter. 
Unquestionably, Freud's discovery of the unconscious decentralized the ego. So 
that we have some coherence of terms, we shortly shall check what Freud himself 
had to say about the `king' of the personality - the crowned ego. 
In The Ego and the Id, Freud enlightens us with a few useful comments: 
`consciousness is the surface of the mental apparatus; that is, we have ascribed it 
as a function to a system which is spatially the first one reached from the external 
world' (Freud, 1927: 9). And Freud also tells us that: `In essence a word is after 
all the mnemic residue of a word that has been heard' (Freud, 1927: 11). In 
Bakhtin, however, we add another dimension: there is also an inner dialogic 
integrity to the word. The word is active from within, it resonates with internal 
dialogic activity. It bursts upon the world with an inner energy that is 
psychologically, ideologically, aesthetically, physiologically, philosophically, 
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resonant with the echo of its own history, with its own present, and its own future 
- and crucially - interwoven with the word of the Other. As Bakhtin states 
variously, there is an intra-atomic intensity in the dialogic interconnections of the 
word. And as Bakhtin also states variously, the word has a memory. 
Word - as Image 
The word is not a hollow tin can. It is packed with action, potential and intent, 
and as Bakhtin teaches, `meaning is not born, nor does it die' (Bakhtin, 1990: 
108). This is perhaps the moment to point out that from now on, the Bakhtinian 
utterance must contain the collision of unconscious and conscious forces. 
Obviously it always did, but the recognition of this fact is not necessarily an easy 
matter. Continuing now with Freud, we find that: `The ego is not sharply 
separated from the id; its lower portion merges into it' (Freud, 1927: 14). 
Simultaneously with this we note: `A grotesque-word matrix drags the messy 
body into territory previously occupied by disembodied, hierarchical word 
systems' (Morson and Emerson, 1990: 438). 
There is no precise connection here, but we would note the similarity of the 
`dragging down' of the grotesque-word matrix and the ego merging into the `id' 
as relevant shortly. And, as a further point we have: ` The repressed is only cut off 
sharply from the ego by the resistances of repression; it can communicate with the 
ego through the Id. ' (Ibid. ). Checking Freud again we also find the following: 
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`For the ego, perception plays the part which in the id falls to instinct' 
(Freud, 1927: 15). And, most importantly for us we have: 
The functional importance of the ego is manifested in the fact that normally 
control over the approaches to motility devolves upon it Thus in relation to the 
id it is like a man on horseback, who has to hold in check the superior strength 
of the horse; with this difference, that the rider tries to do so with his own 
strength, while the ego uses borrowed forces. The analogy may be carried a 
little further. Often a rider, if he is not to be parted from his horse, is obliged to 
guide it where it wants to go; in the same way the ego is in the habit of 
transforming the id's will into action as if it were its own. (Freud, 1927: 15). 
From the following page Freud states: 
The ego is first and foremost a bodily ego; it is not merely a surface entity, but is 
itself the projection of a surface. 
(From Freud's footnote 1 p. 16. ) we have [i. e. the ego is ultimately derived from 
bodily sensations, chiefly those springing from the surface of the body. It may 
be regarded as a mental projection of the surface of the body, besides as we have 
seen above, representing the superficies of the mental apparatus]. (Freud, 1927: 
16). 
Bakhtin's Carnival 
As an example, and introduction to Bakhtin's Carnival and his Rabelais and his 
[1'orld (Bakhtin, 1984a) we need to think about Bakhtin's term heteroglossia. 
Once again we take up the Bakhtinian optic and view his term heteroglossia, so 
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that we may be quite clear. Heteroglossia, ` the centripetal forces of the life of 
language, embodied in a `unitary language' operate in the midst of heteroglossia' 
(Bakhtin, 1981: 271). And `Alongside the centripetal forces, the centrifugal 
forces of language carry on their uninterrupted work; alongside verbal-ideological 
centralization and unification, the uninterrupted processes of decentralization and 
disunification go forward. ' (Bakhtin, 1981: 272). We need also to note the 
following: 
But no living word relates to its object in a singular way: between the word and 
its object, between the word and the speaking subject, there exists an elastic 
environment of other, alien words about the same object, the same theme ... 
(Ibid. 276). 
The gloss on the above comment reminds us that there are interpenetrating 
dialogic arrows filling the sky between speaking subjects. The whole field is 
permeated with dialogic relationships and it is these that Bakhtin draws our 
attention to. We must not assume that between the speaker/listener there is a 
dialogic vacuum, as Bakhtin indicates in the above, far from it. Bakhtin goes on 
to tell us: 
Discourse lives, as it were, beyond itself, in a living impulse toward the object; 
if we detach ourselves completely from this impulse all we have left is the naked 
corpse of the words from which we can learn nothing at all. (Ibid. 292) 
87 
It is extremely important that we take note of Bakhtin's use of the `corpse of the 
words' here, the rotting corpse of the body and the rotting corpse of the word play 
a significant role later in the dissertation, but it is very important that we mark 
them at the level of carnival. Why? Because later we shall have need of the 
concept, but in a sense it has a root in carnival, on the plane of grotesque imagery. 
So, may we perhaps describe heteroglossia, generally, as a diversity of speech 
styles in language, and multi-voiced dialogue? And likewise may we describe, in 
a generalized sense, Bakhtin's use of the term polyphony as the position of an 
author in a text in relationship to the interpenetration of dialogic voice-ideas? In 
these few comments we have hopefully introduced some basic elements of 
Bakhtin's heteroglossia, before we move into the space of the Renaissance 
Carnival. The relevance of heteroglossia for the concept of fragmented speech is 
crucial. Fragmented speech - for reasons that will become clear later - is, in a 
sense, a pathological form of heteroglossia, a `clinical' conception of 
heteroglossia. And this is, also in a certain sense, counterposed to monoglossia. 
However, and this is an extremely important point, the idea we have is one of 
conversion; to bring value to fragmented speech through Bakhtin's 
conceptualization of heteroglossia and carnival. 
Heteroglossia and Fragmented Speech 
As fragmented speech is hauled dripping from the unconscious, it needs some sort 
of `container', a net, however loosely formed, to hold its form. Carnival. in this 
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instance, is the container and the contained. Heteroglossia, is a dialogic 
marketplace; it is the centrifugal force of language bursting open the barrel of the 
centripetal forces, always trying to re-hoop the barrel of language. It is within this 
force field of heteroglossia that Bakhtin leads us through the streets of 
apothecaries, to the razzmatazz of the public square. We find that: `Bakhtin is not 
describing a medieval public square, he is describing a modern discursive space 
as a medieval public square' (Hirschkop, 1999: 200). 1 would like to suggest too, 
that Freud's laugh is directed at the public square, his consulting room dialectic is 
an accident of fate. 
If the body image and the word image resonate throughout medieval carnival, and 
if the ego is the crowned carnival king and there is always an uncrowning 
ceremony, how and in what terms do we locate the system of images described by 
Bakhtin in his Rabelais and his World? (Bakhtin, 1984a) And, most importantly, 
how is all this likely to add up to a useful image of fragmented speech? 
In the first place, we need to detect the system of images in Rabelais and his 
World and apply it to our own text, and, secondly to delineate in terms useful for 
our approach, the potential location of elements of fragmented speech. If this is 
not complex enough, we must also remember that carnival is very much a 
relationship of `I' and the `Other', not to mention the `author' and the `hero'. In 
other words Ne are approaching a system of folklore symbols whose compass of 
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vision may correspond with ours at the level of fragmented speech. Before 
moving on, we recall another statement by Schilder: 
There are vague feelings of temperature. It is more or less the feeling of 
warmth. But the outline of the skin is not felt as a smooth and straight surface. 
This outline is blurred. There are no sharp borderlines between the outside 
world and the body. (Schilder, 1950: 85). 
And again on the body image: 
There is a long series of images. But one of the most important 
characteristics of psychic life is the tendency to multiply images and to 
vary them with every multiplication. It is one of the inherent 
characteristics of our psychic life that we continuously change our 
images; we multiply them and make them appear differently. This 
general rule is true also for the postural model of the body. We let it 
shrink playfully and come to the idea of Lilliputians, or we transform it 
into giants. We have therefore, an almost unlimited number of body 
images (Schilder, 1950: 67). 
In Bakhtin's carnival, we have the body image and the word image and they are 
`contained' along with the image of the ego (unconscious or otherwise) in the 
open unity of carnival. We now explore this carnival system of images as an 
artistic heteroglossia of interpenetrating images that may have room for the 
dismembered body or the fragmented image of the body and the fragmented 
image of the word. Justification of the concept of fragmented speech will occur 
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later. Meanwhile, we shall explore Bakhtin's analysis of Rabelais' system of 
images, and interconnect where appropriate with the work of Freud. 
Freud's Influence on Carnival 
In his article `Freud's Influence on Bakhtin: Traces of Psychoanalytic Theory in 
Rabelais and His World' (Byrd, 1987: 223-30), Byrd traces connections between 
Freud and Bakhtin, but does not take the bold step of making carnival the 
unconscious, and the unconscious carnival, at least in its cultural and artistic 
aspect. Once this bold step is made we believe that Freud's `mechanisms' begin 
to make more sense in a carnival setting. However, so that we may have a flavour 
of Byrd's text let us explore the following: 
Later in his book, Bakhtin exposes a `form of scatophagy' in the grotesque 
Rabelaisian image of sweating. This reading can only be based on a Freudian 
theory of displacement, since it relies not only on Rabelais explicit evocation of 
the salty taste of sweat, but also on an unconscious association of sweat with 
'other elimination'. The discovery of a sensational meaning related only 
inexplicitly to the image but seemingly responsible for it directly parallels 
Freud's unravelling of displacement mechanisms to find the subversive `latent 
content' of dreams and jokes. The hermeneutics of Bakhtin's close reading of a 
Rabelaisian text again seem influenced by Freud (Byrd, 1987: 227). 
This comment gives us, I think, a significant genre placement within the concept 
of carnival and the unconscious and I cite it merely to position ourselves within, 
and external to, Byrd's text. If the unconscious is seen as parallel to, and 
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synonymous with, Bakhtin's Renaissance Carnival, then the juxtaposition of the 
system of images in Carnival and Freud's mechanisms becomes easier to handle. 
We draw no strict analogies but consider the following as inherent both in 
carnival and psychoanalysis: we may think in terms of. (i) repression which is 
vital to an understanding of psychoanalysis, and the release of repression which is 
vital to the formation of carnival. Following this we may likewise consider (ii) 
resistance, which the psychoanalyst has to understand in terms of repression, and 
the resistance, which carnival represents, for example, its crowning and 
uncrowning ceremonies of kings and queens and opposition to an authoritative 
discourse. We consider also (iii) the ego - decentralized in Freudian 
psychoanalysis, and uncrowned and turned in a clown in carnival, the ego, as it 
were, turned upside down. We may also think of (iv) free association, vital as a 
technique in psychoanalysis to trigger the discourse of the unconscious, and vital 
too in carnival where the free interplay of relationships between objects, like 
dreams, allows the whole discourse of carnival to develop. 
Not withstanding this, at this stage, we need to sketch in a few construction lines 
so that we do not get lost in the welter of material from Freud and Bakhtin. I 
suggest we do this in the first instance by analyzing the Bakhtinian categories, 
derived from Rabelais, of the Grotesque Image of the Body and the Language of 
the III irketplace. The juxtaposition of these images is crucial to our cause 
whereby we trace fragmented speech. 
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Grotesque Image of the Body 
If, in Schilder, we have come to understand the image of the body, we now try to 
understand the grotesque image of the body and its relevance. In Schilder, the 
image of the body is built-up by a series of images of both construction and 
destruction. Now we check the relevance of Rabelais' use of the grotesque body 
and Bakhtin's interpretation of it. Precisely what is the grotesque body and what 
is its relevance for fragmented speech? The two words that immediately spring to 
mind are exaggeration and hyperbole. Grotesque realism is the multiplication of 
images of the body. It is also where the body exceeds its own boundaries, 
especially in relationship to the comic. And, as we know: `The comic, in general, 
is based upon the contrast between the feeling of pleasure and displeasure' 
(Bakhtin, 1984a: 305). 
It is difficult to understand the point of the grotesque without the image of bodily 
topography. In the upright towers and concealed and hidden valleys of the 
landscape there are always analogies to be made with bodily topography. Also 
we note the connection between the material bodily lower stratum and upper, 
more `respectable' body. Between earth and heaven. Let us take as an example, 
Bakhtin's opening image in his chapter on the grotesque image of the body 
namely the image of the stutterer. We note Bakhtin's comments: 
A stutterer talking with Harlequin cannot pronounce a difficult word; 
he makes a great effort, loses his breath, keeping the word down in his 
throat, sweats, and gapes, trembles, chokes. His face is swollen, his 
93 
eyes pop; `it looks as if he were in the throes and spasms of childbirth. ' 
Finally Harlequin, weary of waiting, relieves the stutterer by surprise; 
he rushes head forward and hits the man in the abdomen. The difficult 
word is `born' at last. (Bakhtin, 1984a: 304). 
This is a fine example for us because it makes a link between the image of the 
body and the image of the word `stuck' in the body. It is also about the threshold 
of the word in the inner and outer world. Let us follow the image of the stutterer 
further. 
The gaping mouth, the protruding eyes, sweat, trembling, suffocation, the 
swollen face - all these are typical symptoms of the grotesque life of the body; 
here they have the meaning of the act of birth. Harlequin's gesture is also quite 
obvious: he helps to deliver the word, and the word is actually born (Ibid. 308). 
In this, of course, as Bakhtin points out the bodily topography allows the bodily 
hierarchy to be turned upside down. Lower replaces upper, the word is taken from 
the upper level (thought) and plummeted to the lower level, so as Bakhtin again 
stresses the 'entire mechanism of the word is transferred from the apparatus of 
speech to the abdomen' (Bakhtin, 1984a: 309). We must not I think 
underestimate the importance of this connecting symbol. In this example we have 
exaggeration and hyperbole, essential to a definition of the grotesque. Bakhtin 
allows us to glimpse the logic of the grotesque body. Bakhtin goes on to discuss 
other elements of the grotesque: 'It must be recalled that the belfry (a tower) is the 
usual grotesque symbol of the phallus' (ibid. 310). These images do not just 
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locate a bodily topography they also fuse the body with the object; there is a 
blurring of boundaries. 
All these elements of speech create a specific, free atmosphere. Most of them are 
linked to the lower stratum; they lend a bodily character to objects and degrade 
them, fuse the body and the world, thus introducing the concluding theme: the 
transformation of the belfry into a phallus. The bowels and the phallus play of 
course a leading role in the exaggeration and hyperbole of the images. Bakhtin 
depicts all the acts of `depravity' for us, but we need stress only at this point the 
image of dismemberment, which is essential for our use of the grotesque body and 
its relationship to fragmented speech. We obviously do not underplay the 
significance of the anus, the phallus, and all the convexities and orifices that 
Bakhtin describes for us but we note the continuous use of the term 
dismemberment. However, let us see how far we have travelled with Bakhtin: 
The body discloses its essence as a principle of growth which exceeds its own 
limits only in copulation, pregnancy, child birth, the throes of death, eating, 
drinking or defecation (Bakhtin, 1984a: 26). 
Return to the Grotesque Body 
In this second phase description and assessment of the grotesque body, we need to 
note the juxtaposition of the image of the whole body image, the gestalt image 
that is in stark contradistinction to our aim. Bakhtin tells us in respect of this 
it-hole body: 
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The new bodily canon, in all its historic variations and different genres, presents 
an entirely finished, completed, strictly limited body, which is shown from the 
outside as something individual. That which protrudes, bulges, sprouts or 
branches off (when a body transgresses its limits and a new one begins) is 
eliminated, hidden, or moderated. All orifices of the body are closed. The basis 
of the image is the individual, strictly limited mass, the impenetrable facade. 
The opaque surface and the body's `valleys' acquire an essential meaning as the 
border of a closed individuality that does not merge with other bodies and with 
the world. (Bakhtin, 1984a: 320). 
So that we clarify this point fully by Bakhtin, we take another quote from his 
work. 
Philosophy of language, linguistics and stylistics [i. e., such as they have come 
down to us] have all postulated a simple and unmediated relation of speaker to 
his unitary and singular `own' language, and have postulated as well a simple 
realization of this language in the monologic utterance of the individual. Such 
disciplines actually know only two poles in the life of language, between which 
are located all the linguistic and stylistic phenomena they know: on the one 
hand, the system of a unitary language, and on the other the individual speaking 
in this language. Bakhtin, 1981: 269). 
These remarks by Bakhtin, above, now position us partway to where we need to 
be. The singularity of the closed down body, of its orifices and protrusions has a 
similarity with the closed down discourse of monoglossia. In psychoanalytic 
terms, we may say that we are drawing close to a conceptualization of a 
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psychoanalytic speech complex that derives from the body image and the word 
image. 
Continuing, we must understand the basis of Bakhtin's assessment of the 
grotesque and we find: 
at the basis of grotesque imagery a special concept of the body as a whole and 
of the limits of this whole. The confines between the body and the world and 
between separate bodies are drawn in the grotesque genre quite differently than 
in the classic and naturalist images ... and [we] disclose the sources of Rabelais' 
grotesque concept of the body. (Bakhtin, 1984a: 315). 
However, in all these comments we see that the body image is seen in terms of 
construction or destruction. But the border between the body and the world 
becomes deliberately blurred in Rabelais and Bakhtin (and objects for that 
matter). As the border likewise between the social and the individual also 
becomes blurred in Bakhtin. Perhaps now we may say that if the body-image has 
to be built-up and the word-image has to be built-up, so does the world-image. It 
is in answer to some of these questions that the ubiqitious carnival presents, in 
part, solutions. Carnival deals with the living instinct and the instinct, as Freud 
never tired of saying, lies on the frontier between the mental and the physical. 
Checking again with Schilder we note the following: 
The enormous psychological importance of all openings of the body is obvious, 
since it is by these openings that we come in closest contact with the world. By 
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them we ingest air, food, sex products; by them we eject urine, sex products, 
faeces, and air. We have therefore distinguished points in the postural model of 
the body. These points are at the same time points of erotic importance. 
(Schilder, 1950: 124). 
These openings and orifices of the body become crucial as the development of the 
image of the fragmented body becomes entangled with the image of fragmented 
speech and the fragmented `image' of drives. The above statement is also 
emblematic of Rabelaisian carnival. The openings of the body have their own 
interplay with speech. As an addition to this point we may also note the 
following: 
I have specifically pointed out the fact that whatever originates in or emanates 
out of our body will still remain a part of the body-image. The voice, the breath, 
the odour, faeces, menstrual blood, urine, semen, are still parts of the body- 
image even when they are separated in space from the body (Cf. Roheim) 
(Schilder, 1950: 213). 
In these images we begin, I think, to detect Bakhtin's zone of the genre of the 
grotesque body and its `opposition' to the gestalt, to the whole body image. Of 
course as we know, these images re-connect with the image of the centrifuge. We 
have no wish to multiply the images of the grotesque beyond necessity, but note 
the proximity to the zone and register of fragmented speech. However, we now 
connect the images of the grotesque body with the image of `grotesque' speech. 
98 
Language of the Marketplace 
One could be forgiven for blurring the images present in Bakhtin's chapters on 
`The Language in the Marketplace in Rabelais'; and `The Grotesque Image of the 
Body', because there is a general merging. However, we need to explore the 
images of the language of the marketplace or as Bakhtin describes it, billingsgate. 
The grotesque always has in mind the material bodily lower stratum, the zone of 
the genital organs. Bakhtin pinpoints for us, in the opening pages of this chapter 
the `besmirching with mud' and `tossing of excrement' (Bakhtin, 1984a: 148) and 
this he dates as far back as Aeschylus' satric drama The Collector of Bones'. 
Of course we still use the word mud-slinging for any form of dishing the dirt. 
Again here Bakhtin connects up with the topography of the body. High 
immediately becomes low once the excrement reaches its target. However, I do 
not think that we should miss the point made by Bakhtin that the language of 
excrement was interconnected with fertility and this separates Bakhtin from those 
who only see the narrow form of vulgarity. If we are to continue with the images 
already nominated by Bakhtin then surely we need to bear in mind the term 
ambivalent. In the grotesque body-image the initial and overriding ideas were 
exaggeration and hyperbole and here, in the marketplace we shall have praise and 
abuse. 
Bakhtin leaves us in no doubt that 'Rabelais scholars usually understand and 
evaluate the novel's billingsgate and marketplace elements in the spirit of modern 
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interpretation, distinct from the carnival action as a whole. The deep ambivalence 
of these images is no longer understood' (Ibid. 150). The interconnection of the 
grotesque body-image and the grotesque word-image are of course counterposed 
to the whole body-image with its smoothed out surfaces and the whole word- 
image, likewise, with its smoothed out surfaces. 
So what precisely do we mean by the language of the marketplace? This is what 
Bakhtin calls free familiar speech: curses, profanities and oaths. Bakhtin 
shrewdly picks up on the barker's style in the marketplace; Rabelais' own 
opening lines, for example, `Most noble boozers, and you my very esteemed and 
poxy friends' (Rabelais, 1955: 37). Here is the perfect example of intertwining 
praise and abuse in the style of the barker. Now we see the connection that 
Bakhtin made earlier of the stutterer and how the body-image and the word-image 
become more entwined as they are connected through the symbolic head-butting 
episode. Not the word in the head (thought) any longer but the word in the belly, 
ready for birth. We must not miss the point that the physical attribute of the word 
is not missed in Bakhtin. Birth is given to the word in the example of the 
stutterer. I would connect the images brought forth by Bakhtin of exaggeration 
and hyperbole as the grotesque body and praise and abuse as the grotesque word. 
Let us see how Bakhtin himself connects these ideas in respect of praise and 
abuse: 
This phenomenon is reflected in imagery and is extremely important for the 
understanding of entire periods of the development of thought. This 
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development has not as yet been analysed, but in a preliminary and rather 
simplified way we can say that it is based on the conception of the world as 
eternally unfinished: a world dying and being born at the same time, possessing 
as it were two bodies. The dual image combining praise and abuse seeks to 
grasp the very moment of this change, the transfer from the old to the new, from 
death to life. Such an image crowns and uncrowns at the same moment. 
(Bakhtin, 1984a: 165-166). 
Again there is no need to multiply images beyond necessity but the merging of the 
image of the body and the image of the word is essential among the quacks and 
apothecaries in the marketplace, all the images of the body and the images of the 
word interpenetrating in the carnival square. 
itself? 
Carnival Space 
But what of the carnival space 
The image of the body and the image of the word interconnect in the carnival 
square, the forces of the conscious and the unconscious undoubtedly collide there 
too, but what of the space itself? Psychoanalysis has its part to play in Bakhtin's 
formulation of the symbol formation in Rabelais and His World of this, in our 
opinion there is little doubt. Psychoanalysis is implicit in the work, if not, 
understandably, explicitly, so this we offer as a theme in a minor key. However, 
if Freud does have a signboard hanging in a carnival back alley, how does it affect 
the carnival space? Let us check the following remark: 
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A comparison which reminds us that the marvellously open expanses of the 
public square are not only literally but metaphorically spacious, allowing history 
a room for movement which it is denied in the bourgeois parlour. (Hirschkop, 
1999: 249). 
And: 
But Bakhtin is not describing a medieval public square, he is describing a 
modern discursive space as a medieval public square. (Ibid. 260). 
We now analyse these remarks in the light of psychoanalysis in the dialogic 
public square. 
Here we see that Bakhtin has taken dialogism into the public domain; he has 
opened up a `new' discursive space. He has unfolded his linguistics not in the 
bourgeois parlour but in the thoroughly Socratic public square. But what of 
Freud, where is he in the dialogic town square? Huddled away in a `bourgeois 
parlour' or offering his wares on a public stall? In other words what space does 
Freud occupy? It is a serious question. To answer this, we need to take a leaf out 
of Bakhtin's book; if Bakhtin's interpretation of some elements of psychoanalysis 
is contained in his book Rabelais and His World, then presumably Bakhtin placed 
Freud in the public square - or was it the bourgeois parlour? 
We also consider the carnival space and what it may or may not represent 
psychologically, in other words w\ e have to consider the chronotope of carnival its 
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relationship to its own time and space and its relationship to other chronotopes. 
Compare the following statement by Schilder that is itself, without of course 
meaning to be, carnivalesque: 
Experience in pathology, which I cannot discuss here in detail, leads me to the 
conclusion that the psychological space concerning one's own body is 
different from other space. Space, therefore, psychologically shows a lack of 
homogeneity. The outside space and the body space differ in their structure 
(Schilder, 1950: 57-58). 
This position of the carnival space, which of course has its associations with 
centripetal and centrifugal forces, as well as psychological space also finds an 
echo in the following remark: 
we must renounce those `givens' which, according to the system of reference 
chosen, find their place either `in the world' or `in the psyche' (Sartre, 1969: 
xxvii). 
When Hirschkop tells us that Bakhtin is `not describing a medieval public square' 
but a `modern discursive space' we should take notice. Hirschkop opens up the 
carnival space dialogically for us, we are now in a heteroglot space of the 
dialogic, and he also sets us in a metaphoric space. Following on from this in Art 
and Anstiverability, (Bakhtin, 1990) Bakhtin opens up the body as inward and 
outward in terms of the other, and in terms of expressedness. In a sense, we are 
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crossing boundaries all the time and of course boundary space preoccupies the 
carnivalesque. In Sartre's comment he refuses to place us either in the world or in 
the psyche - at least as `givens'. So precisely what strange space are we 
occupying in carnival? 
Counter Space 
Undoubtedly carnival space represents a counter space and has to be apprehended 
in this sense. But is space homogeneous? Is it homogeneous or heterogeneous 
and fragmented? Certainly it would appear that in the case of the unconscious 
and the conscious the mental space does not seem identical. With the 
unconscious `prone' to fragmentation and the conscious `unified'. So that we 
may locate ourselves more clearly we find `[space] is reinforced not only by 
administrative subdivision, not only by scientific and technical specialization, but 
also - indeed most of all - by the retail selling of space' (Lefebvre, 1991: 355). 
We shall follow Lefebvre a little further. He tells us: 
Under its homogeneous aspect, space abolishes distinctions and differences, 
among them that between inside and outside... (Ibid. ) 
In these comments by Lefebvre, we see I think the problems of homogeneous and 
heterogeneous concepts of space, but like heteroglossia and monoglossia they do 
operate simultaneously. For the present, however, we merely note the question of 
space, especially in its carnival settting. We have still to answer the question of 
Freud in the public square. I think, at least as far as this dissertation is concerned, 
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two figures pushed open the old-oak rusted doors of Renaissance Carnival: 
Bakhtin who took us back to the robust imagery of Rabelais, and Freud who 
`released' the instincts endlessly repressed since the Renaissance. Bakhtin knew 
that he could not push such heavy doors open single-handedly and he enlisted the 
assistance of Freud to interpret the images, at least unofficially. 
Lord of Misrule 
Finally in this chapter, we must mention the Lord of Misrule - the carnival king. 
If repression and resistance and displacement are all part of the carnival imagery, 
then what of the crowning and uncrowning of the Carnival king? The carnival 
king is a cultural and artistic equivalent of the Freudian ego. The earlier 
mentioned language of the marketplace included praise and abuse and it also 
included the thrashing of the king. In carnival, according to our hypothesis, the 
carnival king is the conscious and unconscious `form' of the ego. The unified 
monoglot voices are represented by the king, and the carnival folk represent the 
interpenetrating voices of heteroglossia and the stratifying forces involved in this. 
However, as we shall see, the ego is from the first a meconnaissance and the 
rivalry and jealousy associated with this primary identification are reflected or 
refracted in a quite concrete sense within the Renaissance conceptualization of 
carnival. We shall in our next chapter continue our discussion of the Freudian 
ego. Finally, in this chapter we leave the last word with Freud. If in carnival we 
have cross-dressing and upside-down and back-to-front and the clown and joker 
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and all those carnival figures that exceed the boundaries of the body and the word, 
they are in fact all represented in the bourgeois parlour of Freud with his method 
of free association. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
REFLECTIONS ON LACAN: THE MIRROR AND THE PRISM 
Introduction - the consulting room 
If, in carnival, we discovered the systems of images, and the devices that created 
the crowning/uncrowning ceremonies of mock kings and queens, then we have 
found the mimes, masks, mummers' plays and rituals and ceremonies of antiquity. 
In carnival, we discovered a highly complex system of imagery, which is weaved 
with all the intricacy of girls' plaited coloured ribbons around the maypole. It is a 
totally collective experience and does not harbour separation anywhere in its 
organic form. It has no footlights separating the spectator from the performer; all 
the forms are fused together in the spectacle. 
By attempting to unleash the forces of the unconscious discovered by Freud, and 
simultaneously opening the floodgates of the Bakhtinian contrapuntal forces in 
language, we create a maelstrom of activity, which is not easy to assimilate nor 
control. We need, however, to ask ourselves a certain question. Why have we 
attempted to release these forces, to what purpose, and how does it affect our 
lives? It is in the psychoanalytic session (the `bourgeois parlour') that the 
interplay of all the forces previously discussed comes into play, where the forces 
of the unconscious collide with the Bakhtinian philosophy of language. If we 
focus upon the consulting room dialectic, then the fusion of the psychoanalytic 
plane and the interpenetration of the speech plane become paramount. By this 
point, we see that the 'reality' of both psychoanalysis and the unconscious on one 
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hand, and linguistics and literature/literary theory on the other hand, are being 
pushed closer together into the `bourgeois parlour'. There is no longer, hopefully 
as the result of our efforts, the `spatial' difference that occurred in the first 
chapter. 
In a pincer movement operated by psychoanalysis and linguistic theory, they 
catch, take hold and embrace in the heady atmospheric of the psychoanalytic 
session at last. If the route seems circuitous, it is because all the generalized 
parameters need to be in place to reach the psychoanalytic session and our 
discussion of fragmented speech. Both psychoanalysis and linguistic theory 
embrace in this space, because the only tool of psychoanalysis is speech and its 
background agency, silence. In this chapter, we introduce the work of the French 
psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, allowing us to interpret the discovery of 
fragmented speech in the unconscious. 
In the case of Lacan a cursory interpretation will never suffice. In Lacan's work 
too, the problem of the `second consciousness' is raised. The `other' in Lacan is 
not a directly exchangeable coin of currency with the `other' of Bakhtin. In fact, 
we may say that the coin of currency of the `other' in Lacan is not itself a single 
coin, but is exchanged and chinks in a variety of ways. We have to mint a new 
coin of the `other' for an understanding of Lacan. Primarily, in his work we have 
to contend with the other and the Other. 
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I think it is important to understand that Lacan's Other is deliberately ambiguous 
and ambivalent, it shifts in meaning. That is why it is a space of the Other. it is 
also the Other, it is language as the Other (Symbolic) and it is the Other of the 
unconscious. It is this dance of significations that is deliberately provoked and 
choreographed for us by Lacan. If, in Bakhtin, the `drive' is not just monologistic 
or dialogistic but the interrelationship between both, then in Lacan, it is not just 
the other and the Other but their interrelationship in the analytic session that 
provides the `drive'. Hopefully, this briefest description of the other and the 
Other as interrelationships in Lacan's work, will suffice for the present and 
provide at least a small example of how Lacan's coins of currency ring out against 
each other. Lacan thus provides us with an interrelationship of the other and the 
Other -a `second consciousness'. 
Bakhtin and Lacan 
I think the essential question posed for Bakhtin's work, is not only its 
interconnection with Freudian psychoanalysis but also its link with Lacanian 
psychoanalysis. Notwithstanding the undoubted parallelism between aspects of 
ethics in Bakhtin and Lacan, a preoccupation with the `other', in terms of dialogic 
activity, vitally links the work of both men. Even as a first instance, this is the 
case. For example, we think of a comment by Hirschkop that provides initial 
momentum: 
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When we first meet this concept ['dialogism'] in Bakhtin's work it describes a 
certain relation between distinct `voices' in a narrative text ... (Hirschkop, 
1989: 
3). 
There is an interesting relationship of intersubjectivity between the other (Other) 
in Lacan and the dialogization of the other in Bakhtin. Taking up one further 
thread of Hirschkop, we find the following: 
That Bakhtin should be compelled to describe dialogism in terms of encounter 
and making present the other is no accident ... 
(Hirschkop, 1998: 186) 
This steady build up of a picture of the other in Bakhtin is juxtaposed remarkably 
with the other (Other) in Lacan. Hirschkop goes even further when he says: 
Of course, even to mention that ugly word [gesellschaft] is to set people on 
edge, to seem to prescribe an endless diet of linguistic alienation and 
homelessness. (Hirschkop, 1998: 194). 
This alienation and homelessness casts us into the very heart of Lacan's project. 
Once more in Hirschkop, we find: `one cannot speak without getting into an 
argument' (Hirschkop, 1998: 186). Have we not already seen Lacan say variously 
that the very basis of communication is misunderstanding? 
In our process thus far, \\, -e have only gradually drawn psychoanalysis and literary 
theory into the same social space. the psychoanalytic session. It is here that we 
110 
investigate aspects of Lacan's work and his assessment of the other/Other in the 
distinct dialogic space of the psychoanalytic session. Why should we say that 
there is no direct parallel of the other in Bakhtin on one hand and Lacan on the 
other hand? The answer to this nests in the fact that Lacan directly accepted the 
unconscious and the right to interpret it. 
If one is prepared to accept the existence of the unconscious, and this is certainly 
true of the Freudian unconscious, then one is placed in the position of analysing at 
least elements of its content and form. Unless one is prepared to ignore it 
altogether, not unfortunately unknown today even in psychoanalysis, then one 
must be prepared to make some observations on its probable form and content. 
That is unless of course one is able to formulate a discourse that endlessly exposes 
the unconscious in discourse anyway, or discourse in the unconscious. At any 
rate, it is the assessment of some probable elements of its form and content that 
makes up this chapter. 
So, we have drawn this narrative into a narrower, smaller, and more intense social 
space, known as the psychoanalytic session. The Bakhtinian philosophy of 
language and psychoanalysis becomes condensed into the steamy and sultry 
hothouse atmospheric of the consulting room dialectic, with the `gaze' of the 
analyst and the couch of symptoms. This is the place where the two domains of 
psychoanalysis and linguistic theory finally meet - and so too the analyst and the 
analysand. 
Hunting with Lacan 
But what, where, and whom is the subject in this smaller intense social space? 
Having installed, in true Bakhtinian style, an intense `ideological' purview, a 
shared scene and a mutually contextualized space, we can now pinpoint elements 
of a Lacanian discourse in the psychoanalytic session. To hunt with the falconer 
Lacan, is to chase `an other' quarry. The Lacanian hawk, stoops to its prey but is 
schooled with a different lure, is tempted with another bait. Lacan poses the 
problem of desire and the shifting field of the other. In him we see for the first 
time, effectively, the marriage of literature/linguistics and psychoanalysis. 
No one, as far as we know, has drawn literature and literary theory into the 
psychoanalytic field with the same intensity as Lacan, except Freud. The 
problems inherent in any convergence of the two are expressed more fully in his 
work than anywhere else. Freud could not take advantage of the linguistics of the 
Soviets nor the Swiss. Nevertheless, it is certainly possible to argue that much of 
Freud's work seems to intuite certain developments in linguistics. Is not Freud's 
technique of free association an attempt to locate unconscious dialogism through 
the holes left in the conscious dialogue? Anyway, it is certainly possible to argue 
that he discovered an unconscious discourse that interfered with the intentions of 
consciousness. 
In his style, Lacan refracts psychoanalytic `light' at differing angles. The optic of 
his images reflects and refracts a series of angled mirrors that shimmer with this 
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different light, because of his linguistic intensity in a psychoanalytic field. So it is 
that we discover in Lacan his predisposition toward the concept of the image and 
the social milieu. How then do we approach the myriad beams of interaction and 
intensity in the work of the psychoanalyst, Lacan? 
In Lacan's the `Mirror Stage' paper it is all too easy to hurry forward. The 
formulation of his concept lends itself to hurrying forward. And it is as well to 
content oneself, at least at this stage, with a couple of pages only. Also of course 
we do not wish to be accused in a similar fashion to Freud. He was frequently 
charged - and is to this day - with the accusation that he asserted that 
resistance to his ideas proves their validity and the only other alternative is 
acceptance of them. In fact of course this was never true, Freud, however, was 
aware of the charge and responded to it. In our analysis of Lacan's Mirror Stage 
we do not wish to be accused similarly. Anyway, it is all too easy to pass over the 
Mirror Stage far too quickly. 
No Innocent Space 
So even before we start we may ask, is Lacan's mirror itself a metaphorical 
device in the first instance? In other words, does Lacan offer a chimera early, 
prior to the introduction of his ideas? The metaphor would be surrounded by 
innemvelt and umwelt reflections, illusions and meconnaissance. Also the mirror 
teases the verification of the unconscious in a symbolic form. The reflection must 
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accept the conscious and unconscious duality as first outlined by Freud, at least in 
terms of psychoanalysis. 
So it is not the Mirror Stage as a concept that has a metaphorical form, rather the 
mirror. The chimera involves firstly an assumed identification as a first term and 
signification as a second term. It is suggested also that we do not `spring without 
the slightest hesitation from mental to social' in terms of space. We also do not 
wish to incorporate `a mental space which is apparently, but only apparently, 
extra-ideological' (Lefebvre, 1991: 6) and of course this seemingly applies to 
physical space. So it is that we must be careful with the conceptualization of 
space, as we saw in the last chapter on carnival; it may be seen in terms of 
homogeneity and heterogeneity. We have already posited the idea of unified and 
fragmented space. We must remember, however, that according to Lacan our first 
reflection in the mirror appears hardly to have been a success. So the first step is 
to stand back from the mirror and deflect its reflection. Returning to our earlier 
remarks concerning Freud, it is only with the entirety of Freud's oeuvre that we 
now position ourselves in relationship to a mirror. 
Humphrey Bogart and Identification 
Once we begin to speak of identification in terms of the mirror, we have already 
marshalled Freud's oeuvre in advance. Hence, Lacan's advice to Return to 
Fireud, presumably before you even pass this point. In the light of Freud's 
theories the mirror poses a problem. Precisely what is the image that is mirrored? 
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Precisely what is the space that it mirrors? So, as we say, before we confront the 
mirror we nominate its metaphorical or metonymic or symbolic role. What do we 
mean by this? If the mirror is viewed metaphorically it replaces an image with 
another image, if metonymically it juxtaposes images. It transfers the image into 
an `other'. We may think here of the film To Have and Have Not (Director, 
Howard Hawks, 1944). From an original story by Ernest Hemingway but part 
screenplayed by the Nobel prize winner William Faulkner, the hero has two 
names - without explanation. The actor Walter Brennan calls Humphrey Bogart 
`Harry' and Lauren Bacall calls him `Steve'. Presumably his identity slips away 
in the interstice. 
Unfortunately, any psychoanalyst cannot afford the luxury of dealing solely with 
the rational; they must also contend with the irrational as a factor and reality of 
the psyche. So is the mirror a contradiction? Is it a carnivalistic counter-image? 
Does the mirror in fact shatter into shards under the impact of Lacan's thought? 
One further consideration is representation, what does the mirror represent? 
What does the mirror reflect in terms of the unconscious? We do not arrive at the 
mirror this time unarmed, thanks to Lacan. 
So it is suggested that before we even arrive at the mirror we must take 
cognizance of: (i) identification; and (ii) signification in terms of the 
psychoanalytic process. Also the mirror despite its significance is still an object. 
There is no subject-to-subject correspondence of course. It is an object (as object) 
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and an objective of the dialogic. We repeat, we should not arrive innocently at a 
mirror twice. However, it is surely the play of significations that fascinates. 
Fascination with the image introduces us to the Lacanian mirror. Before we 
proceed we need to look perhaps at a few more comments. For example, if we are 
not in charge in our own house, if there is no unitary image of ourselves (in terms 
of conscious and unconscious forces) or unitary image of ourselves on an external 
plane, who precisely is the stranger in the mirror? 
With these few comments we have attempted to introduce the Lacanian mirror as 
a concept and not, up until this point, the Lacanian Mirror Stage as experience. 
Now we glimpse the Mirror Stage concept presented for us by Lacan. In and with 
Lacan's Mirror Stage paper we draw together all the previous implications of our 
work thus far. Here we shall discover the relevance of centripetal and centrifugal 
forces in language: of monoglossia and heteroglossia, of the image of the body 
and the image of the word; the forces of consciousness and the forces of the 
unconscious. So, what precisely happens in the Mirror Stage paper? Let us check 
a comment that helps in the initial stages: 
Lacan's principal thesis is that the newly born human infant, initially sunk in 
motor incapacity, turbulent movements, and fragmentation, first experiences 
itself as a unity through experiencing some kind of reflection of itself, the 
paradigm for which would be self-reflection in a mirror (Muller and Richardson, 
1982: 29). 
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Lacan gives us to understand that this initial experience of the fragmented body is 
due to the `specific prematurity of birth in man' (Lacan, 1977: 4). We now check 
another Lacanian comment that describes for us the experience of the child at the 
mirror stage: 
This jubilant assumption of his specular image by the child at the infans stage, 
still sunk in his motor incapacity and nursling dependence, would seem to 
exhibit in an exemplary situation the symbolic matrix in which the I is 
precipitated in a primordial form, before it is objectified in the dialectic of 
identification with the other.... The fact is that the total form of the body by 
which the subject anticipates in a mirage the maturation of his power, is given to 
him only as Gestalt, that is to say, in an exteriority in which this form is 
certainly more constituent than constituted, but in which it appears to him above 
all in a contrasting size (un relief stature) that fixes it and in a symmetry that 
inverts it, in contrast with the turbulent movements that the subject feels are 
animating him. (Lacan, 1977[1966]: 2). 
The next point is crucial, Lacan remarks: 
This fragmented body - which term I have also introduced into our system of 
theoretical references - usually manifests itself in dreams when the movement 
of the analysis encounters a certain level of aggressive disintegration in the 
individual. It then appears in the form of disjointed limbs, or of those organs 
represented in exoscopy, growing wings and taking arms for intestinal 
persecutions - the very same that the visionary Hieronymus Bosch has fixed, 
for all time, in painting, in their ascent from the fifteenth century to imaginary 
zenith of modern man. (Lacan, 1977: 4-5). 
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So from this we see that the fragmented body-image is held, as a `value' in the 
unconscious. The image of the `whole body' is held by the conscious, and the 
image of the fragmented body is held by the unconscious. However, in our 
hypothesis the image of the fragmented body is tied to the image of the 
fragmented word, hence it is a speech complex. Before we analyse the nature of 
the fragmented word we also assume that the `whole word-image' is held by 
consciousness, like that of the body image, and that it too represses a fragmented 
image in order to `unify' the ego. As Lacan says, however, the ego is a 
meconnaissance by the subject in the first place. 
The `whole body-image' in terms of speech has more in common with 
monoglossia and is therefore tied to the ego; and the `fragmented body-image' in 
terms of speech is, in effect, tied to the unconscious and has more in common 
with heteroglossia. The whole word-image is monoglossia in the conscious, and 
the fragmented word-image is heteroglossia in the field of the unconscious. We 
know that monoglossia and heteroglossia are both situated in consciousness, but 
speech in its fragmented aspect would have to be nominated within the register of 
heteroglossia in the unconscious. Monoglossia and heteroglossia may both be 
interpreted in terms of psychoanalysis, as we shall see. Just as we know that 
speech in its unified aspect would have to be nominated to consciousness and 
monoglossia, at least in terms of an ego position. However, we would state that 
monoglossia and heteroglossia do have a role in the formation of the body-image 
and the 'L'ord-image. So how do we come upon the fragmented image of speech? 
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Fragmented Speech 
At the present level of our enquiries we have assumed that fragmented speech is 
connected to the image of the f agmented body, in the first instance, in the infant, 
we must add to this the `image' of fragmented drives, however, this is not a 
dominant of our discursive field at present. The image of speech is probably 
built-up by a series of images, at first inchoate, in much the same way as the body 
image is built up, with the capability for construction or destruction. In a similar 
way, the word has an `image' of itself, an historical apperception that builds up 
internally (within itself) and externally (in the world of the other). It appears to us 
that the word has a relationship to itself - inner dynamic - and an exterior 
relationship - external dynamic and, so Bakhtin tells us, memory. 
The word also has an inward relationship to the Subject and an outward 
relationship as it crosses the threshold from the inner to the outer world. There is 
a connection between the image of the body and the image of speech, which it is 
hard to ignore. However, our case does not rest upon this assumption, although it 
is an interesting point to note. As the image of the fragmented body is replaced 
by the image of the `whole body', the gestalt, at the Mirror Stage, so the image of 
the fragmented word is replaced by the image of the `whole word', i. e., the 
'gestalt' of the word. The image of `wholeness' is now held in consciousness, 
and the image of fragmentation repressed into the unconscious. The fragmented 
body image and fragmented speech are tied to each other as image and accrue as a 
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`value' in the unconscious, fragmented speech has far more in common with 
spectral dispersion than unity. 
Lacan tells us that the event of the mirror stage takes place from the age of six 
months. Continuing, Lacan says: `unable as yet to walk, or even to stand up... ' 
the child `... overcomes in a flutter of jubilant activity, the obstructions of his 
support and, fixing his attitude in a slightly leaning-forward position, in order to 
hold it in his gaze, brings back an instantaneous aspect of the image' (Lacan, 
1977: 1-2). It seems to us that these observations are generally observable if a 
child is confronted with a mirror. It certainly does not need, in any general sense, 
quantifiable evidence of the phenomenon one would have thought. Lacan's 
`flutter of jubilant activity' is quite easily observed. However, before moving any 
further we must recognize the concept of aggressivity and alienation that Lacan 
detected also. Lacan tells us: 
We have only to understand the mirror stage as an identification, in the full 
sense that analysis gives to the term: namely the transformation that takes place 
in the subject when he assumes an image. (Lacan, 1977: 2) 
Lacan again: 
This form would have to be called the Ideal-I if we wished to incorporate it into 
our usual register, in the sense that it will also be the source of secondary 
identifications, under which term I would place the functions of libidinal 
normalization. But the important point is that this form situates the agency of 
the ego, before its social determination, in a fictional direction, which will 
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always remain irreducible for the individual alone, or rather, which will only 
rejoin the coming-into-being (le devenir) of the subject asymptotically, whatever 
the success of the dialectical syntheses by which he must resolve as I his 
discordance with his own reality. (Lacan, 1977: 2). 
We have already discovered that the mirror stage, as experience, reflects initially 
a total unity replacing fragmentation. But we now discover, crucially, that the 
primary identification becomes an idealized model, and all subsequent secondary 
identifications are based upon this assumption. However, the form of this 
assumption, just prior to identification, is `other', external to the subject, and 
consequently is experienced as alienation. This leads to `the assumption of the 
armour of an alienating identity, which will mark with its rigid structure the 
subject's entire mental development' (Lacan, 1977: 4). Aggressivity and 
alienation are now enclosed in the ego, and we shall have to bear this constantly 
in mind. 
Fragmented Body Image 
In the light of our previous comments we need to reflect differently and peer, as it 
were, deeper into the mirror. The child perceiving itself in the mirror still lacks 
co-ordination of movement; however, it comprehends the visual image, at some 
point, as a unitary image of wholeness. This of course belies the uncoordinated 
and fragmentary nature of the child's movements. The initial jubilation of the 
child absorbing the image of wholeness is in fact premature, because the 
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always remain irreducible for the individual alone, or rather, which will only 
rejoin the coming-into-being (le devenir) of the subject asymptotically, whatever 
the success of the dialectical syntheses by which he must resolve as I his 
discordance with his own reality. (Lacan, 1977: 2). 
We have already discovered that the mirror stage, as experience, reflects initially 
a total unity replacing fragmentation. But we now discover, crucially, that the 
primary identification becomes an idealized model, and all subsequent secondary 
identifications are based upon this assumption. However, the form of this 
assumption, just prior to identification, is `other', external to the subject, and 
consequently is experienced as alienation. This leads to `the assumption of the 
armour of an alienating identity, which will mark with its rigid structure the 
subject's entire mental development' (Lacan, 1977: 4). Aggressivity and 
alienation are now enclosed in the ego, and we shall have to bear this constantly 
in mind. 
Fragmented Body Image 
In the light of our previous comments we need to reflect differently and peer, as it 
were, deeper into the mirror. The child perceiving itself in the mirror still lacks 
co-ordination of movement; however, it comprehends the visual image, at some 
point, as a unitary image of wholeness. This of course belies the uncoordinated 
and fragmentary nature of the child's movements. The initial jubilation of the 
child absorbing the image of wholeness is in fact premature, because the 
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fragmented body-image lags behind the unitary image perceived in the mirror. 
The ego is formed at this point. 
The child perceives the image as jubilatory on one hand but also identifies the 
image as the other and this relationship is one of alienation. As the child absorbs 
in a jubilatory fashion the unity of its person (we leave aside for the moment any 
`Other' comment or reflected image) reflected in the specular image, the 
alienation between the reflected specular image and the subject is manifest. The 
child now has an imaginary relationship with its specular image. So there now 
exists a libidinal relationship with the body image. 
Identification 
So it is that the ego is constructed by identification with the specular image at the 
Mirror Stage, setting up also the relationship of alienation with the `Ideal' mirror 
image. The child is now in the perilous position of alienation with its own image 
as other. This results in an aggressive tension between the subject and the image. 
The child, to resolve the aggressive tension, identifies with the image. This is the 
earlier mentioned primary identification. As we now see the mirror stage has 
become a raise en scene, a site of alienation for the subject - from himself. 
The child has also identified the other as rival. We find Lacan's aggressivity 
situated in the dual relation existing between the ego and its counterpart (see 
Lacan, 1977: 8-29). Now, howw ever, the wholeness of the unitary image threatens 
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the body with the previous condition of uncoordinated movements, 
dismemberment and fragmentation. So the child identifies with the apparently 
unitary specular image, and ejects the previous condition of the fragmented and 
uncoordinated into the unconscious. 
As Bakhtin said on numerous occasions, only Adam received language 
unannointed (and we might add) with the discourse and inflection of the other. 
We may, however, aliken the process of aggressivity in Lacan, formed at the 
Mirror Stage experience, to the hostile brothers Cain and Abel. As soon as 
language was handed down from Adam and Eve, as holders of the original 
utterance - to Cain and Abel - the first murder took place. Perhaps the mirror 
was only discovered by the second generation? The hostile brothers are the 
metaphor for the image perceived and image received - aggressivity at the point 
of the formation of the ego. 
In several places we left out the Other holding the child in front of the mirror and 
the reflected environment seen by the child. The reason for this is that the social 
T and the role of the Other in the first instance of the Mirror Stage need to be 
cautiously interpreted. 
Image of Language as System 
We consider that Lacan is quite correct in his assessment in the Mirror Stage 
paper, with the exception that fragmented speech is tied to the fragmented body as 
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image. Now it follows that the fragmented nature of the word and language as 
system accompanying all the previously mentioned fragmented and dismembered 
considerations, is held somewhere as a fragmented image along with the 
fragmented body image that returns in the psychoanalytic session. The small 
cluster of fragmented word images and the assumption of language as system 
image arrive at the mirror simultaneously (this simultaneity is not vital, at this 
stage it is the principle of the repression of both that is crucial) with the image of 
the fragmented body. The visual image snaps shut the unitary ego with its 
assumption of unity. 
Hence, the assumption of the unity of the specular image draws the word into the 
illusion, and the specular image is a meconnaissance. The fragmented body- 
image is held in the unconscious to become the return of the repressed, so too the 
fragmented word-image is held in the unconscious. We now look at two further 
comments by Lacan that describe elements of the fragmented body: 
One only has to listen to children aged between two and five playing, alone or 
together, to know that the pulling off of the head and ripping open of the belly 
are themes that occur spontaneously to their imagination, and that this is 
corroborated by the experience of the doll torn to pieces. 
Also: 
We must turn to the works of Hieronymus Bosch for an atlas of all the 
aggressive images that torment mankind. (Lacan, 1977: 11) 
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Lacan may as well have added Gargantua and Pantragruel by Rabelais, however, 
in far more carnivalesque merry time (Bakhtin, 1984a). Hopefully, by this point, 
we have built up a reasonable image of the fragmented body. The image of 
fragmented speech has been repressed along with the image of the fragmented 
body and they both now take up residence in the unconscious. Conversely, the 
statuesque ego `the stone guest' now holds the keys of unity of the body and the 
word. The keys of fragmentation have been discarded, thrown into the dungeon 
of the unconscious. This is the situation that prevails at the Mirror Stage as 
experience. 
Return of the Repressed - Carnival Images 
We can now, with profit, remember of course the earlier mentioned carnival 
images in connection with the Lacanian concept of the fragmented body and its 
connection with the lower material bodily stratum and the Grotesque Body. In 
connection with this, we may refer to two relevant studies in: Bakhtin Carnival 
and Other Subjects (Ed. by David Shepherd). The first of these is The Ethics of 
Subject Creation in Bakhtin and Lacan (Handley, 1993). Obviously, as the title 
suggests, Handley deals primarily with the ethical positions of both Bakhtin and 
Lacan, in relation to subject creation. This does not immediately concern us in 
the direct way that it is developed by Handley. However, Handley's study is 
extremely informative and is a necessary addition to the current discussion. As an 
example of this we have: 
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Lacanian analysis, for all its theoretical applications, is first and finally such an 
event [open event of the lived life], an active dialogue or process between the 
analyst and the analysand, like that between the author and hero. (Handley, 
1993: 145). 
If this is correct, then we could argue that Lacan has developed the possibilities 
inherent in author and hero relationships that are present neither in Rank nor 
Freud. This would appear to be in part due to his other and Other 
interrelationships. At any rate, we may see a useful connection made by Handley, 
linking the analyst and analysand with the author and hero, and he develops his 
argument accordingly. From our point of view, this connection seems extremely 
useful for future research. However, we would suggest that Handley does not 
quite develop enough connections to be drawn from Lacan's mirror stage. 
Although he discusses the fact that there is `no internal sovereign territory' 
(Handley, 1993: 150) according to Bakhtin, he moves a little too quickly in his 
assessments. For example, we consider that the implications of Lacan's Symbolic 
Order are developed too quickly, too soon, whereas we have tried to halt 
perception at an earlier point. 
The second study to which we refer is Unachievable Monologism and the 
Production of the Monster (Hall, 1993). Hall too develops Lacan's Mirror Stage 
in terms of a Bakhtinian analysis. Hall has this to say: 
The Lacanian mirror phase is helpful here, since the idealising perception of the 
body unified by the je ideal' corresponds almost exactly to the Classical 
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monologism which Bakhtin's narrative locates as triumphant over the collective 
-grotesque body' (Hall, 1993: 104). 
Although we have not moved very far with the Lacanian concept of `je ideal' we 
must agree with Hall when he says `... correspond[s] almost exactly to the 
Classical monologism which Bakhtin's narrative locates as triumphant over the 
collective "grotesque body" ' (Hall, 1993: 104). We see here the connection 
between monologism and the grotesque body. The connection, however, that we 
wish to develop is the idea that the fragmented body and the fragmented word are 
linked with the conception of the grotesque body and the grotesque language of 
the marketplace. Hall is not quite correct when he makes the following comment: 
The infant's pleasurable identification with this idealised and idealising image of 
the self might as well be said to correspond dialectically to the uncontrolled 
dispersive drives and non- individuation, now left behind but `obscurely 
remembered' as a terror overcome. (Hall, 1993: 104). 
To take the last point first, it is certainly far from being the case that it is a `terror 
overcome', as hopefully we shall see in the rest of the dissertation. 
Anxiety 
In fact, we wish to argue that terrible anxiety accompanies the repressed images 
of the fragmented body and fragmented speech. Also, the `infant's pleasure' is of 
course tainted in Lacan by aggressivity (Lacan, 1977: 8-29), when the child finds 
in the specular image along \v ith jubilation, alienation. However, the point we 
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wish to make is that Hall's phrase `obscurely remembered' is not, at least for our 
purposes, quite correct and the `uncontrolled dispersive drives' and `non- 
individuation' (Hall, 1993: 104) are actually repressed into the unconscious. We 
have no wish to be pedantic but `obscurely remembered' is not accurate enough. 
Having now looked at these two studies briefly, let us return to our theme. We 
have seen that there is a fragmented body, as image, held in the unconscious. As 
we know the image of the fragmented body exists in Carnival - the image of 
dismemberment (grotesque body). And, as we have also seen, the grotesque body 
is accompanied by the grotesque word (language of the marketplace) in Carnival. 
Returning, however, to the Mirror Stage experience, it becomes clear in Lacan 
that the relationship of the subject to the specular image is filtered through a prism 
of inversion; there is consequently a distortion of the ego's perception of reality, 
leading to a meconnaissance that structures the ego. 
This leads to a misrecognition by the child itself, of itself, and of others and the 
associated spaces. As we said earlier, however, we must hold steady in this 
mental space at present, we must neither move too quickly into the social space, 
nor into physical assumptions of space. Neither must we move too quickly into 
the space of the other/Other described for us by Lacan. Unfortunately, it seems 
we must hold the image of the unitary mirror and the fragmented mirror 
simultaneously as image(s). Now , 
however, we theorize on a separate path from 
Lacan's work on the fragmented body. The fragmented body is rejected or 
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ejected by the developing ego (meconnaissance) and consciousness at the Mirror 
Stage. The subject, perceiving the illusory premature unity of the body image, 
assumes the spurious unity of the ego. 
Imaginary 
It is an imaginary unity for, because of prematurity at birth, the infant appears to 
be in a hurry to constitute and consolidate its own image; so the child fortifies the 
castle of the ego with armour-like defences, in its rush to evade the ramifications 
inherent in its earlier motor incapacity, nursling dependence and fragmented 
body. Now, as the fragmented and dismembered are discarded in favour of the 
unitary ego, they are now to be found in the unconscious. And, according to both 
Freud and Lacan, we will always experience, at some stage, the return of the 
repressed. To this point Lacan has taken us. It is here that we recall the crowning 
and uncrowning of the carnival king. The ego is not only uncrowned but also 
beaten in carnival. There is a carnival image of the crowned and uncrowned ego 
and the ego is displaced through the recognition, in carnival, of the 
meconnaissance, hence the uncrowning through laughter. 
However, what we wish to suggest here, is that the image of the fragmented body 
that is driven into the unconscious, is accompanied by the fragmented word. The 
thing that must constantly be borne in mind in all of this, is the fact that, for 
Lacan, the ego unity is a ineconnaissance, in other words it is a fiction. But 
outside of this spurious ego construction there is still a field of fragmentation and 
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dismemberment. And this field of the fragmented and dismembered has an image 
in language itself. Not, however, until Bakhtin does it become possible to 
visualize this. This is because language is generally assumed to seek (as with the 
ego) unity of the image. However, as we have seen, Bakhtin has left us with an 
alternative to monologism, to monoglossia, and that is heteroglossia. Armed by 
Bakhtin with this information, allows us to identify the unity of the ego 
(meconnaissance) within the field of monoglossia in Bakhtin's theory of the 
centripetal and centrifugal forces operative in language. 
We have now discovered the discarded sibling of the unified ego, the fragmented 
and dismembered, taking up residence in the field of the unconscious. Following 
its exclusion from the field of the unitary ego, it is now in the centrifugal force 
field of dispersal. The fragmented body, of which Lacan speaks, is now 
accompanied by the image of fragmented speech. As the unity of the ego is a 
meconnaissance in Lacan, I suggest there is a similar meconnaissance of the 
image of speech as a unity also; and this will have far-reaching implications. 
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Register of fragmented and dismembered 
The ego resides in the unitary image of language known by Bakhtin as 
monoglossia and the fragmented and dismembered resides in the field known as 
heteroglossia. These images of fragmentation nest in the fields of heteroglossia, 
or in the case of assumed unity, monoglossia, but they are not monoglossia or 
heteroglossia per se. In the case of Lacan, we must note that he deals in the 
psychoanalytic session with the problem of the fragmented body, but he does not 
deal with the problem of the speech complex, which is the tie between the inner 
body (including images of the organs) and outer body in terms of fragmentation 
and dismemberment, and the possibility of the fragmentation of speech. But, and 
this is where Bakhtin comes in, the image of the fragmented body and fragmented 
word as a speech complex, can only be formulated in terms of Bakhtin's 
monoglossia and heteroglossia. We are not speaking here of symptoms that 
involve brain lesions, we are speaking of a speech complex derived from 
psychoanalytic and linguistic theory. 
The child initially has a fragmented body-image and just as surely has a 
fragmented speech-image. Driven by the premature need to unify the ego, the 
fragmented body image is repressed into the unconscious and so is the fragmented 
image of speech. As the ego spuriously unites the image of the fragmented body, 
it drives the image into the unconscious by which it is haunted, creating the 
possibility of its return as the return of the repressed. In the case of the 
fragmented image of speech, the child assumes the unity of the image of speech 
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(monoglossia), thereby driving the fragmented and dismembered image of speech 
into the unconscious also, and under certain circumstances this too becomes the 
return of the repressed. 
In the case of a unitary image, of speech or the body, this creates a premature 
state of unity in consciousness. Speech now crystallizes as a monologic field in 
support of the ego and monoglossia is now the image of speech, held by 
consciousness and the ego. In the unconscious the fragmented body-image 
(which according to Lacan still exists, and returns during psychoanalysis) and the 
fragmented word-image, create a heterogeneous state of the image of the body 
and speech in the unconscious. So it is that the fragmented image of speech is a 
heteroglot force in the unconscious. 
Surface of Language 
Not until Bakhtin is the surface of language drawn back for long enough to reveal 
heteroglossia; previously a monologic world is assumed. Now we see that 
fragmentation is reflected and refracted through the prism of language as well as 
the image of the fragmented body. So the speech complex is an inchoate image of 
the body and the word tied to each other in the unconscious. Meanwhile, 
consciousness, it is assumed, holds all the cards of unity. All that is fragmented 
and dismembered has been despatched to the unconscious. However, if Lacan is 
correct and the fragmented body (now including the fragmented image of speech) 
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returns from the unconscious during the analytic process then it obviously has 
remained active in the unconscious. 
Fragmented Body and Word - Return of the Repressed 
It is easier to pause momentarily and reflect upon the implications of these ideas. 
For example, Lacan did not identify the possibility of a fragmented and 
dismembered image of speech as also being repressed into the unconscious. He 
did, however, identify the fragmented body and its implications for 
psychoanalysis, and he certainly visualized its presence in the unconscious. But if 
we are correct and the fragmented image of speech is repressed at the same time 
as the image of the fragmented body, then we must demonstrate, as Lacan did, 
that in this case too there will be the return of the repressed. The approximate 
timing of the repression of the fragmented image of the body, and the timing of 
the repression of the fragmented image of speech requires more research but at 
the moment would impede progress. For the moment, we assume the simultaneity 
of ejection from the ego of the image of the fragmented body and fragmented 
speech. 
So it is that we understand the fragmented image of speech, with all its inchoate 
impulses, devoid of the unifying presence of the ego, it sinks under the surface of 
consciousness to take up residence in the unconscious. This, however, would 
have had to be the end of the matter, but Bakhtin discovered a force field in 
language, which he named heteroglossia. It is often assumed that everyone works 
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toward a unified vision of language, but heteroglossia is an other force field, 
perhaps in many ways still to be discovered. It is into the forcefield of 
heteroglossia that the voices of the fragmented and dismembered disappear into 
the unconscious. And it is in the field of heteroglossia that they must indeed 
become the return of the repressed. They cannot re-group around any notion of 
monoglossia because the ego has already repulsed them, so they must return in the 
form of heteroglossia. This would appear to be the psychoanalytic aspect of 
heteroglossia. 
Heteroglossia and the Unconscious 
Desire cannot have language at its disposal until we understand what happened to 
the inchoate images of language. We could not understand any of these 
possibilities anyway, until the Bakhtinian concept of heteroglossia had arrived. 
Of course, as Bakhtin did not specifically deal with heteroglossia in the 
unconscious, or monoglossia for that matter, certain difficulties arise, but 
certainly not any problems that we have failed to encounter before. Nevertheless, 
we attempt to deal further with this concept now. If Bakhtin is right and 
monoglossia and heteroglossia exist as forces within language, and if Lacan is 
correct and the unconscious is structured like a language, then we are confronted 
with an immediate dilemma. It is likely that monologic and heterogeneous forces 
exist in both consciousness and the unconscious. 
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The monologic obviously veers towards consciousness, with its unitary ego, 
leading the battalion of the conscious forces. Of course this does not indicate that 
heterogeneity does not operate in consciousness as we have already seen, in fact, 
it does. However, heteroglossia would seem to be indicative of the nature of the 
unconscious. In other words there are a multiplicity of voices in the unconscious. 
Nevertheless, in dreams the monologic, or at least the ego, would seem to have its 
representative also. As Lacan himself says: 
Correlatively, the formation of the I is symbolized in dreams by a fortress or 
stadium - its inner arena and enclosure, surrounded by marshes and rubbish 
tips, dividing it into two opposed fields of contest where the subject flounders in 
quest of the lofty, remote inner castle whose form (sometimes juxtaposed in the 
same scenario) symbolizes the id in a startling way. Similarly, on the mental 
plane, we find realized the structures of fortified works, the metaphor of which 
arises spontaneously, as if issuing from the symptoms themselves, to designate 
the mechanisms of obsessional neurosis - inversion, isolation, reduplication, 
cancellation and displacement. (Lacan, 1977: 5). 
lt would surely appear from this, that the image of the unified ego is also in the 
unconscious field? Although care has to be taken with this, because it is possible 
to shatter into a multiplicity of images and characters in dreams and even turn into 
another person or people. All this allows us to realise a crossover of the two 
forces, from one field to another. 
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Whether or not there is the possibility of enantiodromia in this process and to 
what effect is difficult to say at this stage. In terms of the image of language, it 
seems to exist as monoglossia and heteroglossia in both consciousness and the 
unconscious but with a distinct bias in both cases. To sum up at this point, we 
could say that the unconscious holds the image(s) of heteroglossia dearer to itself. 
Likewise, consciousness tends to hold the image of monoglossia sacrosanct. 
Perhaps we could extrapolate from this that the unconscious tends to drive 
consciousness toward a multiplicity of voices (heteroglossia) and consciousness 
attempts, through monoglossia, to hold in check the multiplicity of voices 
emerging from the unconscious. By this principle, discovered by Bakhtin, we are 
able to locate both of these forces of language in the conscious and unconscious 
discovered by Freud. 
Field Theory 
At the moment we lack a field theory for the fragmented and dismembered, but 
slowly it becomes possible to build a picture. We have seen that the unitary and 
centripetalizing nature of monoglossia in language also extends to the 
meconnaissance of the ego detected by Lacan. But Bakhtin has taught us that the 
assumption of homogeneity in language is not correct. This fact allows us to 
expand our horizons into the multiple world of heteroglossia. Hopefully, it 
becomes clear at this point that we are attempting to provide a dialogized 
background for the fragmented and dismembered. It begins to occur to us that the 
systematicalness that Bakhtin so correctly rejected, in fact stood in the way of any 
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effective assessment of the value and buried treasure of the fragmented and 
dismembered. This may remind us likewise of Michael Holquist's comment in 
The Dialogic Imagination: 
Bakhtin is constantly working with what is emerging as the central 
preoccupation of our time - language. But unlike others who have made 
substantial contributions to our understanding of language in the twentieth 
century - Saussure, Hjelmslev, Benveniste and, above all, Roman Jakobson (all 
of whom are systematic to an extraordinary degree) - Bakhtin is not (Holquist, 
198 1: xvii-iii). 
And a further comment from Holquist is: 
Bakhtin, need it be said, is not working in this dichotomy of forces with the 
kind of binary opposition that has proved so important in structuralist linguistics 
(and so seductive to social scientists and humanists lusting for a greater degree 
of systematicalness). That opposition leads from human speech to computer 
language; it conduces, in other words, to machines. Bakhtin's sense of a duel 
between more widely implicated forces leads in the opposite direction and 
stresses the fragility and ineluctably historical nature of language, the coming 
and dying of meaning that it, as a phenomenon, shares with that other 
phenomenon it ventrioquates, man. (Holquist, 1981: xviii). 
lt is surely in this world that we must build a body-image and word-image 
`united' as a speech complex. It is in this sense that we have posited the 
background of Carnival. That is why we outlined the form of carnival so 
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distinctly in the previous chapter on Carnival. It holds a cultural and artistic key 
to the background of the fragmented, through the complex system of images 
known as Renaissance Carnival. It lends itself, if only as a background, to the 
dialogic terrain of the psychoanalytic session, to the fragmented body, and 
fragmented speech. 
Hopefully this clarifies the need for Bakhtin's vision in the preceding chapter on 
carnival. Again it is necessary to take full cognizance of the facts in carnival, 
stressing the fragmented, the dismembered, along with the displaced. But now we 
take up a snag deliberately left by Lacan when the image of the fragmented body 
was discovered. This is the psychoanalytic discovery by Lacan, of the 
aggressivity that accompanies, or seems to accompany, the fragmented and 
dismembered; fled as they are by the ego, for fear and terror of a return of the 
fragmented and dismembered. 
If we have maintained the connection between the fragmented and dismembered 
and all we have said about Carnival images, then we have the space, the ground at 
least for the base of our field theory. We need I think to remember that carnival 
links a complex system of images, often a non-verbal sign system of images. We 
return now, to our theme of aggressivity in Lacan, and its connection with the 
fragmented and dismembered, again bearing in mind the case we wish to 
represent, namely, the image of the body and speech, held fragmentarily in the 
unconscious. 
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Fountain of the Ego 
Correlatively, we have found the fragmented body and the fragmented word. 
Both have been denied succour at the fountain of the ego. Here we note that if 
there is dialogic fragmentation that accompanies the image of the fragmented 
body (left out by the agency of the ego) then it affects the whole field. The image 
of the fragmented body is cast back into the unconscious, anxiety holding in check 
its return. The formation of the ego is a meconnaissance, and the child 
misinterprets language too by enclosing only the monologic field of perception, 
establishing, within the child, a monologic field of vision, which is in fact a 
meconnaissance. So it is that we see the spuriously united image of speech in 
consciousness, which now coalesces with the image of the unified body, and 
presumably there is an attempt to unite the inchoate desires; in other words the 
whole process of unitary speech, unitary body, and unitary desires are all 
imagined and interrelated and all are an illusion. 
This is true at least in terms of the unitary ego. The fragmented body reappears in 
the psychoanalytic session as we have seen in Lacan, through the return of the 
repressed, analysed by the Freudian process of free association. In speech, the 
image of multiplicity, of heteroglossia is driven partially (there is no totalization 
in this) into the unconscious. The child has understood language only through a 
monologic reflective prism; the child has a monologic field of vision and naturally 
must assume that the other too holds this imaginary monologism. 
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There are planes of inner and outer conscious dialogic activity that play a crucial 
role in speech. For example, the other inside to whom we speak. It is essential 
that we fully orchestrate Bakhtin's polyphonic score in an analytic setting. We 
are using the term polyphony here in the sense as that which dialogizes all the 
interpenetrating voices of heteroglossia. We must identify the forces of 
centripetality and centrifugality as ` formative of the Function of the I as Revealed 
in Psychoanalytic Experience'. Thus it is we can see how one of the forces is 
driven underground. We find certain traits of the conscious and unconscious 
correlative to the centripetal and centrifugal forces in language. 
Anxiety concerning the return of the image of the fragmented word and body 
results in fleeing from the image of disunity. It is this interplay that leads to the 
repression into the unconscious of the fragmented dialectic into which the child is 
born. Unfortunately, fragmented speech does not directly have language at its 
disposal. Along with the image of the fragmented body it was repressed too early. 
It exists only in the unconscious, symbolized as the dismemberment of the body 
and the word, although it may return. Fragmented speech is thrust into the 
unconscious only as the bruised word of uncoordinated speech movement. But 
this is just as terrifying, one would have thought, as the image of the fragmented 
body. And it is fled with just as great intensity surely as the fragmented body 
image? However, as nothing ever comes to rest in the unconscious, this repressed 
early speech movement, progresses in some form in the unconscious. 
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Flotsam and Jetsam 
The evidence would appear to be that the fragmented and dismembered in fact 
develop as an underground stream of carnival that, for example in the novel, 
endlessly flows from a carnival sense of the word and world. As carnival flows 
past the supposed flotsam and jetsam of the fragmented word, it gathers it up and 
passes it, as it were, along an associated cultural and artistic chain. This achieves 
two purposes. It releases the forces of heteroglossia in the unconscious into the 
stream of life and ritual and it consequently allows the image(s) of heteroglossia 
to develop, even if these images are part of a non-verbal sign system. 
As the image of the fragmented body is not subject to stasis in the unconscious, so 
too the image of fragmented speech attaches itself to whatever carnival or 
heteroglossia emblems, of any kind, that it finds as it drifts. We must remember, 
however, that this may only be part of the release of heteroglot forces from the 
unconscious; we are not suggesting that carnival is the only release, merely a 
probable one. We shall see later that under certain circumstances all the forces 
are released. 
lt is to this extent that we have attempted to derive a Bakhtinian linguistic 
analysis, from the Lacanian Mirror Stage. When Lacan discovered the mirror 
stage, he burst open, along with Bakhtin, as we said, the old-oak banquet doors of 
heteroglossia that had remained rust-locked since the Renaissance. In Lacan's 
analysis of the development of the child, he pinpoints for us the singular moment 
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when the child attempts to realise its own unity and rushes terrified from the 
images of the fragmented body and speech. In order to co-ordinate the image of 
its dismembered parts the child consolidates within itself a `stone guest who joins 
the banquet'. It is only Lacan, and Freud of course, who recognizes the stone 
guest at the banquet. Even if Lacan were wrong about the consequences/impact 
of the Mirror Stage, he would still be right because there is, or must be, a moment 
of reflected fascination when the subject is held in thrall by the prospect of unity, 
escaping the terror of dismemberment. All of this creates imaginary relationships 
that have a profound impact on the child and adult. 
The aggressivity of which we have spoken, is interconnected with the analytic 
process itself and develops further of course in a clinical setting than we can 
possibly achieve here. However, what we have attempted, over the course of the 
previous chapters, and what we also do here, is to slowly draw Bakhtinian 
linguistics into the psychoanalytic field of study. 
We discovered a gap too wide in Chapter One, where Otto Rank discovered the 
Oedipus complex at the centre of the literary creative matrix, thereby 
psychoanalytically couching and casting the novelist and poet. His `discovery' of 
the unconscious seemed to complicate our collected mise en scene. Nevertheless, 
ve opened a dialogic space that allowed the possibility of a monologic and 
heteroglossic discursive field. By the time we reach this chapter, we introduce 
only the early original thought of Lacan. His mirror stage allowed us to place the 
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prism of Bakhtinian linguistics against the reflected, if inverted, image of the ego. 
If we have failed to deal with big Other relations and other relations and the all 
important transference at this stage, it is only because we have held a fixed frame 
long enough to reflect Lacan's image of the Mirror Stage, with all its 
ramifications, and paused long enough to hold Bakhtin's prism up against the 
image of language. 
Image of the Ego 
In Lacan's Mirror Stage paper, he unlocks the sacrosanct image of the ego, 
exposing it to the forces of the unconscious. But, as we now know, the unitary 
image of the ego recognized by Lacan is a meconnaissance, consequently the 
crown of the ego slips and Bakhtin pushes the carnival door open. Lacan releases 
us from the fiction of the unitary ego; creating the possibility of the entry into the 
interstice, of the Bakhtinian centripetal and centrifugal forces. The unitary ego, 
that has been so effectively prised apart by Lacan at the Mirror Stage, allows for 
the further possibility of heteroglossia appearing within the broken frame of the 
encased ego. We see that Bakhtin's conceptualization of heteroglossia has wide 
implications and we can see why, from Holquist: 
The reason is that not only most critics, but most genres begin with this 
assumption: the homogeneity of the genre corresponds to ideas about the 
privileged status of a unitary, centripetalizing language shared by its 
practitioners on the one hand and its students on the other. (Holquist, 1981: 
xxx). 
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In this comment we can see the effect of heteroglossia quite clearly, although a 
description of the Bakhtinian genre is dealt with later. Let us again remember 
what Holquist tells us: 
Bakhtin's basic scenario for modelling variety is two actual people talking to 
each other in a specific dialogue at a particular time and in a particular place. 
But these persons would not confront each other as sovereign egos capable of 
sending messages to each other through the kind of uncluttered space envisioned 
by the artists who illustrate most receiver - sender models of communication 
(Holquist, 1981: xx). 
So here we see the dialogic space opening up, and it is also in a psychoanalytic 
sense that it opens up, as we saw when Lacan discovered his Mirror Stage. 
Throwing Out the Baby with the Bath Water 
We now move to the end of our comments in this chapter on Lacan's Mirror 
Stage paper, the experience and its conceptualization and the possible interaction 
with dialogic planes of thought in Bakhtin. Along with the fragmented body, we 
have attempted to introduce the similarly discarded fragmented image of speech. 
The unifying ego throws out the baby with the bath water on the one hand, and 
creates the `stone guest' of the ego on the other hand with its single-voiced 
monoglossia. It may well be asked, is it not in the nature of things to unite the 
ego, afraid of its image of the dismembered body and the voice strangled by its 
early guttural cries? The answer of course is yes, there will always be, along with 
heterogeneity the monologic (which it seems is never truly dialogic), but in the 
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case of psychoanalysis and Lacan's mirror stage in particular, the act is premature 
and, worse still, a meconnaissance. 
This all creates a space for heteroglossia in the psychoanalytic field. Added to 
this there is the unconscious/conscious spectrum, which features monologic and 
heteroglossic characteristics. We now perceive the gradually emerging crossover 
points, the misrecognized unity in consciousness, and the other thing being held in 
the unconscious. It will be necessary at some time in the future to enter the 
psychoanalytic space of paranoiac knowledge and to develop further theories 
concerning aggressivity, certainly in language. But the major premise that we 
have attempted to introduce in this chapter outlines Lacan's Mirror Stage and 
Bakhtin's heteroglossia and attempts to introduce them into a psychoanalytic 
setting entwined. Plus, it outlines the possibility of latent vestiges of fragmented 
speech that, not unlike the fragmented body, is cast aside by the premature 
formation of the ego. We must also not forget the space of the public square and 
the `bourgeois parlour', because Bakhtin, Freud, and Lacan, are essentially of the 
public square. Their laughter and their despair are, as with Socrates, situated 
there. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
LACAN WITH BAKHTIN: FRAGMENTED SPEECH IN PSYCHOANALYSIS 
Introduction 
Introducing Lacan's mirror and Mirror Stage involves a number of complex formulations. 
Let us revise our interpretation of a few of the salient factors. In the first place, and 
moving on, we have to understand that space does not only exist as an homogenous space 
of an empty area, according to Lefebvre. It is not in itself necessarily unified, it too is 
also fragmented. Introducing a mirror into the conceptualization of space is obviously a 
complex matter. Nevertheless Lacan defines for us a point (similar to Foucault's field 
hospital) bringing together diverse phenomena at the place of the mirror. We need to 
brake perception at this point. Why? To answer this and to introduce our topic in this 
chapter, we look now at a footnote in The Production of Space by Henri Lefebvre. In this 
footnote Lefebvre begins by quoting a definition of the mirror from Jean Baudrillard 
seeing the mirror as: ' nothing more for the bourgeois than an extension of his drawing 
room or bedroom' (Lefebvre, 1991: 185. n. 19). Lefebvre comments that this limits the 
mirror's real significance attempting to abolish the (psychoanalytic) notion of narcissism. 
Lefebvre goes on to say that the ambiguity of these phenomena (mirrors) along with their 
`inherent complexity' emerges clearly `from the analyses of Jacques Lacan'. Lefebvre 
considers that: `For him [Lacan] the mirror helps to counteract the tendency of language 
to break up the body into pieces' (Lefebvre, 1991: 185). And Lefebvre, in the same 
footnote, goes on to say that the mirror for Lacan, `freezes the Ego into a rigid form 
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rather than leading it towards transcendence in and through a space which is at once 
practical and symbolic (imaginary)'. 
So it is that we pause at this place concerning space. If the notion that language has the 
tendency to break up the body into pieces, is correct then it must be dealt with. Now, for 
the moment, we assume nothing. Nothing is assumed because we must first of all take 
cognizance of those spaces with which we must deal. These are: (i) mental space; (ii) 
social space; (iii) space of the specular image (space of postitionality) and (iv) space of 
language. If these spaces are thought of independently, for the moment, they halt the 
tendency to rush forward from Lacan's mirror. Lefebvre's point concerning the fact that 
Lacan opposes the tendency of language to break the body up into pieces, is a matter with 
which we shall attempt to deal. If we mark the above-mentioned spaces as junctions 
provided by the mirror, it becomes easier to break our work down. 
Echo and Narcissus 
At this point we introduce, in a basic manner, the theme of Echo and Narcissus. The 
myth is fairly familiar but we intend to use it as a metaphor for the fragmented body and 
the fragmented word because it ties the two together. There is a painting that helps 
enormously in clarifying our position. The painting of Echo and Narcissus by 
J. W. Waterhouse R. A., shows Narcissus gazing at his own reflection in the lake - in the 
centre of the painting, but to the side of him on the left we see Echo anxiously awaiting 
as he is captured by his own image. As so often happens with the ancient myths they 
enfold the events of childhood, may we think of Oedipus for example? However, the 
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importance of this picture is the simultaneous representation of Echo and Narcissus 
within the same mise en scene, as he beholds his specular image. The painting conveys 
entirely what we are endeavouring to capture. If the scene is set as the mirror stage, the 
`fragmented body' of Narcissus (fragmented because he has yet to encounter the 
centralizing effect of his specular image) is accompanied by the fragmented word of 
Echo who cannot finish her sentences; they both partake of the same scene. The crucial 
point to note is that the body image and the word image arrive together fragmented 
before the mirror. 
Lacan failed to realize that fragmented speech arrives simultaneously with the image of 
the fragmented body and this oversight has considerable implications for psychoanalysis. 
For example, one must ask the crucial question: throughout the mirror stage period what 
precisely is the state of the child's perception of language? And how does the child state: 
`That is me! ' if language is not around? There is, in my opinion, no instantiation of the 
creation of the image of language. Although, having said that, the image of the system of 
speech is enclosed simultaneously with the `acceptance' of the unified specular image. 
The problem is not just one of Narcissus, however, it is the problem of Narcissus and 
Echo. 
The Greek myth is quite correct, in that it holds the specular image and speech together. 
Of course we must recall that the whole scene is affected by the child's prematurity at 
birth. One of the crucial considerations is that the ego encloses the meconnaissance of 
speech unity, which the child does not possess, like the gestalt of the body image, which 
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is a sad reflection of the child's inner turmoil and conflict. This state is therefore not 
easily escaped. The idea that the child has captured the system of speech whole, in an 
instant, is also a sad reflection of the child's inner turmoil and conflict and a speech 
delusion. The myth tells us quite clearly (or at least Waterhouse's painting does) that 
Echo and Narcissus approach the mirror. 
Before we proceed any further we need to note a matter that seems to complicate further 
an already complex situation. We note the following: 
We cannot deny that a deeper insight into the structure of the body-image (postural model 
of the body) must lead to a new conception of human actions. The greatest progress that 
has been made so far in the understanding of human action is due to Liepmann's 
investigations. He has shown that every action is based on an anticipatory plan. This 
anticipatory plan has a specific structure. It not only contains the final aim, but also 
comprises the insight into the single actions which are necessary for the actualisation of 
the plan. Liepmann refers to `Teilzielvorstellungun' (images of partial aims)... (Schilder, 
1955: 50). 
The idea here is that we are now in the zone of the partial aims and partial drives of the 
child - the fragmented body. Let us check another comment this time by Lacan: 
[the subject] He is originally an inchoate collection of desires - there you have the true 
sense of the expression fragmented body - and the initial synthesis of the ego is 
essentially an alter ego, it is `alienated'. (Lacan, 1993: 39). 
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The Satyr 
In these last two comments we discover the `partial drives and aims' - the fragmented. 
So, thus far we have the image of the fragmented body and the image of the fragmented 
word. We shall have to consider also the position of the fragmented drives, the `image 
of the drives may not necessarily be `whole' of course, here we may think of early 
childhood. We would consider the relationship of fragmented speech, body, drives, to be 
a kind of reciprocal interaction somewhat akin to reflective mirrors whose surfaces reflect 
and refract the interaction. This interaction would also have to be a part of what we call 
the speech complex. In the case of fragmented drives, however, we see no reason why 
we could not add in the background to Narcissus and Echo the figure of the satyr to 
represent these `partial drives'. Was not the satyr himself an aggregate, a 
conglomeration? 
The idea of the interconnection between all of these spaces and images at the mirror stage 
has a tendency to float conceptualisation. In order to check this we tie in Narcissus and 
Echo, so that at least the spaces of the specular image and the fragmented word are tied. 
We must of course also add the aspect of the fragmented drives and desires - the satyr. 
So it is that we see, at least for the time being, the specular image and speech tied 
together with the fragmented drive. The fragmented word, it is suggested, approaches 
the mirror with the fragmented body as image. 
W'e'hen the unity of the specular image is assumed by the ego, which exists only from the 
moment of the assumption of the image, so too the fragmented word assumes the identity 
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of wholeness of the word and the system of speech, which is a meconnaissance. 
Whatever is left of the fragmented body and fragmented word `disappears' into the 
unconscious. This is why Narcissus is tied to Echo. Now, however, we need another 
link. Prior to the child's primary identification with its image, the child realizes its own 
inner turmoil and dismembered state, and initially, just prior to the identification with the 
image views it as `other' and is alienated from the image; this is the foundation of 
Lacan's term aggressivity, and forms the basis of all secondary identifications. 
Why does the child become alienated from its own image? Because the child realizes 
that its own inner state of turmoil is not truly matched by the assumption of the unity of 
the image it is about to make. And therefore just prior to the absorption of the image, the 
child experiences rivalry with and alienation from its own image. Thereafter, the 
fragmented images (body and speech) are despatched to the unconscious and there is left 
in consciousness a unitary image of the body and speech, a meconnaissance, with just a 
`hint' of aggressivity. 
We must make it clear that Narcissus and Echo only provide, at this stage, a metaphor 
that ties-in the specular image and `reflected' image of the word. We draw no further 
implications from the myth at this stage other than its capability to tie, however loosely, 
the specular image and the word. The reason we tie the two together is that they both 
join in the assumption of the image at Lacan's Mirror Stage. The key to the myth is that 
Echo loves Narcissus (Ovid, 1955 ed.: 83-87). As the specular image enfolds the Subject, 
Echo is caught in the deadly embrace of Narcissus. We must stress that the assumption 
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of the image is a totalizing experience (but meconnaissance nevertheless). Now we can 
see that the `space' of the mirror is totalized as an apprehension of a unified and unifying 
space (also a meconnaissance of space). There is, by the child, no assumption of the 
possibility of a fragmented space. Specular image, speech image, space as image, all 
frozen and unified in that moment as a unified ego that is a misrecognition and alienation 
through the image - from itself. 
Arising from this, however, a particular problem occurs that is worthy of interpretation. 
In the Mirror Stage we saw in the infant the attempted consolidation of the agency of the 
ego by a `prematurely' born child. If we take another look at a phrase used in The Mirror 
Stage paper by Lacan, we recall his following statement: 
This jubilant assumption of his specular image by the child at the infans stage, still sunk 
in his motor incapacity and nursling dependence (Lacan, 1977: 2) 
So we see that the child moves away from `motor incapacity and nursling dependence'. 
If we look more closely at Lacan's Mirror Stage we may note another interesting point: 
The mirror stage is a drama whose internal thrust is precipitated from insufficiency to 
anticipation - and which manufactures for the subject, caught up in the lure of spatial 
identification, the succession of phantasies that extends from a fragmented body-image to 
a form of its totality that I shall call orthopaedic - and, lastly, to the assumption of the 
armour of an alienating identity, which will mark with its rigid structure the subject's 
entire mental development... (Lacan, 1977: 4) 
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And extending a comment from earlier: 
This fragmented body - which term I have also introduced into our system of theoretical 
references - usually manifests itself in dreams when the movement of the analysis 
encounters a certain level of aggressive disintegration in the individual. It then appears in 
the form of disjointed limbs, or of those organs represented in exoscopy, growing wings 
and taking up arms for intestinal persecutions - the very same that visionary 
Hieronymus Bosch has fixed, for all time, in painting, in their assent from the fifteenth 
century to the imaginary zenith of modern man. But this form is even tangibly revealed 
at the organic level, in the lines of `fragilization' that define the anatomy of phantasy, as 
exhibited in the schizoid and spasmodic symptoms of hysteria. (Lacan, 1977: 4-5) 
From this we see that as the rigid armour of the ego begins to fall away during the 
analytic process, the analysis encounters `a certain level of aggressive disintegration in 
the individual'. The subject is split at the mirror stage. As the ego `falls away' so the 
images of fragmentation return. However, Lacan does not elucidate the fragmented word 
for us so we must search for its `essence' ourselves. 
Function of Fragmentation 
We can see quite clearly from this that the fragmented and dismembered body image is 
hastily rejected in favour of the unity promised by the agency of the ego. But if the unity 
of the ego is a meconnaissance in Lacan, does this mean that fragmentation and 
dismemberment have, however strange this may appear, a function that has been rejected 
by the haste of the consolidation of the ego? If the fragmented and the dismembered 
have been rejected with the development of the prematurely created unified ego, then we 
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may ask, what happens to the hastily rejected fragmented and dismembered images? 
Obviously, the child rushes away from them as quickly as possible to consolidate the ego, 
but the ego, as we have seen, is a meconnaissance. We recall Freud's comment: 
... 
in both cases (castration and birth) what is in question is the separation of part of the 
body from the whole. (Freud, 1991: 510, footnote 1 [added 1909]). 
Since antiquity, have they not spoken of the `treasure' that lies buried in the dirt, the 
treasure that is hidden in the most rejected thing? Could this be the treasure? But how 
could there be value in the fragmented and dismembered; on this occasion was not the 
Royal Ego correct to rush so quickly from uncoordinated limbs, shattered body image, 
splintered dialogic interaction, in other words fragmentation and dismemberment? As 
Lacan said, motor incapacity and nursling dependence. At this point we could ask 
ourselves another question: does the rejection of the image of the fragmented body and 
word in fact have an effect on the shape of the unconscious? The dream offers a `shape' 
of the unconscious, and if the dream is taken as an exemplar it works with a dismembered 
discourse and the fragmented body. In other words does symbolization take place in the 
lacuna created by the separation of the fragmented image and the whole image? 
So, it looks as though in the haste to unify the ego, something of value was left out. At 
first sight it would appear of little value. But on closer analysis, we have to acknowledge 
that the fragmented body and fragmented word had been an essential part of `being'. 
Uncoordinated and lost they may have been, they still had the essence of `being'. And 
x\ e know that they were `foreclosed' too soon. The clue to the possible value of the 
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fragmented and dismembered lies in the image. If the infant is in a hurry to consolidate 
the specular image, then there is an element of the image that has been left out. This is 
where we would introduce the next hypothesis of the speech complex. By the way, it is 
by no means clear that aggressivity (Lacan, 1977: 8-29) is not, in part, the result of this 
factor being left out. Another point of value is that, by their very nature, the fragmented 
body and word image have been left out of the consolidation of the ego. The fragmented 
images take up their position, or more correctly positions, outside of the ego. So what 
precisely is the speech complex? 
Speech Complex 
The speech complex is the interrelationship between the image of the fragmented body 
and the fragmented word in relation to the unified ego. What happens if they are left out 
of the agency of the ego? Before we answer this, we must understand that the image(s) 
can in no way be seen as in any sense unified. Unless, we consider what Freud noted in 
The Interpretation of Dreams ' Even the very centre of the dream is only loosely put 
together'. (Freud, 1991: 104). It is an image of fragmentation and dismemberment and as 
such lies disused, like a cracked mirror, deflecting light at the strangest angles. But it 
haunts human consciousness. If it is rejected and therefore outside of the ego, what 
happens to it? 
Presumably, in the classic psychoanalytic manner it is repressed into the unconscious 
realm, as we have already seen in our previous chapter. This is because there is a certain 
psychic energy, otherwise it could not have been left out; it must take up residence 
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somewhere. It must be repressed into the unconscious. Or is it possible that the problem 
is one of foreclosure in the Freudian and Lacanian sense? At any rate, if it is repressed it 
will situate itself as the return of the repressed at some point, in some way. So as we 
initially pass through the Lacanian Mirror Stage what do we find on the other side? How 
do we make use of the fragmented body-image and fragmented word-image in the first 
instance? To answer this question we discover a dialogic echo left from the first chapter 
concerning the Oedipus complex and the psychoanalytic form this takes known as 
neurosis. 
Neurosis 
Introductory Remarks 
It must be fairly obvious by now, that we have not accepted the generalized 
conceptualization of Structuralist linguistics. Less obvious perhaps is that a point by 
point refutation of Lacan's acceptance of certain Saussurean principles will not 
essentially lead us very far. This is because the overall approach of Bakhtinian 
linguistics affects the psychoanalytic process in a different way. We may recall 
Bakhtin's comment: `Structuralism has only one subject - the subject of the research 
himself (Bakhtin, 1986: 169). The trouble is, if we accept a Structuralist concept and 
approach to language, then we are applying a centralizing form of linguistics to 
psychoanalysis, which itself involves the de-centring of the position of the ego. And we 
cannot effectively use a centralizing code system of evaluating language in an assessment 
of the de-centred ego altered by Freud's discovery, in our opinion. 
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However, having said all of this, it seems necessary and relevant perhaps to think of 
clinical definitions of psychoanalytic categories in terms of structure as well as 
symptoms. This Lacan achieved to quite an extraordinary degree. So we may speak of 
the clinical structure of neurosis and psychosis, for example. It is obviously one thing to 
speak of molecular structure, for example, and quite another to speak of the structure of 
language, however. In the following remarks we define elements of the structure of 
neurosis and psychosis, and we restrict ourselves to certain key issues. We shall attempt 
to define these terms in respect of. (a) body-image; and (b) the word-image they provoke, 
in terms of (c) conflict; and in terms of their relevance for our hypothesis (d) image of 
fragmented speech. Or we could pose it in the form of another question. What is the 
interrelationship between the fragmented body/word image (speech complex) and 
neurosis/psychosis and the symptom/structure? Once we have reasonably defined these 
terms (neurosis and psychosis), we shall then assess them against a backdrop of Bakhtin's 
definition of the utterance and speech genres and later the chronotope. This all creates 
the space for us to broaden our horizon without being hog-tied by Structuralist linguistics. 
Both terms, neurosis and psychosis, have had an extremely chequered career and seem to 
be endlessly reaccentuated by various interceding factors and institutions, so the terms 
themselves are ambiguous and ambivalent and are certainly a movable feast. If we blow 
the dust of the nineteenth century away from the term neurosis, certain key features do 
begin to appear. For example, we note a dialogic echo from the first chapter, namely, the 
Freudian term that combined Greek mythology, self-analysis, and psychoanalysis, which 
he nominated as the Oedipus complex. In the Oedipus complex, as we have seen, along 
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with the image of the mother and her child - that dyad of complexity, we have also the 
crucial image of the Father. 
The Oedipus is, as Freud himself stated, the nuclear complex upon which neurosis and 
psychoanalysis is based. Now we shall attempt to define certain aspects of the structure 
of neurosis and psychosis, without, however, necessarily following Lacan into the depth 
structure of his own unique definition of Saussure's signifier and signified. I hasten to 
add that we do not critique Lacan's use of the signifier and signified to achieve the aims 
and purposes of his diagnostic `intervention'. We just do not move in that direction in 
totality and cannot follow Lacan into the labyrinthine pathways of the signifier and 
signified. So it is inevitable that we shall not necessarily draw the same conclusions as 
Lacan, although we follow considerably along the trail that he blazed. 
Background 
In the nineteenth century, neurosis seems to have covered a whole range of mental 
disorders. There was a great variety of the symptomatology itself, but Freud first posited 
the idea of neurosis in opposition to psychosis. In Lacan, we always find neurosis in 
opposition to psychosis. Lacan emphasizes structure, but traces no difference between 
the normal and the neurotic. For Lacan, mental health is an illusion, an ideal of 
wholeness, which is never attainable because, as we saw, the subject is split. As we also 
saw in the first chapter, in neurosis we find that the conflict lies in the subject's 
childhood, and symptoms constitute compromises between wish and defence. The 
neurosis speaks its symptoms in the language of the unconscious, which the analyst may 
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hear. In psychosis the symptom does not speak in the language of the unconscious, so in 
a very direct sense psychosis has to be seen in terms of its structure. 
The term neurosis itself, seems to have a long history dating from 1777, and was 
apparently coined by a Scottish doctor, William Cullen. As we shall see later, words 
have a memory of their earlier use; they resonate with their own history and have a 
rhythm and cadence, and an echo. They also vibrate with their future possible use. As 
Bakhtin said variously the word sentimentalism was reaccentuated from its original use, 
in the nineteenth century. So too with neurosis, it is now a generalized term as well as an 
antiseptic clinical category. If the parody of the last remark seems wholly inappropriate, 
we may add that the word neurosis may be seen as a Bakhtinian utterance and speech 
genre and as such prey to a multiplicity of stratifications of meaning. As Bakhtin said: 
`Language is not a neutral medium that passes freely and easily into the private property 
of the speaker's intentions' (Bakhtin, 1981: 294). However, and notwithstanding this 
remark, referring once again to neurosis let us check this remark by Lacan himself: 
What is repression for a neurotic? It's a language, another language that he manufactures 
with his symptoms, that is, if he is a hysteric or an obsessional, with the imaginary 
dialectic of himself and the other. The neurotic symptom acts as a language that enables 
repression to be expressed. (Lacan, 1993: 60). 
This seems to sum up quite adequately a definition of neurosis. However, as we are 
pursuing fragmented speech, I suggest we also follow a comment by Freud: 
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The verbal malformations in dreams greatly resemble those which are familiar in 
paranoia but which are also present in hysteria and obsessions. The linguistic tricks 
performed by children who sometimes actually treat words as though they were objects 
and moreover invent new languages and artificial syntactic forms, are the common source 
of those things in dreams and psychoneuroses alike. (Freud, 1991: 269). 
If we wish, however, to understand the impact of the fragmented word on neurosis and 
psychosis, in terms of symptom and structure, we must understand that there is terrible 
anxiety concerning the return of the repressed fragmented speech. 
In fact, at this stage of our research we consider the return of fragmented speech as 
potentially more `serious' than the return of the fragmented body as image. Why? 
Because fragmented speech has an earlier archaic base than the fragmented image. The 
inchoate visualization of speech in the child begins with the first time the child listens 
rather than speaks. In fact it is probably the first thing a child does when it is born (other 
than scream that is). Listening probably loses its `innocence' earlier than most other 
senses. Didn't Echo lose the power of speech because she colluded with Zeus in halting 
Hera's discovery of his adultery with the wood nymphs? All of this is not unimportant 
when it comes to the return of the repressed fragmentation in neurosis and psychosis. 
We would add, however, that in the case of neurosis the appearance of fragmented speech 
is not as marked as it is in psychosis. We should also add that all the psychoanalytic 
categories are implicated in the speech complex of course. 
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Regarding Lacan's use of the term dialectic of the fragmented body, it seems to us (a) 
that dialectic needs to be visualized in terms of fragmented speech (b) if it is not, then it 
is seen in terms of neurosis only because the dialectic of the fragmented body is seen only 
in terms of the expression of fragmented drives and there is more at stake here than this. 
We must recall that Lacan discovers the image of the fragmented body when the analysis 
encounters a certain aggressive disintegration with the `arrival' of the negative 
transference. If we recall that neurosis invariably involves the configuration of the 
Oedipus complex we shall have the basis of an argument. 
Psychosis 
Preliminary Remarks 
A tremendously broad range of mental illnesses appears under the diagnostic realm of the 
word psychosis. Again we meet the problem of structures. It has different structures, 
namely, paranoia, schizophrenia and melancholia and mania. But psychoanalysis seems 
to discover the common denominator as a disturbance of the libidinal relation to reality. 
Again, we need to blow away the musty nineteenth-century dust from the word 
psychosis. Throughout the work of Foucault, for example, we find his regular reference 
to the fifteenth century notion of the carnivalesque `folly' instead of the usual madness. 
A metamorphosis through the `wisdom' of the centuries has taken place and turned the 
carnival `folly' into paranoid schizophrenia. Neurosis and psychosis evolved, however, 
in different contexts. The neuroses were derived from disturbances that were seen as 
nervous disorders. 
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In the case of psychosis, there appears to be an immediate rupture between the ego and 
reality. In psychosis also that prime figure of dismemberment, the castration complex. 
arrives on the psychoanalytic stage with all the power that Oedipus arranges neurosis. 
Obviously too, fragmented speech has a relation to the castration complex. Castration is 
not just a relationship to the vision of the fragmented body. What would we consider to 
be a set of `classic' symptoms in psychosis? Perhaps hallucinations, delusions, 
`regressive' conduct, senseless speech? In Lacan's work, we shall consider The Name of 
the Father as a crucial factor because, as Lacan sees it, the Name of the Father is not 
integrated into the symbolic realm of the psychotic; it is foreclosed. It also appears that 
the psychotic structure results from a malfunction of the Oedipus complex. However, we 
now look at a couple of comments made by Lacan himself that are of especial interest to 
us: 
I was brought in, in short, to declare that she was psychotic and not, as had at first 
appeared, an obsessional neurotic. I refused to diagnose her as psychotic for one decisive 
reason, which was that there were none of those disturbances that are our object of study 
this year, which are disorders at the level of language. We must insist upon the presence 
of these disorders before making a diagnosis of psychosis. (Lacan, 1993: 92). 
And: 
If psychoanalysis inhabits language, in its discourse it cannot misrecognize it with 
impunity. This is the whole sense of what I have been teaching you for a number of 
years, and this is where we are with respect to the psychoses. The emphasis on, the 
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importance given to, language phenomena in psychosis is for us the most fruitful lesson 
of all. (Lacan, 1993: 144). 
We would go even further, and say that if a clinical definition of language were built 
around a fictitious evaluation of language all hell would break loose. So that we may 
move on let us take one final example by Lacan in this section: 
But for us to have a psychosis, there must be disturbances of language... (Lacan, Ibid., 
92). 
We need I think elaborate no further on psychosis at present, as it will be analysed in 
much greater depth in our final chapter. We wish now, however, to carry out the 
following functions: draw out some implications of neurosis and psychosis in terms of 
the Bakhtinian utterance and the Bakhtinian Speech Genres and their interrelationship 
with neurosis and psychosis. If we ourselves wish to elaborate neurosis and psychosis on 
to a plane that discovers a field of fragmented speech we must first tap in place certain 
Bakhtinian linguistic features that act as a counterweight to the Structuralist approach. 
Bakhtinian Horizon 
Through the very distinctive nature of Bakhtin's philosophy of language, it becomes 
possible to rethink the problem of the fragmented and the dismembered, in the sense of 
both the body and the word. May we recall first of all Bakhtin's work Art and 
4nsmc. 'rabilio, - Early Philosophical Essays (Bakhtin, 1990), especially the vital essay 
.1 uthor and Hero irr Aesthetic Activity, in which there is a 
fascinating sequence of events 
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that interest us. First, we have the metaphor of seeing or the excess of seeing that one has 
of the other, and the reverse. So here Bakhtin, in a similar fashion to Lacan, begins by 
placing us at the level of visual perception. For Bakhtin, seeing never crosses the 
threshold of the body - thinking may. We may think ourselves across the threshold of 
the body, into the objects of the external world but we see only from an internal unitary 
perspective. 
However, if we take into account Lacan's mirror stage, at this vital junction of Bakhtin's 
work, we may perceive why Bakhtin sees our own inner image fragmenting when it 
crosses the line of the body and why the other holds the key for Bakhtin. Bakhtin begins 
with the metaphor of visual perception, and Lacan too of course begins with visual 
perception. The next stage for Bakhtin, however, is to move (as far as our work is 
concerned) to the inner and outer body in self-experience (Bakhtin, 1990: 59). If `I' 
experience myself as the unitary `I', according to Bakhtin, when I cross the threshold of 
the body and experience myself on an outward plane, and we repeat the following occurs: 
It is only in the form of scattered fragments, scraps, dangling on the string of my inner 
sensation of myself, that my own exterior enters the field of my outer senses, and, first of 
all, the sense of vision. (Bakhtin, 1990: 28) 
One has to wonder just how far Bakhtin is away from Lacan at this point. First of all, we 
accept a crossover, for example, fragmented body-image may cross with whole word- 
image and fragmented speech may cross with whole body-image. If this is accepted 
certain things come to light. We need to hold on to the image of fragmented outward 
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perception - of oneself - present in Bakhtin. If both men are right, then Bakhtin's 
observations in Art and Answerability on the inward and the outward image of the body 
are perceived at the post-mirror stage position. When the `unified' inner ego position 
crosses the threshold between the body and the world, the image of oneself fragments in 
the world of the `other'. If this is the case, then we must perceive ourselves as projecting 
the fragmented image of ourselves as it crosses the threshold of the body. So, as Bakhtin 
says I do not experience myself as whole when the threshold of the inner to the outer 
world is crossed. 
This seems entirely in line with Lacan's thinking. At least to me, the fragmented image 
is left behind in pursuit of the unitary image, the unitary image is enclosed by the ego 
prematurely, and the image of oneself (not of the other) `unifies' as an inner experience 
but not as an outer experience. When we experience ourselves on an outer plane, in other 
words when we cross the threshold, we do so fragmentarily. We must take into account 
all these matters if we are to make the correct assumptions of fragmented speech. Thus 
far we have: (1) body as whole image and body as fragmented image; (2) word as whole 
image and word as fragmented image; (3) the dialogic reaction of the subject to the inner 
and outer threshold of the body, in terms of the unified and the fragmented as one in fact 
crosses that threshold. And one final point on this matter, if I have an excess of seeing 
with respect to the other and the other has an excess of seeing with respect to me, then I 
and the other must be marked by a lack with respect to ourselves. Lacan, has the final 
«ord at this point, in answer to the question: Who is the inner other to whom I speak? 
Lacan would have answered: the ego. 
165 
It is in this very specific sense that we re-enter the Bakhtinian world of the utterance and 
speech genres, especially as they may affect fragmented speech. We now look at a few 
comments that may orient us within the specific domain of Speech Genres in Bakhtin. In 
his Introduction (Holquist, 1986: xvi), Holquist makes the following highly relevant 
comment: 
But genres are constructed with words not as they exist in the system Bakhtin here 
calls mere language, but rather as they are present in communication. The distinction 
between the two is not, as is sometimes assumed, merely a reformulation of the 
difference between langue and parole, general system and particular performance. 
"Communication" as Bakhtin uses the term does indeed cover many of the aspects of 
Saussure's parole, for it is concerned with what happens when real people in all the 
contingency of their myriad lives actually speak to each other. But Saussure conceived 
the individual language user to be an absolutely free agent with the ability to choose any 
words to implement a particular intention. Saussure concluded, not surprisingly, that 
language as used by heterogeneous millions of such wilful subjects was unstudiable, a 
chaotic jungle beyond the capacity of science to domesticate. 
Bakhtin, on the other hand, begins by assuming that individual speakers do not have the 
kind of freedom parole assumes they have: the basic unit for the study of actual speech 
practice is the "Utterance", which, "with all its individuality and creativity, can in no way 
be regarded as a completely free combination of forms of language, as is supposed, for 
example, by Saussure ... who 
juxtaposed the utterance (la parole) as a purely individual 
act, to the system of language as a phenomenon that is purely social and mandatory for 
the individuum". 
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And Holquist goes on: 
The problem here is that the great Genevan linguist overlooks the fact that "in addition to 
the forms of language there are also forms of combinations of these forms" ( Holquist, 
1986: xvi ). 
This, as we shall see, is highly significant for our whole project. Because, again as 
Holquist says: `These forms of combinations of forms are what Bakhtin calls speech 
genres. And although he recognises their enormous variety, he is able to conclude, 
unlike Saussure, that the immediate reality of living speech can be studied... ' (Holquist, 
1986: xvi). By his evocation of the category of speech genres, Bakhtin opens up the 
possibility of finding these speech genres in the most unlikely places and unlikely 
contexts. And one wonders if the narrow doorway through which we would need to pass 
could be at this place, in our search for the fragmented and dismembered word? 
Especially with reference to neurosis and psychosis. 
Bakhtin's use of speech genres allows voices to appear that never before could have seen 
the light of day, because he has articulated a whole range of speech phenomena that 
Saussure missed. The holes in conscious dialogue Freud discovered revealed the nature 
of the unconscious. Added to this, the dialogization of hitherto unknown fields of 
discourse by Bakhtin, means that it is possible to re-group around the study of the 
meconnaissance of the ego, discovered by Lacan. The installation at the mirror stage of 
aggr"essivity allows for the possibility of an interpretation of the fragmented body and 
fragmented ii, ord on this level too. In reference to the utterance we particularly note: `An 
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essential (constitutive) marker of the utterance is its quality of being directed toward 
someone, its addressivity' (Bakhtin, 1986: 95). 
Symptom of Fragmented Speech 
The symptom of fragmented speech reveals itself in a number of ways. As we have said 
the return of the image of fragmented speech from the unconscious is a cause of terrible 
anxiety in the Subject and as such its return meets with considerable resistance. To 
understand the nature of fragmented speech we must first of all understand that `unitary' 
speech is held as a `value' by the ego. But as we have seen the ego is itself a 
meconnaissance. When the ego encloses the body image as unified it also encloses the 
image of the system of speech as unified. In other words we are all deluded in the 
assumption that we understand the system of speech in its entirety, and that we somehow 
encompass the system of speech (rather than fitting into it, as Bakhtin said so often). 
Let us recall that the mirror stage involves the child from the age of six to eighteen 
months - although the image is absorbed in an instant. This leads, in the infant, to a 
form of speech megalomania in the sense of the power of the world, and omnipotence in 
the sense of the power of the spirit. These are the senses in which the unified word of the 
infant is enclosed in the stone structure of the ego. If we require `proof of the arrival of 
fragmented speech at the mirror, then Echo provides this, the whole point of the myth is 
her incompleteness in the face of Narcissus' `completeness', surely? If we miss this, then 
wwe miss the whole point of the myth of Narcissus and Echo. We see now that there is a 
misidentification of language too at the mirror stage. From the mirror stage onward there 
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is a never-ending flicker that takes place between the image of the body and the image of 
the word and the `image' of desire. And it appears that these images are interrelated to 
the effects of centripetal and centrifugal forces operating upon the ego. In other words 
we would constitute all these phenomena as being a part of a speech complex. As we 
know, however, the centripetal and centrifugal forces in language also operate - 
crucially for us, Outside of the ego. 
Now, however, we must take up a strand that appears to have been lost, namely the 
aggressivity that is involved in the formation of the ego. We must stress immediately that 
this aggressivity is as much tied with fragmented speech as with the fragmented body. 
We have seen the identification that takes place, but just prior to this identification there 
is an alienation of the image, whereupon the `other' is perceived in terms of rivalry and 
jealousy and this brings about the Lacanian aggressivity as well as an erotic connection 
with the image. This notion of aggressivity in Lacan is correlative with the narcissisitic 
structure. Now, within the psychoanalytic session the image of the fragmented body 
appears when aggressive disintegration begins to take place brought about by the 
`induced' negative transference that is the `initial knot' of the analytic drama. In other 
words this is the carefully installed `paranoiac knowledge' of the split subject. 
Lacan deliberately drives a wedge into the heart of the split in the subject. He bursts 
asunder the identification of the subject with the ego. This surely is the basis of paranoid 
knowledge? The aggressivity toward the analyst becomes manifest. However. the 
analyst provides a `mirror' that is implacable. Or, as Jessie Taft said of her analysis with 
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Otto Rank, 'I was deprived of a foe' (Taft, 1958. xii). Images of fragmentation involve 
aggressivity. However, along with the aggressivity that is present at the mirror stage 
there is also satisfaction. This derives from the power of the feeling when the organic 
incapacity is overcome by the unitary formation of the ego. This creates the narcissistic 
energy' of self-love. In a sense here we can perhaps see the interconnection between 
Bakhtin's constant refusal to separate birth from death - as image, and Freud's 
insistence upon the erotic and death drive as the black horses pulling the hearse of the 
Subject. 
Sacrifice 
We now reiterate an idea made earlier. It would not be possible to reach this spot if it 
were not for the articulation of the problem itself by Lacan and the possibility of a 
solution by Bakhtin. Let us then make a beginning with the fragmented and the 
dismembered. It is `foreclosed' in the very first instance by the specular image. It is the 
assumption of the unity in the specular image that leads to the rejection of the 
fragmented. So it is, as it were, left on the outside of the ego. Apart, that is, from a tiny 
entrail of aggressivity left in the `unified' ego. Therefore the ego must have rejected it 
because it was not, of itself, unified. It was rejected because it was a multiplicity 
therefore it stayed on the Outside. Is the fragmented body/word the part of ourselves of 
which sacrifice is demanded even at a very early stage? The very word sacrifice has a 
link with dismemberment. It seems a possibility that the shape of the unconscious itself 
could have been altered with this eventuality. It certainly seems to take place at around 
the `time' one would have expected the cleavage to take place between the conscious and 
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the unconscious. As we travel on with this heterogeneous journey, we need, I think to 
take note of another vital matter that excludes the unitary from our discourse, and allows 
us to penetrate the image of fragmented speech. Freud, in a letter to Fliess states: 
As you know, I am working on the assumption that our psychical mechanism has come 
about by a process of stratification: Thus what is essentially new in my theory is the 
thesis that memory is present not once but several times over ... (Freud, 
Origins. 1954: 
Letter 52, p. 173 - dated 6.12.1896). 
And: 
for consciousness and memory are mutually exclusive (Ibid. 174). 
It appears that memory too is dialogically stratified and occurs more than once and that 
`consciousness and memory are mutually exclusive'. This comment is crucial for us, 
because fragmented speech has itself a memory in the unconscious. 
Bakhtin's Utterance and Speech Genres 
In the final section of this chapter, we shall draw out the implications of fragmented 
speech against a background of Bakhtin's two conceptualizations of, on the one hand, the 
utterance and on the other hand speech genres. We do this because our task now is to sift 
through the linguistic debris left after the formation of the ego. An utterance, for 
Bakhtin, is the event of turning to someone in speech - without this the utterance cannot 
take place. The problem of the utterance, unlike the statuesque sentence, is the question 
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of addressivity. To whom do `I' speak, in what situation and context? So it is that we 
see the utterance as a unit of speech communion. The speaker and the listener are always 
the co-authors of the utterance. Let us follow a little more closely a comment by Bakhtin: 
It is all the more remarkable that linguistics and the philosophy of discourse have been 
primarily oriented precisely toward this artificial, preconditioned status of the word, a 
word excised from dialogue and taken for the norm (although the primacy of dialogue 
over monologue is frequently proclaimed). Dialogue is studied merely as a 
compositional form in the structuring of speech, but the internal dialogism of the word 
(which occurs in a monologic utterance as well as a rejoinder), the dialogism that 
penetrates its entire structure, all its semantic and expressive layers is entirely ignored. 
(Bakhtin, 1981: 279). 
It is the internal dialogism of the word that has such a profound effect upon fragmented 
speech. If, as we hypothesize, the speech image is built up gradually by a series of 
interpenetrating images, then there is a certain spectral dispersion that exists in the 
linguistic mist in which the word is formed. The word does not just have an outer value 
as presence in an external field; it has an inner value -a relationship to itself. The sub- 
atomic particles of speech have an inner relationship to themselves. This is as well as the 
projection of their outward life. The memory of this spectral dispersion is continuously 
present in the unconscious. If the image of the word collapses then it is no longer 
possible to think. It is the terrible anxiety that even a hint of this occurring presents that 
determines the symptoms of fragmented speech under specific conditions. Of course this 
also includes the image of the fragmented body. 
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The Return of Fragmented Speech 
The conditions bringing about the return of the repressed fragmented speech are 
associated with the conditions appertaining to the image of the fragmented body and 
partial drives, because as we have seen they are all interconnected. There is another link, 
a strand, between the earlier mentioned aggressivity, dismemberment and the relation to 
the ego. Fragmented speech is, at least at this stage in our research, a more serious 
development than the return of the fragmented body image. It is not that the subject 
experiencing fragmented speech does not understand the glue that holds language 
together, but the glue no longer holds. Prior to this eventuality occurring, the subject 
meets it with the utmost resistance. If the inner integrity of the word dissolves, it is no 
longer possible to think. Madness is the result of expecting this will occur. It is the 
attempts made to stave off this eventuality that provide the symptoms that accompany 
fragmented speech and is the `structure' that accompanies it. 
The Bakhtinian utterance and speech genres provide an apperceptive background 
allowing us to reconnoitre this terrain. We must recall that the emergence of fragmented 
speech proceeds from the unconscious. As the fragmented body appears there is always 
the chance that the cloth of language covering the subject will alter shape. 
Moving on slightly from the utterance, earlier we spoke of `forms of combinations of 
these forms", and they are what Bakhtin refers to as speech genres. Looking again at 
Michael Holquist's `Introduction' we see the following: 
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And although he recognises their enormous variety [speech genres], he is able to 
conclude, unlike Saussure, that the immediate reality of living speech can be studied, for 
although `each separate utterance is individual ... each sphere in which language is used 
develops its own relatively stable types of these utterances (Holquist, 1986: xvi). 
This allows the way in, through Bakhtin, for the study of genres that would not 
normally be seen in language. This is not just literary genres and literary critical 
genres but, for example, would include the development in the philosophy of 
language of the whole psychoanalytic discourse as a highly specific `speech 
genre', and of the certainty of sub-genres within the overall field. Here we may 
think of neurosis and psychosis. Now this in turn leads us to what Holquist 
describes: 
I shall not dwell on these, but remark only that, for those concerned with the 
thought of Bakhtin himself, this piece [The Problem of Speech Genres, p. 60] 
holds great interest as a further contribution not only to his translinguists, but to 
his conception of the subject. (Holquist, 1986: xvii). 
By this last remark: `conception of the subject', we are released into the dialogic 
atmosphere of Bakhtinian thought, allowing us to become steeped in the linguistic 
mist that surrounds the utterance and that Bakhtin releases for us. Of course, we 
see that literary genres are probably the most studied. But Bakhtin, takes us into 
the world of `short rejoinders' of daily dialogue, and these, seemingly so simple, 
have a variety of subject matter, situations and participants. In other words 
Bakhtin discovers for us the everyday genre or the genre of the everyday. He 
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goes on to describe other speech genres, `brief standard military command', 
elaborate and detailed order, repertoire of business documents and the `diverse 
world of commentary: social, political', and `scientific statements'. These 
develop over time, as `relatively stable types' and are genre specific, again we 
may be reminded of psychoanalysis itself as a specific genre. 
In Bakhtin, as we have seen, the word itself has an internal value - for itself. It 
echoes with its own history it resonates with its own possible future - and it has 
a memory. So that we are clear on this point let us take an example from Bakhtin 
himself: 
The expression of a performed act from within and the expression of once- 
occurrent Being-as-event in which that act is performed require the entire 
fullness of the word: its content/sense aspect (the word as concept) as well as its 
palpable-expressive aspect (the word as image) and its emotional-volitional 
aspect (the intonation of the word) in their unity. (Bakhtin, 1993: 31). 
We should do well not to forget these ideas; there is an internal integrity of the 
word in Bakhtin. It is not just affected by an outside interlocutor; it affects itself 
from within it. In reference to speech genres, Bakhtin tells us: 
Each sphere has and applies its own genres that correspond to its own specific 
conditions. There are also particular styles that correspond to these genres. A 
particular function (scientific, technical, commentarial, business, everyday) and 
the particular conditions of speech communication specific for each sphere give 
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rise to particular genres, that is, certain relatively stable thematic, compositional, 
and stylistic types of utterance (Bakhtin, 1986: 64). 
As we build a picture of speech genres we quote from Holquist's `Introduction' 
again, and his borrowed heading: 
To strive at higher mathematical formulas for linguistic meaning while knowing 
nothing correctly of the shirt-sleeve rudiments of language is to court disaster. 
(Benjamin Lee Whorf " Linguistics as an Exact Science", 1941). (Holquist, 
1986: ix ). 
The problem to solve now is: does it become possible to use Bakhtin's speech 
genres to try and locate the possible psychoanalytic category of fragmentation and 
dismemberment? It is on the basis of the preceding evidence that we would have 
to think through a discourse of the fragmented and the dismembered. It is 
certainly not a discourse articulated in consciousness. It has been rejected by the 
ego and operates as an unconscious force. So that we reinforce our ground quite 
clearly, for an assumption of fragmented speech depends on it, we look again at a 
comment by Bakhtin: 
Sausurre defines the utterance (la parole) as an "individual act. It is wilful and 
intellectual. Within the act, we should distinguish between (1) the combinations 
by which the speaker uses the language code for expressing his own thoughts; 
and (2) the psychological mechanism that allows him to exteriorize those 
combinations" (Course in General Linguistics [New York: McCraw-Hill, 1966]: 
14). Thus Saussure ignores the fact that in addition to forms of language there 
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are also forms of combinations of these forms, that is, he ignores speech genres. 
(Bakhtin, 1986: 81: footnote f). 
Not until Bakhtin is there the possibility of discovering a mental space for the area 
marked out by Lacan. But we see that, according to Bakhtin, when we construct 
an utterance and choose words we do not, as he has said so often, take them from 
the system of language in their neutral, dictionary form. We take them says 
Bakhtin from other utterances and usually from utterances that are similar to ours 
in genre, that is, in theme, composition, or style. 
It is an assumption here, that something is known, in the infant, of the fragmented 
and dismembered nature of its disposition prior to the consolidation of the ego. It 
is the suspicion of this that leads to the aggressivity mentioned in Lacan's second 
chapter in Ecrits (Lacan, 1977). The child tends to assimilate images, language, 
others, and objects as unified, as monologic. However, something has been left 
out, and left out because of the infant's prematurity at birth, leading to the 
enclosure of the ego. It is closed too soon, and a fragmented `sibling' is left out. 
When Bakhtin says: `The speaker is not the biblical Adam, dealing only with 
virgin and still unnamed objects, giving them names for the first time' (Bakhtin, 
1986: 93), we may whole-heartedly agree and say the speaker is not the `only' 
speaker and his discourse is formed by the nature of the desire of the other. For 
Bakhtin, turning to someone is the essence of the utterance and the addressee and 
addressor are the very stuff of the utterance. It is always a question of the 
relationship of entities to each other that is of prime concern to Bakhtin. 
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Consequently, we have the relationship of the author and the hero, the relationship 
of the inner and the outer world, space and time and `I' and the `Other', just as 
examples. However, as addressee relations are part of the utterance we look now 
at another relationship and that is the problem of the addressee in dialogic 
relationships, and the new term the superaddressee. 
The Problem of the Text 
Bakhtin discusses the superaddressee in useful terms for us in the chapter The 
Problem of the Text (Bakhtin, 1986: 126). There is, in Bakhtin, a superaddressee 
that is part of the utterance itself. So what precisely is this superaddressee? Let 
us check a few comments by Bakhtin himself, to achieve some understanding of 
the term. `Any utterance always has an addressee (of various sorts, with varying 
degrees of proximity, concreteness, awareness and so forth), whose responsive 
understanding the author of the speech work seeks and surpasses' (Bakhtin, 1986: 
126). And Bakhtin goes on to say `that this is the second party'. Bakhtin now, 
however, introduces a third figure into the field of the utterance and he has this to 
say: 
But in addition to this addressee (the second party), the author of the utterance, 
with a greater or lesser awareness, presupposes a higher superaddressee (third), 
whose absolutely just responsive understanding is presumed, either in some 
metaphysical distance or in distant historical time (the loophole addressee). In 
various ages and with various understandings of the world, this superaddressee 
and his ideally true responsive understanding assume various ideological 
178 
expressions (God, absolute truth, the court of dispassionate human conscience, 
the people, the court of history, science and so forth). (Bakhtin, 1986: 126) 
So that we become clearer of Bakhtin's meaning, he adds the following: `Each 
dialogue takes place as if against the background of the responsive understanding 
of an invisibly present third party who stands above all the participants in the 
dialogue (partners)' (Bakhtin, 1986: Ibid. ). In these statements we reach what 
Bakhtin is to call the microworld of the word. The superaddressee is the `person' 
present in the utterance beyond the addressor/addressee and the immediate 
proximity of their relations. So, for Bakhtin, the utterance is not a dyad but a 
trinity. All that we need to remember for the present is the third party present in 
any utterance. 
In psychoanalysis, the superaddressee may be seen in such terms as Lacan's 
Name-of-the-Father and No-of-the-Father. For Bakhtin, there is never only a 
direct correlation (as in Saussure, for example) between sender/receiver messages, 
which in itself would be in the nature of a monologic relationship. 
Sender/receiver messages are not transferred or transposed across a semantic void 
according to Bakhtin. There is an endless penetration of dialogic activity within a 
dialogic forcefield. The borders of the sentence do not govern the borders of the 
utterance for Bakhtin. For him the borders of the utterance are governed by a 
change of speech subjects, and this is the essential border of the utterance. This 
border zone is essential, it seem to me, in any understanding of Bakhtin. As he 
says, the utterance can only occur by turning to someone. 
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Newer Dialogic Fields 
In this, admittedly brief, exploration of Bakhtin's thought on the utterance and the 
superaddressee, we attempt to open up these dialogic fields discovered by 
Bakhtin. In the case of Lacan's Name-of-the-Father we take note of the 
following. Initially Lacan referred (in the 1950s) to the name of the father 
without capitals as the prohibitive role of the father, as the one who lays down the 
incest taboo in the Oedipus complex (see Chapter One). Lacan, however, 
develops this theme further and in the seminar on The Psychoses (Lacan, 1955- 
56), the term becomes more precise and is capitalized and hyphenated. 
In Lacan, if the Name-of-the-Father is foreclosed (not included in Lacan's 
symbolic order) the result must be psychosis. This concept develops within 
Lacan, to become the Paternal Metaphor, involving the Name of the Father with 
metaphoric substitution for the desire of the mother. However, this takes us too 
far into the Lacanian psychoanalytic field at present. 
Suffice it to say that the potential for the connection between the superaddressee 
and the Name of the Father could have significance in the future for analysis of 
any psychotic discourse because Bakhtin penetrates the word. He does this, for 
example, by his use of the addressor/addressee/ superaddressee. In this way he 
reveals the internal meaning of the word in relationship to itself and thereby 
exposes, for example, the psychotic word that seemingly is complete. 
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If the problem is approached from, as it were, the atomic elements of the word, 
then we enter the problem from the heart of speech. If we add to this Lacan's 
Name of the Father then we certainly have added another dimension to the 
unidimensionality of the psychotic word. In other words we approach the 
problem from within the word in the first instance, and the fragmented word at 
that. Bakhtin does not accept a direct addressor/addressee relationship in the 
utterance but posits also a superaddressee to whom one is also referring in any 
utterance. If we take the superaddressee of Bakhtin and compare it with the 
Name-of-the-Father and Paternal Metaphor in Lacan's work we can see the 
similarities immediately. 
The usefulness of this is that the superaddressee is already `contained' in the 
utterance; we assume a third party in our discourse (as an outside interlocutor 
present in the formation of the utterance). God is already locked in the word. As 
we draw this chapter to a close let us look at a comment by Lacan that provides 
thought for the subject of speech: 
For the unripe grape of speech by which the child receives too early from a 
father the authentification of the nothingness of existence, and the bunch of 
wrath that replies to the words of false hope with which the mother has baited 
him in feeding him with the milk of her true despair, set his teeth on edge more 
than having been weaned on an imaginary jouissance or even having been 
deprived of such real attentions. (Lacan, 1977: 143) 
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In this continuation of Lacan's stone guest `speech' we see as the father, that 
obscene, ferocious figure in which we must see the true signification of the 
superego' (Lacan, 1977; 143). Who is this if not the father or Father? The Name 
of the Father has its double meaning in Lacan too. Added to this we remember 
Freud's words ... `for the father of prehistoric times was undoubtedly terrible' 
(SE: XIV: 131), and as he also said: `Just as for primaeval man, so also for the 
unconscious' (SE: XIV: 298). 
We now check the whole symphony of Bakhtin's superaddressee. Let us begin 
by making a few cursory remarks concerning the superaddressee assisted again 
by Michael Holquist. He comments: `Thus, each speaker authors an utterance not 
only with an audience-addressee, but a superaddressee in mind' (Holquist, 1986: 
xviii). This superaddressee may be seen in a metaphysical distance or in distant 
historical time. Holquist goes on to itemize some of these superaddressees 
discussed by Bakhtin. So we have: `God, absolute truth, the court of 
dispassionate human conscience, the people, the court of history, science and so 
forth' (Holquist, 1986: xviii). So, in both cases, Name of the Father and the 
superaddressee, we cannot pretend that incense has not been swung over the 
word; it is always impregnated with the ritual magic of its history along with its 
emptiness and its future. This superaddressee says Bakhtin is `not in any 
mystical or metaphysical being' (Bakhtin, 1986: 126) although, he says it could 
be, but is `a constitutive aspect of the whole utterance, who, under deeper 
analysis, can be revealed in it' (Bakhtin, 1986: 126-127). The word then, 
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according to Bakhtin, moves ever forward in search of responsive understanding. 
So it seems that the word is not only for the second other but there is an 
awareness of the possibility of a third other. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter we have drawn implications from the work of Bakhtin and Lacan 
and in certain instances we have discovered common ground. We have developed 
Lacan's Mirror Stage, from the previous chapter, into the compass of vision of 
Bakhtin. We have tried to define more closely our conceptualization of 
fragmented speech and discovered the field of the superaddressee and the Name 
of the Father. However, if fragmented speech in the unconscious exists and it is 
our hypothesis that it does, then it must be our task to provide some form of 
application of fragmented speech to a given text. Primarily in this chapter we 
have attempted to draw Lacan and Bakhtin on to a similar plane by the use of 
Lacan's landmark Mirror Stage paper and Bakhtin's philosophy of language - 
especially his use of the utterance and speech genres. Most importantly for us, 
we have clarified certain thoughts appertaining to fragmented speech. If we have 
our parameters in place, we may now move into the final chapter and provide an 
application of fragmented speech to a given text. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
FRAGMENTED SPEECH IN THE SCHREBER `TEXT' 
Were such things here as we do speak about? 
Or have we eaten of the insane root 
That takes the reason prisoner? 
Shakespeare: Macbeth, I, iii (1605) 
Introduction 
If, in the first chapter, we noted that Rank had refused to acknowledge that the reader is a 
third party who triangulates the relationship between the writer and the plot, then it 
becomes incumbent upon us not to do precisely the same thing. In other words, if we 
wish to interpret aspects of a `text' we need, in the first instance, to describe quite clearly 
our own methodology. In this final chapter, we interpret aspects of. Memoirs of My 
Nervous Illness (Schreber, 1955). To what end? We intend to discover fragmented 
speech in practice. However, before we attempt to discover fragmented speech within a 
given utterance (Schreber's work) we must position ourselves vis-a-vis that work. We 
must attempt to dialogize our relationship with Schreber. So, prior to approaching 
Schreber's text in terms of fragmented speech we first describe our own methodology, 
based upon assumptions we have made hitherto. 
In order to position or pinpoint our methodology quite precisely, we wish to quote 
Bakhtin: 
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The exact sciences constitute a monologic form of knowledge: the intellect contemplates 
a thing and expounds upon it. There is only one subject here - cognising 
(contemplating) and speaking (expounding). In opposition to the subject there is only a 
voiceless thing. Any object of knowledge (including man) can be perceived and cognised 
as a thing. But a subject as such cannot be perceived and studied as a thing, for as a 
subject it cannot, while remaining a subject, become voiceless, and, consequently, 
cognition of it can only be dialogic. (Bakhtin, 1986: 161). 
We therefore enter into a dialogic relationship with Schreber (hence the opening remark 
from Macbeth). Inasmuch as we attempt to `confront' Schreber within an intersubjective 
zone, is our sanity too then open to question? If we see the Schreber `case' as a subject- 
object relationship presumably not. But, if we enter into a dialogic relationship with 
Schreber (subject-subject) then our own dialogic stance is surely at least questionable? 
We only stress that we too are implicated in Schreber's discourse. We do this in the fond 
knowledge that our reader will also enter into a dialogic relationship with us. 
It becomes impossible to locate fragmented speech, or determine what precisely it is, 
unless one understands it, first of all, in terms of methodology. So our approach is 
essentially dialogic. The aims and purposes of this final chapter are twofold. First, to 
provide a methodology of interpretation of Schreber's utterance and secondly, to 
interpret, as a result of that methodology, our own discovery of fragmented speech. `Any 
understanding is a correlation of a given text with other texts' (Bakhtin, 1986: 161), and 
this correlation is dialogic. The dialogic correlation we have chosen is: Schreber - Freud 
- Lacan. If the overall rationale in this chapter is the detection of fragmented speech in 
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Schreber's book, then we note several premises that are necessary in our intepretation of 
the Schreber text. 
The first premise is that Schreber's metaphor of `rays' is equal to `language' in a 
generalized sense. His metaphor of `nerves' is likewise equal to the `body' or the 
penetration of the body. It is a second premise that Schreber is especially subject to the 
centripetal and centrifugal forces in language (examples of our premises will follow). 
Schreber uses the term `basic language', which we premise as an attempt to hold on to 
the `whole' language as system, when the image of language starts to fragment. These 
are the basic premises upon which we intepret Schreber's text. In terms of 
conceptualization, we deliver the following ideas. First, if there is an image of the whole 
body and the whole word, incarcerated in the ego at the time of the mirror stage 
experience, then, in psychosis, the image of the `whole' body and `whole' speech image 
begins to fragment. 
Our second concept is that as the images of `wholeness' begin to collapse they are 
accompanied by terrible anxiety in the subject. The return of the fragmented body and 
speech image is the reason for this terrible anxiety. It is a further concept that the 
symptoms of the psychotic are arranged in such a way, that they attempt to stave off the 
approach of the images of the fragmented body and fragmented speech existing as a force 
in the unconscious. There is considerable resistance to the return of the images of the 
fragmented body and fragmented speech in psychosis. In fact, the psychotic sets up a 
flimsy discourse of intensified 'wholeness' to compensate for the insurgent forces 
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emanating from the unconscious. Hence we find what one may only describe as a 
baroque insignia of grandiose speech. 
Thirdly, and essentially, the problem dealt with in this dissertation has been the problem 
of the `second consciousness', whether that second consciousness is the duality of the 
inner voice' of Freud's unconscious plane, or the problem of the `other' that we have 
defined in Bakhtin and Lacan. We have seen the discourse of the other and the Other in 
Lacan. `The Other is nothing but the dimension of the others that remains unknown to 
the speaker, because he approaches them via language' (Nobus, 2000: 12). Nobus points 
out for us the enigma of the Other in Schreber: 
`Schreber for instance described how divine figures tormented him day and night by 
uttering unfinished sentences such as `Now I will myself... ' and `You ought to ... ', 
which he was forced to complete with the endpart, respectively ... `face the 
fact that I am 
... 
be exposed as the negator of God and as given up to dissolute an idiot' and ' 
sensuality, not to mention other things'. (Nobus, 2000: 13) 
The memoirs of President Schreber provide the focus and the impetus for this final 
chapter. It is here that we shall draw the final implications of our work. We shall 
approach his Memoirs from differing dialogic angles. Freud analysed Schreber's text and 
so did Lacan. We shall examine Schreber's `text' in the light of our discovery of 
fragmented speech. Bakhtin's oeuvre will provide the dialogic-linguistic angle and we 
shall use his all-important utterance and speech genres. Let us, throughout this chapter, 
recall that: `A grotesque-word matrix drags the messy body into territory previously 
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occupied by disembodied, hierarchical word systems'. (Morson and Emerson, 1990: 
438). 
Working hypothesis - Fragmented Speech 
Fragmented speech - base condition upon which unitary speech is acquired. It is 
initially, in the child, a conscious phenomenon, in other words the only 'form' of speech. 
It is half-understood words, it is a partial understanding of relationships between words 
(also one's own word, and the other's word), it is the tower of babel of all the 
interpenetrating voices to which the child is subject - both inner and outer. 
It is the centrifugal without the necessary condition of the centripetal. It is heteroglossia 
without monoglossia. It is the living event of spectral dispersion. It is the confusion of 
inner and outer voices and voice environments. We may assume it is the jigsaw puzzle of 
speech, emptied out of the box. It is the state in which the child approaches the mirror as 
Echo. At the level of the mirror stage experience, Echo ( speech image) joins forces with 
Narcissus (the specular image) and the pair unify both the specular image `That's me! ' 
and speech image - assumed mastery of the system of language. However, as Lacan 
teaches, the unification of the specular image and (as we believe) speech, unified to meet 
the needs of the developing ego, are based upon a meconnaissance due to the prematurity 
at birth of the child. 
When the rudimentary ego is formed, the fragmented images of the body and speech are 
repressed into the unconscious to make way for the unification of the specular image and 
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speech image in consciousness. If once the fragmented specular image (non-unified 
visual image) and the fragmented speech image (non-unified speech image) return to 
consciousness from the unconscious, they are met with, in the subject, with terrible 
anxiety. 
This base condition needs to have an application if it is to prove valid. We need, in other 
words, to provide evidence of its existence as an unconscious force operating in the 
unconscious. Fragmented speech is applied here to Schreber's book, Memoirs of My 
Nervous Illness. There is a correlation between the carnivalesque grotesque body image 
and the grotesque speech image (language of the marketplace) and the fragmented body 
image and fragmented speech image. In psychosis, fragmented speech would be a 
symptom of the illness. 
Schreber's `Text' 
Daniel Paul Schreber (1842-1911) was a distinguished German jurist, who in 1884 
suffered the first of a series of mental collapses that affected him for the rest of his life. 
Before his mental collapse, he served as chief justice of the supreme court of the state of 
Saxony. He was the son of a distinguished German medical authority on child rearing. 
His book Memoirs of My Nervous Illness (Schreber, 1955) was originally published in 
1903; Freud's celebrated paper on Schreber was published in 1911 (SE. 12: 9-70). 
Schreber's father, Moritz Schreber, was, as we say, a renowned authority on child 
rearing. In her `Introduction' to the most recent reprint of Schreber's Memoirs, 
Rosemary Dinnage makes the following comment: 
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Moritz Schreber was in fact hugely influential. As late as the 1930s (I am told by a 
German friend) German children were being threatened with the Schreber Geradehalter, 
a contraption of boards and straps, if they did not sit up straight. He had a system and a 
manual for everything - the cold-water health system, the system to cure harmful body 
habits, indoor gymnastic systems for health preservation, outdoor play systems, the life- 
long systematic diet guide. But of his two sons, one committed suicide and one (Paul, 
author of Memoirs) went mad. (Schreber, 1955: xiii). 
In Schreber, we discover that his Memoirs `were written whilst he was in Sonnenstein 
public asylum, as an account of what he believed were his unique experiences and as a 
plea for release' (Schreber, [Introduction] xiii). As Bakhtin may have said: 'Who 
speaks? ', in which context and under what conditions? In Schreber, it appears, we have 
the answer to all three. Resulting from his Memoirs, written as they were to bring about 
his release from the Asylum, we need to bear in mind Bakhtin's description of a loophole 
discourse and his sideways glance (see Bakhtin's Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics, 
especially pp. 232-36 for loophole discourse) which understandably pervade Schreber's 
'text'. 
Schreber's Voices 
In his work on Schreber, Freud did not deal with the voices that Schreber heard. We, 
however, shall position ourselves directly at this point. We shall deal with the voice 
zones present in Schreber's text; it is the interpenetration of voice zones that will interest 
us. If the generalized diagnosis of psychosis is hallucinations and delusions, then the 
dialogic implications of this for the fragmented body image and the fragmented speech 
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image are of direct concern to us and hopefully we shall see why. As Schreber himself 
says: The system of not-finishing-a-sentence became more and more prevalent in the 
course of the years' (Schreber, 1955: 198) Our methodology draws directly from 
Bakhtin's assessment of the utterance and his speech genres. In fact, if we follow 
Bakhtin in his course of action we discover that we may position ourselves `within' 
Schreber's text and interpenetrate it with Freud and Lacan's comments as utterances and 
speech genres. So let us begin with a definition recalled from Bakhtin: 
Two aspects that define the text as an utterance: its plan (intention) and the realization of 
this plan. The dynamic interrelations of these aspects, their struggle, which determine the 
nature of the text. (Bakhtin, 1986: 104). 
The fragmented body-image and the fragmented speech-image appear throughout 
Schreber's `text', as we shall see. `The event of the life of the text, that is, its true 
essence, always develops on the boundary between two consciousnesses, two subjects' 
(Bakhtin, 1986: 106). In Schreber of course many voices occur within the same 
individual. Of one thing Schreber makes us quite clear however: the voices are, at least 
at the outset, loud and persistent, to such an extent that Schreber often has to bellow 
(confirmed by his physician Dr. Weber) to override these persistent voices. 
At this point we recall why we placed our conception of Bakhtin's Carnival on to a single 
plane. In Schreber, we find Carnival without the laughter, for what in Schreber is 
pathologically serious, is in Rabelais parody through laughter. Schreber's text has 
remarkable parallels with the magnificent Rabelais: `On one occasion 240 Benedictine 
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Monks ... moved into my head to persist therein' (Schreber, 1955: 57). In Rabelais we 
have: 
This was the manner in which Gargamelle was brought to bed - and if you don't believe 
it, may your fundament fall out! Her fundament fell out one afternoon, on the third of 
February, after she had overeaten herself on godebillios. Godebillios are the fat tripes of 
coiros. Coiros are oxen fattened at the stall and in guimo meadows, and guimo meadows 
are those that carry two grass crops a year. They had killed three hundred and sixty- 
seven thousand and fourteen of these fat oxen to be salted down on Shrove Tuesday. 
(Rabelais, 1955: 47). 
lt is the preoccupation, in both cases, with numerical accuracy that is interesting and is, 
by the way, carnivalesque as Bakhtin variously points out. There are other instances of 
this in both Schreber and Rabelais. If one takes a one-dimensional image of carnival and 
places it, similar to an acetate or transparency, over the Schreber case one may map the 
dialogic lines of similarity, and the images correspond, in many ways, quite precisely. 
For example, the grotesque body image and language of the marketplace, prevail and see- 
saw throughout Schreber's text. 
We must bear this in mind, because carnival encompasses the forces of consciousness 
and the unconscious and, in a sense, leaves room for `folly'. Schreber is intensely subject 
to the high and low tides of the unconscious and the conscious. However, let us now 
recall the Bakhtinian utterance once more. The utterance is `The change of speaking 
subjects and the change of speakers' ( Bakhtin, 1986: 108). But how does this refer? In 
the case of Schreber's Memoirs, the utterance of Schreber, who is locked up, is obviously 
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not the same as the utterance of Dr. Weber, who is in charge of the incarcerated Schreber. 
although the utterances meet upon similar dialogic terrain. For example, Schreber marks 
his own inner and outer world dimension, but it does not in all instances correspond with 
Dr. Weber's apperception of the 'scene'. 
As Schreber describes his inner life, he does not describe the terror in his own eyes that 
Weber perceives. He does not describe the terrified and terrifying laughter that Weber 
describes. The horizon of Schreber's seeing and his environment provide a contrapuntal 
score that allows us to visualize that Schreber is certainly not unaware of his environment 
as many may suppose. Also we may note an area of dialogic intensity between 
Schreber's Memoirs and the `Medical expert's report to the court' (Schreber, 1955: 327) 
by Dr. Weber, Superintendent of the Asylum. So that we delve more deeply into our 
methodology and analysis of the Schreber 'text' we need, I think, to utilize the `micro 
dialogue' of Bakhtin. We need, in other words, to nest ourselves in the heart of 
Schreber's text, in the heart of his subjectivity and intersubjectivity. We have taken 
Bakhtin's advice and realise that the most important thing is to avoid severance from the 
text. 
Bakhtin tells us: 
Dialogical relations among utterances that also pervade individual utterances from within 
fall into the realm of metalinguistics. They differ radically from all possible linguistic 
relations among elements, both in the language system and in the individual utterance. 
(Bakhtin, 1986: 117). 
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Schreber's dialogic life is furrowed with the dialogic echoes of the discourse of others 
and the inmixing of his own voices and visions. Schreber is caught up in the 'carnival' 
body topography of upper and lower body, or as Bakhtin might say the lower material 
bodily stratum. `I observed here too the otherwise frequent phenomena that friendly 
souls always tended towards the region of my sexual organs (of the abdomen etc. ) where 
they did little or no damage and hardly molested me, whereas inimical souls always 
aspired towards my head' (Schreber, 1955: 114: footnote 57). If we are to make sense of 
Schreber's `empty babel', we must take not only the Bakhtinian utterance but also his 
vital Speech Genres as part of our methodology. In respect of fragmentation, we make 
another comment so that we can make some sense of the terms hallucination and 
delusion. We have to assess, as Freud indicated variously, to what extent hallucination 
and delusion are sired from the stable of phantasy. Freud made the following 
observation: 
Phantasies arise from an unconscious combination of things experienced and heard, 
constructed for particular purposes. These purposes aim at making inaccessible the 
memory from which symptoms have been generated or might be generated. Phantasies 
are constructed by a process of fusion and distortion analogous to the decomposition of a 
chemical body which is combined with another one. For the first kind of distortion 
consists in a falsification of memory by a process of fragmentation, which involves a 
disregard of chronological considerations. (Chronological corrections seem to depend 
precisely on the activity of the system of consciousness). A fragment of a visual scene is 
then joined up to a fragment of an auditory one and made into a phantasy, while the 
fragment left over is linked up with something else. ( Freud, 1954: 204). 
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This remark by Freud of course is related to phantasies, but we hypothesize that there is a 
relation between phantasy and the delusions and hallucinations present in Schreber's text. 
We now note a further comment by Freud: 
the most important genetic difference between a neurosis and psychosis: neurosis is 
the result of a conflict between the ego and the id, whereas psychosis is the analogous 
outcome of a similar disturbance in the relations between the ego and the external world. 
(SE. XIX: 149). 
Freud again: 
The close affinity of [this] psychosis to normal dreams is unmistakable. A pre-condition 
of dreaming, moreover, is a state of sleep, and one of the features of sleep is a complete 
turning away from perception and the external world. (Ibid. 151). 
And finally on this point: 
In regard to the genesis of delusions, a fair number of analyses have taught us that the 
delusion is found applied like a patch over the place where originally a rent had appeared 
in the ego's relation to the external world (Ibid. ). 
In a slightly later paper Freud says: 
I have recently indicated as one of the features which differentiates a neurosis from a 
psychosis the fact that in a neurosis the ego, in its dependence on reality, suppresses a 
piece of the id (of instinctual life), whereas in a psychosis, this same ego, in the service 
of the id, withdraws from a piece of reality. (SE. XIX: 183). 
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In psychosis, Freud tells us that there is the `creation of a new reality' (Ibid. 185). so that: 
`in neurosis a piece of reality is avoided by a sort of flight, whereas in psychosis it is 
remodelled' (Ibid. ). Freud further asserts: `Thus the psychosis is also faced with the task 
of procuring for itself perceptions of a kind which shall correspond to the new reality: 
and this is most radically effected by means of hallucination' (Ibid. 186). He goes on: 
The fact that, in so many forms and cases of psychosis, the paramnesias, the delusions 
and the hallucinations that occur are of a most distressing character and are bound up 
with a generation of anxiety - this fact is without doubt a sign that the whole process of 
remodelling is carried through against forces which oppose it violently (Ibid. 186). 
We would add, however, that the return of the image of the fragmented body and the 
image of the return of fragmented speech are responsible for this generation of anxiety. 
We leave the final word on this with Freud: 
It can hardly be doubted that the world of phantasy plays the same part in psychosis 
and there, too, it is the storehouse from which the materials or the pattern for building the 
new reality are derived. (Ibid. 187). 
This final remark allows us to place ourselves at the point of phantasy originally 
mentioned. 
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In a letter to Fliess from Freud, we also find the following: 
let me repeat that I have discovered the source of auditory hallucinations in paranoia. 
The origin of the phantasies, as in hysteria also, is things heard but only understood 
subsequently (Freud, 1954: Letter 62: 201, dated 16.5.1897). 
Freud's comment resonates with the conceptualization of Carnival. The relation of the 
ego to the external world and the creation of a `new reality' are the everyday stuff of 
Carnival. One could perhaps be forgiven for wondering to what extent Carnival is a 
`psychotic discourse', or at the very least, it appears to incorporate many of the 
mechanisms. 
We now turn our attention to Bakhtin's Speech Genres, to see how Bakhtin's work 
allows us to place ourselves, without confusion, at the heart of Schreber's utterance. The 
utterance - written or spoken - always has a previous referent and will always leave a 
hook at its end, unless one assumes that one speaks into the void or, as Bakhtin says, that 
one is Adam. Also there is always an outside interlocutor to which one refers in the triad 
of speech. But this outside interlocutor is within the utterance, this is Bakhtin's 
superaddressee, and bears comparison with Lacan's Name of the Father, however, this 
time within the utterance. 
System of Language 
The utterance in Bakhtin cannot be placed within the system of language and it is not just 
the individual utterance, it is the expression of what happens intersubjectively. It is a 
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dialogic vein that connects one concrete utterance to another and by-passes the system of 
language (although of course the system of language is presupposed). Bakhtin's 
linguistic transfusion takes place through the living event of the utterance, supplying 
blood to the dialogic heart of language and not the system of language. In this Bakhtin is 
subversive, as Freud was subversive. 
In Schreber's Memoirs, I consider that they may, in fact, be divided into two sections. In 
the first half of the book (roughly), Schreber deals primarily with descriptions of his 
bodily disintegration and the interpenetrating voices attached thereto. In the second half 
of the book speech disintegration begins to predominate, speech disintegration becomes 
the dominant. At this point we must clarify a particular matter. We do not question that 
Schreber displays, throughout his book, a coherent and sustained discourse. In fact, his 
book played a significant part in his release from the asylum. Fragmented speech, in 
Schreber, relates not to a change in writing style, for example, but rather to the object of 
description, i. e., his psychic reality. We would expect to find, for example, the 
dissemination of Schreber's actual speech, which is in fact authenticated for us by Dr. 
Weber. 
To continue, one may find many examples of bodily disintegration in the first half of the 
book, and then there is a gradual diminution of such references (although, it must be said, 
not entirely) in the second half. As an example of this let us check the following 
statement in Schreber: 
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The reason for this was the fact that the manifestations of the disease were always 
subsequently removed by pure rays. For one distinguished `searing' and `blessing' rays; 
the former were laden with the poison of corpses or some other putrid matter, and 
therefore carried some germ of the disease into the body or brought about some other 
destructive effect in it. The blessing (pure) rays in turn healed this damage. (Schreber, 
1955: 95). 
Conversely, let us check another comment much later in the book: 
It is true that I used strong language occasionally; but these words did not spring from my 
own spiritual soil, but are used only as far as I can see, when I relate the content of a 
conversation the voices carry on with me. It is not my fault that these voices often use 
expressions not fit for drawing rooms; to give a faithful picture I had to render these 
forms of speech literally. I will give only one example as proof that the `strong language' 
used by the voices could not have been produced by my own nerves: that particularly 
offensive word beginning with f hardly passed my lips ten times in my earlier life 
whereas in the course of the last few years I have heard it ten thousand times from the 
voices ... (Schreber, 
1955: 380-381). 
We recognize that these two examples are by no means exhaustive, but they are 
representative of a `trend' towards concentration on language rather than the body in the 
second half of the book. Schreber becomes more preoccupied with the fragmentation of 
speech. First half, Narcissus, second half, Echo - the pair came together at the mirror 
stage and they stay together - however fragmented they may appear. 
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Schreber does not depend upon a stable body-image, it is for him a permeable membrane, 
he crosses the boundary and re-writes the body image continuously and, subsequently, 
the speech image. For example: `At times M. and Sch. unloaded into my body a part of 
their bodies in the form of a foul mass in order "to remove themselves" (Schreber, 1955: 
118). Here we see an example of appersonization, whereby what normally may be the 
unconscious absorption of the body image of another, in this case is designated 
consciously. Schreber is also subjected to depersonalization in the form of .... ` finally a 
change in my whole stature (diminution of body size) - probably due to contraction of 
the vertebrae and possibly my thigh bone' (Schreber, 1955: 142). 
We posit a correlation between Schreber's `rotting' body image and its effect upon his 
general body image and speech image. `God's rays appeared to act from the instinctive 
knowledge that it would be most distasteful for them to have to allow themselves to be 
attracted by a rotting body' (Ibid. 146). Schreber tells us that: 
The effect of the pumping out was that the spinal cord left my mouth in considerable 
quantity in the form of little clouds, particularly when I was walking in the garden' (Ibid. 
146). 
And the comment: `Rays [language] did not seem to appreciate at all that a human being 
who exists must be somewhere' (Ibid. 15 1). We must also note: 
As mentioned in chapter nine the talk of the voices had become mostly an empty babel of 
ever-recurring monotonous phrases in tiresome repetition; on top of this they were 
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rendered grammatically incomplete by the omission of words and even syllables. (ibid. 
152). 
In the interplay between the fragmented body image and fragmented speech image we 
repeat, in Schreber, there is a gradual increase in the use of fragmented speech, which 
ultimately becomes the dominant. There is a distinct inmixing of `rays' and `nerves' in 
which the fragmented body image and fragmented speech image interpenetrate each 
other- this we would designate as a speech complex. 
Speech Genres 
As speech genres play such a vital role in our discussion of the Schreber case, we clarify 
their use described for us in Bakhtin's Speech Genres and Other Late Essays: `Each 
separate utterance is individual of course, but each sphere in which language is used 
develops its own relatively stable types of these utterances. These we may call speech 
genres' (Bakhtin, 1986: xxi). If the utterance dialogically by-passes the system of 
language, then it becomes possible to understand that the utterance may be defined in 
terms of relatively stable types of utterances, thereby forming a speech genre. What is an 
example of a speech genre? The discursive field of everyday dialogic interaction, the 
rejoinder, turning to someone, the give-and-take of everyday discourse in other words, is 
a speech genre. In a text such as Schreber's it is crucial to mark the change in speech 
subjects (the utterance) and discursive `groups' of utterances (speech genres), otherwise 
one becomes lost in the welter of voices. When we first speak, as infants, we do not 
speak in terms of the system of language, but we do address ourselves to utterances and, 
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as Bakhtin tells us, we have speech genres at our disposal from the very beginning. A 
stratification of genres will be our aim in attempting to interpret the Schreber 'text'. 
We consider, however, that in the first instance there is no greater language stratifying 
force than that which exists between the conscious and the unconscious. This is, for us, a 
basic premise. Also, it is a premise of ours that unless we pick up on the dialogic 
implications of Bakhtin's thought, we find ourselves with an imaginary relationship to 
language. `The language is, so to speak, more or less self-conscious of its ``face" because 
it has encountered an image of itself (Morson and Emerson, 1990: 310). This is, in 
effect, the mirror of speech; the utterance is interindividual. It seems that one has to be 
able to take up a position external to language and `see' language as the `other'. The 
superaddressee is a constitutive aspect of the whole utterance' (Morson and Emerson, 
1990: 135). As we move deep into the Schreber text, we should recall that `Dialogue 
moves into the deepest molecular and, ultimately, subatomic levels' (Bakhtin, 1981: 
300). 
Our primary purpose is to locate fragmented speech in a 'psychotic discourse' and draw 
certain conclusions, and so, we find that the proof of the pudding must surely be in the 
eating? We understand that `Dialogic relations presuppose a language, but they do not 
reside within the system of a language' (Bakhtin, 1986: 117). Bakhtin also teaches: 
'Thus, the listener who understands passively, who is depicted as the speaker's partner in 
the schematic diagrams of general linguistics, does not correspond to the real participant 
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in speech communication' (Bakhtin, 1986: 69). As Bakhtin says so often, we understand 
with the utterance that someone relinquishes the floor. 
Authoritative and Internally Persuasive Discourse 
The interpenetration of genres and the dialogic relationships of the utterance provide us 
with the methodology that allows us to interpret the Schreber text in our own terms. We 
draw another line in the sand and delineate clearly the Bakhtinian authoritative discourse 
and the internally persuasive discourse and its acute application to Schreber. Proceeding 
through Schreber's text we shall trace evidence of the authoritative discourse and the 
internally persuasive discourse, just as we found and traced evidence of the centrifugal 
and centripetal forces operative in language. So what precisely is an authoritative and 
internally persuasive discourse? To trace just an outline, we borrow the definition 
provided by the Editor of The Dialogic Imagination, Michael Holquist, in the Glossary. 
First: 
Authoritative Discourse: `This is a privileged language that approaches us from without, 
it is distanced, taboo, and permits no play with its framing context [Sacred Writ, for 
example). We recite it. It has great power over us, but only while in power; if ever 
dethroned it immediately becomes a dead thing, a relic. 
Opposed to it is internally persuasive discourse which is more akin to retelling a text in 
one's own words, with one's own accents, gestures, modifications. Human coming-to- 
consciousness, in Bakhtin's view, is a constant struggle between these two types of 
discourse: an attempt to assimilate more into one's own system, and the simultaneous 
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freeing of one's own discourse from the authoritative word, or from previous earlier 
persuasive words that have ceased to mean'. (Bakhtin, [Holquist] 1981: 424-425). 
We may ask ourselves as we work through the Schreber text, to what extent is Schreber 
caught up in his failure to apprehend the difference between these two quite specific 
voice zones? 
As we draw to a close our comments on the utterance and speech genres, we just note the 
following as clarification: `The problem of understanding the utterance. In order to 
understand, it is first of all necessary to establish the principal and clear-cut boundaries of 
the utterance. The alternation of speech subjects. ' (Bakhtin, 1986: 112). We understand 
the utterance is a unit of speech communication. The work (Schreber's Memoirs) is 
related to other work-utterances (Freud's paper on Schreber, and Lacan's work The 
Psychoses, for example). And now the absolutely crucial `... only the contact between 
the language meaning and the concrete reality that takes place in the utterance can create 
the spark of expression' (ibid. 87). We may wish at this stage to assess the 
contradistinction of this with Lacan's statement: 'When he speaks, the subject has the 
entire material of language at his disposal, and this is where concrete discourse begins to 
be formed' (Lacan, 1993: 54). Bakhtin tells us: `We repeat, only the contact between the 
language meaning and the concrete reality that takes place in the utterance can create the 
spark of expression. It exists neither in the system of language nor in the objective reality 
surrounding us' (Bakhtin, 1986: 86-87). 
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Approaching Schreber's Utterance 
We now analyse certain aspects of Schreber's text in respect of our discovery of 
fragmented speech and in the light of the work produced surrounding Schreber by Freud 
and Lacan. We should also add that the medical text of the report produced by Dr. Weber 
- as his medical assessment of Schreber, interpenetrates our assessment of the dialogic 
voices of Schreber as well. Let us begin with an opening assessment of the fragmented 
body image of Schreber himself that is outlined for us by Freud: 
During the first years of his illness certain of his bodily organs suffered such destructive 
injuries as would inevitably have led to the death of any other man: he lived for a long 
time without a stomach, without intestines, almost without lungs, with a torn oesophagus, 
without a bladder, and with shattered ribs, he used sometimes to swallow parts of his own 
larynx with his food etc., But divine miracles ('rays') always restored what had been 
destroyed. (SE. XII: 17). 
Freud allows us here to glimpse the fragmented body image of Schreber and our first 
mention of the 'rays'. Schreber's use of rays we define as a metaphor of language for 
Schreber. The term nerves we define as a metaphor describing the body. Schreber's 
`rays' and `nerves' are attempts to stabilize the image. Within the Schreber text itself 
there are variations on this theme but basically `rays' often refer to voices and the 
`nerves' are an impregnation of the body. We would also expect to find Schreber's 'basic 
language' or something of the sort, in any similar discourse. The reason? At the mirror 
stage, as an experience, the acquisition of `whole' speech is marked by a language 
megalomania and omnipotence in contradistinction to the repressed fragmented images of 
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both the body and speech. `In contrast the genuine basic language, that is the expression 
of the souls' true feelings before the time the mechanically repeated phrases commenced, 
excelled in form also by its dignity and simplicity' (Schreber, 1955: 156). There is, in 
Schreber, a continuous duality between the forces of heteroglossia and monoglossia but, 
in pathological form. We note: `Fancy a person who was Senatspräsident allowing 
himself to be f----d' (Ibid. 164). And finally, we have `... in senseless monotony like a 
barrel-organ by all the other tasteless forms of speech' (Ibid. 171). Again, we may 
remind ourselves of the similarities with the Bakhtinian carnival and language of the 
marketplace. 
So, to some degree, we shall always expect to find hi-falutin' language accompanied by 
`grotesque' language in Schreber: `it would be preferable that the content of these spoken 
words made sense - even if in endless repetition - and not consist of sheer nonsense or 
frank vulgarities' (Ibid. 172). It is at such times that Schreber approaches Rabelais, alas, 
however, without the parody. Again, it is as if, in the case of psychosis, as the 
unconscious crosses the frontier of the censor and unsettles the ego, it drags with it the 
previously repressed fragmented body image and fragmented word image - we regard 
the interaction of the two (fragmented body/speech image) as: the speech complex. We 
must, I think, remember that there is an image of the whole body, there is an image of the 
whole word, but in the Lacanian register both would be a meconnaissance. And both are 
constitutive of the ego. On the other hand, the fragmented body and fragmented speech 
are held as images in the unconscious, and they seem to have a relationship with, what 
one can only describe as, the fragmented libidinous investment. 
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Schreber - Carnival Motif of Crossdressing 
`I venture to assert flatly that anybody who sees me standing in front of a mirror with the 
upper part of my body naked would get the undoubted impression of a female trunk - 
especially when the illusion is strengthened by some feminine adornments'. (Ibid. 248). 
Let us set up a dialogic encounter here with Dr. Webers comment in his medical report 
(speech genre). ... ' the patient was frequently found in his room half undressed, 
declared that he already had feminine breasts, liked to occupy himself by looking at 
pictures of naked women' (Ibid. 331). We have here an in-between discourse in more 
senses than one, we have the dialogic space between Schreber and Dr. Weber. That, in 
itself, is a discursive field, or at least contains the germ of a speech genre. We may also 
understand that, as Bakhtin teaches, an utterance is unique and unrepeatable. This 
becomes apparent in the differing dialogic zones of Schreber and Weber. 
We now recall a comment by Freud that clarifies for us certain questions that one may 
have regarding Schreber's phantasies, hallucinations and delusions: 
In the final stages of Schreber's delusion a magnificent victory was scored by the 
infantile sexual urge; for voluptuousness became God-fearing, and God himself (his 
father) never tired of demanding it from him. His father's most dreaded threat, 
castration, actually provided the material for his wishful phantasy (at first resisted but 
later accepted) of being transformed into a woman. (SE. XII: 55-56). 
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Freud provides a brilliant insight into part of Schreber's delusional structure. So what 
precisely did Schreber himself say, and how does it fit in with our analysis of visual and 
auditory hallucinations? 
Furthermore, one morning while still in bed (whether still half asleep or already awake I 
cannot remember), I had a feeling which, thinking about it later when fully awake, struck 
me as highly peculiar. It was the idea that it really must be rather pleasant to be a woman 
succumbing to intercourse (Schreber, 1955: 46). 
Increasingly, these thoughts will haunt Schreber, as he drifts in and out of a state that we 
may describe as the genre of voluptousness within his utterance. `Mere common sense 
therefore commands that as far as humanly possible I fill every pause in my thinking - 
in other words the periods of rest for intellectual activity - with the cultivation of 
voluptuousness' (Ibid. 252). We shall return to this crucial genre later. Freud makes the 
following points that help us position, as it were, our first essential genres in Schreber's 
delusional system. However, first of all a crucial comment by Freud: it may be added 
that the "voices" which the patient heard never treated his transformation into a woman 
as anything but a sexual disgrace'. (SE. XII: 20). 
Freud tells us that `... the medical officer lays stress upon two points as being of chief 
importance: the patient's assumption of the role of Redeemer, and his transformation into 
a woman'. (SE. XII: 18). Now, although we do not elaborate on Freud's assumptions 
here, because we are tracking down fragmented speech, \e must mark both - first, as 
Freud calls it, the theologico-psychological system and Schreber's voluptousness as both 
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interpenetrating and separate genres. This is where Bakhtin's meaning becomes clearer. 
by delineating specific genres; their interpenetration may create a new genre. This 
appertains even if earlier dialogic echoes have furrowed the genre out previously. On 
this level it becomes possible to reaccentuate Schreber's discourse. 
In the last statements, we have attempted to position ourselves vis-G-vis genres in 
Schreber's text, but now, although still connected, we check a comment made by 
Schreber himself. `The souls to be purified learnt during purification the language spoken 
by God himself, the so-called "basic language", a somewhat antiquated but nevertheless 
powerful German ... ' (Schreber, 1955: 26). In this kind of statement Schreber is holding 
on to the image of `whole' speech, he is resisting the return of fragmented speech. In 
Schreber's text there is a web of interpenetrating discursive fields and if we are to discern 
effectively this interpenetration we must now locate ourselves again at the level of the 
body image. 
The Body Image 
`In November 1894 the patient's stiff posture loosened a little, he came out of himself 
more, became more mobile, started to speak coherently although in an abrupt and 
somewhat staccato manner; there now emerged undisguised, the fantastic delusional 
elaboration of his continual hallucinations' (Dr. Weber's medical report, [Schreber: 
329]). We note also: For some time the physical behaviour of the patient showed only 
little change, the peculiar very loud forced laughter and the monotonous uttering in 
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endless repetition of incomprehensible abusive language (for instance, the sun is a 
whore). (Ibid. [Weber] : 331). 
The onset of Schreber's illness appears to have been marked by hyperaesthesia 
(sensitivity to light and noise) and also to hypochondria. We have already mentioned 
appersonization and depersonalization; we now clarify the image: ' We take parts of the 
body of others and incorporate them in our own body-image (This phenomenon is called 
"Appersonization" in general psychopathology)' (Schilder, 1950: 172). An example of 
this, in Schreber, is: `... about that time I had Professor Flechsig's soul and most 
probably his whole soul temporarily in my body' (Schreber, 1955: 86). Further to this: 
`In "depersonalisation" the individual withdraws from his body-image' (Schilder, 1950: 
173). And again in Schreber: `... finally a change in my whole stature (diminution of 
body size) probably due to a contraction of the vertebrae and possibly of my thigh bones 
(Ibid. 142). 
We would make a considerable mistake if we assumed that these oscillations in the 
conceptualisation of the body image had little or no impact on the speech image. It is 
only through Bakhtin's utterance and speech genres that we have a hope of discerning 
these correlations between the body and speech image. We need perhaps to note the 
following: ' the language we assimilate comes to us already dialogised, already spoken 
about, already evaluated; it is encountered as learned as something used and patched, as 
an aggregate rather than a system' (Morson and Emerson, 1990: 145). And: `Utterances 
are not indifferent to one another, and are not self-sufficient; they are aware of and 
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mutally affect one another'. (Bakhtin, 1986: 91). Before moving on, we wish to note also 
a comment by Schreber that relates directly to the body image of the other: 
On the contrary my nerves were shattered again the following morning, indeed so badly 
that I vomited the breakfast. A particularly terrifying impression was created in me by 
the totally distorted features which I thought I could see on the attendant R. when I 
awoke. (Schreber, 1955: 51-52) 
In this we see that the `physical' image of the other begins to fragment, a fragmented 
visual image of the other. Fragmented speech, it has to be remembered, is connected to 
the partially developed drives of the child, or fragmented drives, in other words the 
development of libido. 
The splintered nature of the acquisition of speech leaves linguistic shards comparable 
with the images of the fragmented body. The child just - or so it thinks - needs an 
image of wholeness of the body and speech in order to be Ideal. We must, I think, note 
that there will always be a reaction from the ego to the return of fragmented speech in the 
form of terrible anxiety. It is a question of the relationship of the ego to the fragmented. 
In this we may recall Lacan's comment: `I say that the subject speaks to himself with his 
ego' (Lacan, 1993[1981]: 14). Following this thread of Lacan's: `... psychosis, where at 
some time there has been a hole, a rupture, a rent, a gap, with respect to external reality' 
(Lacan, ibid. 45). In this rent, in this tear does not the unmediated unconscious appear? 
Notwithstanding this, however, we must now detect the Lacanian mirror stage register, 
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because the aggressivity detected by Lacan also looms large at this point of our 
investigation. Lacan teaches: 
all erotic identification, all seizing of the other in an image in a relationship of erotic 
captivation, occurs by way of the narcissistic relation - and it is also the basis of 
aggressive tension. (Lacan, 1981: 92-92). 
We must make this quite clear because Bakhtin does not essentially deal with the 
agggressivity inherent in the ego and we do not wish to miss the fact in passing. So that 
we do not lose sight of these facts, Lacan tells us also: 
This is precisely where the mirror stage is useful. It brings to light the nature of this 
aggressive relation and what it signifies. If the aggressive relation enters into this 
formation called the ego, it's because it is constitutive of it, because the ego is already by 
itself an other, and because it sets itself up in a duality internal to the subject (ibid. 92- 
93). 
And finally and most importantly: 
In every relationship with the other, even an erotic one, there is some echo of this relation 
of exclusion, it's either him or me, because, on the imaginary plane, the human subject is 
so constituted that the other is always on the point of re-adopting the place of mastery in 
relation to him, because there is an ego in him that is always in part foreign to him 
(Lacan, ibid. 92-93) 
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Schreber's Fragmented Speech - as Image 
`The term "text" is not at all adequate to the essence of the entire utterance' (Bakhtin, 
1986: 136). This is undoubtedly true in the case of Schreber. We are dealing with The 
problem of the second consciousness in the human sciences' (Ibid. ) we must recall. It is 
the dialogic interpenetration of all the voices, including the unconscious that is necessary 
in Schreber. In the first instance, the way in which we trace fragmented speech in 
Schreber's discourse is: his relationship to `whole' speech and his relationship to 
fragmented speech as inner and outer experience and his interrelationship with language. 
As Hirschkop has said, we must understand what it means to participate in language. 
It is here that we see the merit of inner (conscious/unconscious) experience and outer 
(conscious/unconscious) experience. `But here I saw only extraordinary figures, among 
them fellows in linen overalls covered in soot. Almost all of them were silent and 
practically motionless; only a few used occasionally to utter certain fragmentary sounds 
... ' (Schreber, 1955: 104). As we saw earlier, the 
face of the Attendant R. fragmented, so 
in this last comment we see that the image of speech, of those surrounding Schreber, is 
now fragmenting. There is also, for example, a distinct genre that could be followed 
through appertaining to Schreber's inner body experience as he himself describes it, and 
his relationship to the external world, his environment, and the way in which his 
physician, Dr Weber, experiences the outward image and discourse of Schreber. 
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For Schreber, it appears as if the unconscious drips undiluted into consciousness. 
Following Dinnage again, we note her comment: `His [Schreber's] own identity having 
been invaded, fragmented, distorted, and annihilated, a story had to be found that made 
sense of it' (Schreber, [Introduction] : xviii). In our opinion the story makes no sense 
without the speech complex. Now we check a vital comment by Schreber that places us 
at the outset of his illness: 
During several nights when I could not get to sleep, a recurrent crackling noise in the 
wall of our bedroom became noticeable at shorter or longer intervals; time and again it 
woke me as I was about to go to sleep. Naturally we thought of a mouse although it was 
very extraordinary that a mouse should have found its way to the first floor of such a 
solidly built house. But having heard similar noises innumerable times since then, and 
still hearing them around me everyday in day-time and at night, I have come to recognize 
them as undoubted divine miracles-they are called `interferences' by the voices talking 
to me... (ibid. 47). 
This would seem to indicate that the voices are penetrating his consciousness and perhaps 
we need to ask from where do the voices emerge? It seems plausible that they must arise 
from the unconscious, not, as in neurosis in the form of a language intelligible to 
consciousness, but, in the case of psychosis, as an echo of the image of the fragmented 
body and fragmented speech recalled from the mirror stage experience. Two things now 
seem to happen; the fragmented images `appear' to come from both inside and outside. It 
would seem that if the unconscious penetrates consciousness in this way. it 
predominantly returns from without. The unconscious now appears to be on the outside 
looking in. If the unconscious can only be on the inside, how then would we explain the 
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transference? Projection? Maybe, but even so surely the projection of contents to the 
outside necessitates movement of the unconscious? At any rate, the voices penetrate 
Schreber from both inside and outside. The unconscious must be inside or outside, for 
obvious reasons it cannot be in consciousness, at least in full. We now intend to check a 
crucial footnote by Schreber himself that we consider constitutes, within his `text', the 
onset or perhaps one should say onslaught, of the fragmentation of his speech: 
The word `think' was omitted in the above answer. This was because the souls [part of 
religico-philosophical genre] were in the habit - even before the conditions contrary to 
the Order of the World [perhaps Law of the Father genre] had started - of giving their 
thoughts (when communicating with one another) grammatically incomplete expression; 
that is to say they omitted certain words which were not essential for the sense. In the 
course of time this habit degenerated into an abominable abuse of me, because a human 
beings nerves of mind (his `foundation' as the expression goes in the basic language) 
were excited continuously by such interrupted phrases, because they automatically try to 
find the word that is missing to make up the sense. For instance as one of innumerable 
examples, I have for years heard hundreds of times each day the question: `Why do you 
not say it? ', the word `aloud' necessary to complete the sense being omitted, and the rays 
giving the answer themselves as if it came from me: `Because I am stupid perhaps'. For 
years my nerves have had to endure incessantly such and similar nonsense in dreary 
monotony (as if it came from them). I will later say more about the reason for the choice 
of expressions and the effects they were designed to produce (ibid. 56) 
Although this footnote by Schreber is far from the very first instance of the existence of 
fragmented speech in his text, this seems to be the first case where an interpenetration of 
various voice : ones is penetrated by the possibility of fragmentation. The language glue 
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is coming unstuck; it will not hold. The grandiose speech, the unified discourse so 
brilliant in its continuous rhetoric (another genre) is falling apart. There is al\\ays a 
reflection and refraction existing between the image of the fragmented body and the 
fragmented word; there is correlation, a never-ending flicker of meaning between the 
two, which, under certain conditions, may prove fatal. The fragmented body image and 
fragmented speech image may act as a reflective prism. This of course is interrelated 
with the `whole' images of the body and the word - and the `pure' body and the `pure' 
word in contradistinction of course to the grotesque. Note, however. Schreber's 
continuous juxtaposition of `high' and `low' language. 
So that we remain quite clear about the relationship with the fragmented body we recall 
another comment by Schreber: 
A lung worm was frequently produced in me by miracles ... I 
had the definite feeling that 
my diaphragm was raised high in my chest to almost directly under my larynx and that 
there remained only a small remnant of lung in between with which I could hardly 
breathe (ibid. 143). 
We should not discard Schreber's comments, variously made, that he believed he would 
have to rot alive. Again, the decomposition of his body corresponds to the decomposition 
of his speech. It appears that the body-image and speech-image are interconnected 
in 
such a way that the dissolution of one brings about the 
dissolution of the other. 
Schreber's Symphony to Madness has to be transcribed for a number of orchestra parts. 
Schreber wrote the symphony but he could not transcribe it. 
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Checking Schreber again we find: 
My nerves are influenced by the rays to vibrate corresponding to certain human words, 
their choice therefore is not subject to my own will, but is due to an influence exerted on 
me from without. From the beginning the system of not-finishing-a-sentence prevailed 
that is to say the vibrations caused in my nerves and the words so produced contain not 
mainly finished thoughts, but unfinished ideas, or only fragments of ideas... (ibid. 197). 
Again, Narcissus and Echo provide the answer to Schreber's `question' of the specular 
image and the speech image. We now find that Schreber gives us the `grammar' of 
fragmented speech completely unfolded for us: 
1. Now I shall, 
2. You were to, 
3.1 shall, 
4. It will be, 
5. This of course was, 
6. Lacking now is, 
With this teasing space, Schreber now provides us with the answers: 
1. (second part only) resign myself to being stupid, 
2. be represented as denying God, as given to voluptuousness 
[genre] excesses etc., 
3. have to think about that first, 
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4. done now, the joint of pork, 
5. too much from the soul's point of view, 
6. only the leading idea, that is - we, the rays, have no thoughts. (Schreber, 1955: 198- 
199) 
Schreber is not playing around here, the image of speech is slowly disintegrating. It 
would, however, not necessarily be a slow disintegration, it could be a flash of lightning, 
or like a firework taking ages to prepare and taking only a second to go off. We must not 
of course neglect the ego and the ego position and remember Freud's remark: 
We might add, perhaps, that the ego wears a `cap of hearing' ... but it might be said to 
wear it awry' (SE. XIX: 25). 
Freud tells us that the paranoic builds his world again: 
And the paranoic builds it again, not more splendid, it is true, but at least so that he can 
once more live in it. He builds it up by the work of his delusions. The delusional 
formation, which we take to be the pathological product, is in reality an attempt at 
recovery, a process of reconstruction. Such a reconstruction after the catastrophe is 
successful to a greater or lesser extent, but never wholly so; in Schreber's own words, 
there has been a `profound internal change' in the world. (SE. XII: 70-71). 
In Schreber's decomposition of the body image and the speech image we come to 
understand, we think, that there is interplay between the fragmented body image and 
fragmented speech image that is itself, a reflective symptomatology. Lacan tells us: 
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I refused to diagnose her as psychotic for one decisive reason, which was that there were 
none of those disturbances that are our object of study this year, which are disorders at 
the level of language. We must insist upon the presence of these disorders before making 
a diagnosis of psychosis. (Lacan, 1981: 92). 
Clarifying this statement by Lacan - for ourselves, Lacan is quite clear here that a 
disturbance at the level of language is symptomatic in psychosis. Lacan also said: As 
soon as there is a delusion, we enter at full tilt upon the domain of intersubjectivity' 
(Lacan, 1981: 193). However, perhaps in contradistinction to Lacan, we would not 
consider that Saussure was the conquistador capable of taking us into that particular 
territory. By which we mean Saussure did not dialogize intersubjectivity, whereas 
Bakhtin of course did. Continuing, the reciprocal relationship between fragmented 
speech and the image of the fragmented body means of course that they are tied to each 
other as we saw previously - Narcissus and Echo. As Lacan's aggressivity returns in 
the psychoanalytic session, so the image of the fragmented body and fragmented speech 
emerge simultaneously - at least in the case of psychosis. Let us recall again Lacan's 
comment in his mirror stage paper: 
This fragmented body - which term I have also introduced into our system of theoretical 
references - usually manifests itself in dreams when the movement of the analysis 
encounters a certain level of aggressive disintegration in the individual. (Lacan, 
1977[1966]: 4). 
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This is because as a state of `regression' (we do use the word cautiously) is reached in 
psychosis, to the mirror stage, the image of the fragmented body returns and so does the 
image of fragmented speech. The image of fragmentation of both the body and speech 
are constituted outside of the formation of the ego. They owe no allegiance to each other. 
It is the meconnaissance in the experience of the mirror stage, the prematurity of the child 
at birth, that catapults (at the mirror stage) the fragmented body image and fragmented 
speech image into the unconscious. 
If the fragmented body image and speech image return, associated with the aggressivity 
discovered by Lacan, then the ego strengthens its defences against the marauding forces 
opposed to it. In psychosis, presumably one will always find an attempt to shore up the 
defences of the ego, which is now under threat. As Freud rightly tells us, in psychosis, 
after the deluge the crippled ego attempts to re-construct its image of the psyche in terms 
of delusions and hallucinations in order to create a new reality. These constructs, 
however useful they may be in order to stabilize consciousness, are `contaminated' now 
with images that are fragmented and dismembered. 
It is the return of the images of fragmentation that causes such terrible anxiety. If these 
images 'cross the line' at any time by, as it were, swamping consciousness the deluge is 
too great. The ego we must remember has only the misrecognized solidity of the unified 
body image and the unified speech image at its disposal and has also enclosed 
aggressivity within its solid parameters. The reason that the ego cannot stand up against 
the return of the fragmented is that it threw away the keys of 
fragmentation. Instead it 
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picked up the keys of a unified assumption of its specular image, a unified assumption of 
its speech image, and finally the key of an alienated split-subject of aggressivity that is, in 
fact, an alienated image of itself. 
In the Schreber case, there are two methods that allow for reinterpretation and 
reassessment in the light of the discovery of fragmented speech and in the light of 
Bakhtin's discovery of the utterance and speech genres. In the first place, Schreber's text 
may be completely re-interpreted in terms of a change in speech subjects, conducive with 
Bakhtin's expression of the utterance. For example, there is a genre or sub-genre of 
cross-dressing that cuts through various other genres. There is the genre of the Law of 
the Father and as the superaddressee it is already contained in the trinity of the word. It 
is suggested here that the image of the two suns in the sky spoken of by Schreber (despite 
being depicted as female) are the father (personal) and the Father (God). There seems 
little doubt that Schreber unconsciously considers being penetrated by the `rays' of both. 
Bakhtin allows us to set up fields of dialogic potential that dialogically criss-cross the 
whole Schreber `text' enabling us to discover new genres continuously. In this way the 
reader is within the subjective field of Schreber; intersubjectivity holds sway and there 
has to be a subject-subject relationship to the text. Bakhtin forces us to interact 
discursively with Schreber, and there is no possibility of a subject-object relationship. If 
one follows Bakhtin's direction within the text then one is responsive to Schreber; it is no 
longer possible to hold Schreber at a convenient distance - right in there, in the padded 
cell - it's the only way. To continue our earlier comments about the Law of the Father, 
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in genre terms we now have the law of the father (personal) superseded by the Law of the 
Father (God), but they are crossed, in Schreber, by the earlier mentioned genre of 
voluptuousness. I am aware that we have not in any way completed a stratification of all 
the voices present in Schreber's text, let alone a comprehensive assessment of genres, but 
our aim and purpose have been primarily to discover within and without of Schreber's 
text evidence of our hypothesis concerning fragmented speech. Here again, we have not 
itemized every occurrence where fragmented speech seems to be suggested, but hopefully 
we have stressed relevant passages. If one carefully articulates Bakhtin's utterance in the 
change of speaking subjects in Schreber one re-writes the map of Schreber's thought. 
The second re-interpretation we need to make is of Lacan. If Lacan's work is approached 
in terms of an assumption of fragmented speech occurring at the mirror stage, then Lacan, 
in spite of his brilliant exposition, has left out half of what occurs in Schreber's discourse. 
Once one realizes that Schreber's language meaning is collapsing (we need not be 
seduced by Schreber's early eloquence) then the signs are everywhere. At some point, a 
psychotic revisits the scene of the mirror stage experience and ignites once more the 
memory and problem of Narcissus and Echo and the accompanying libidinal investment. 
As the fragmented images inherent in Schreber's work drift in and out of focus, with his 
voices that speak quietly in `lisping tones' that eventually transpose into hissing. and 
where he compensates for the voices by bellowing, we can more easily locate the 
interpenetration of Schreber's heterogeneity of dialogic voices by the use of Bakhtin's 
utterance and speech genres. In other words, if we have a superimposed image of 
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conscious and unconscious forces superimposed upon the utterance and the respective 
speech genres, it is possible to understand the psychotic discourse, because the 
unconscious appears to be present in consciousness in psychosis. The consciousness and 
the `second consciousness' are co-authors of the utterance in psychosis. There is an 
inmixing of forces, hence the tower of babel. The unconscious speaks from within and 
from without. And in psychosis the unconscious does speak, but the speech is 
fragmented, and has the quality of dream thoughts, fragments of phantasies that plague 
consciousness from within. If Schreber, and we when approaching the text, are plagued 
by his stratification of voices on so many dialogic levels, it needs the open unity of 
Bakhtin's thought to iron out Schreber's dialogic creases, long enough to wear Schreber's 
verbal vestments, and be present at the altar where Schreber worships. Perhaps all the 
contraptions and straps and devices that Schreber was subjected to as a child, consciously 
or unconsciously, should not be replaced in any assessment of his work by the rigid 
constraints of further structure but by the open unity of anti-structure. 
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CONCLUSION 
In this project we have presented a hypothesis of fragmented speech. It had to be 
contextualized, however, and this we attempted to achieve in the first chapter by locating 
the early relationship between psychoanalysis and the literary text. The first engagement 
with a text was predominantly Freud's own engagement with Sophocles' Oedipus Rex. 
However, towards the end of the first chapter we discovered that Rank and, to a certain 
extent Freud, had overlooked the triangulated relationship of the reader and the 
writer/plot. This problem - as we found, was not about to go away. 
The development of the idea of fragmented speech depends upon certain assumptions 
concerning the Freudian unconscious and in our second chapter we attempted to engage 
our assumptions within a loosely formed Bakhtinian framework. Fragmented speech 
appears in much evidence throughout Renaissance Carnival, and here we saw the first 
splitting of the image of the conceptualisation of the `whole' body and the dismembered 
body and fragmented speech - the grotesque speech (language of the marketplace). In 
this carnival atmosphere we found sufficient strands to form a hawser strong enough to 
hold our thesis. The imagery surrounding the language of fragmented speech, or 
grotesque speech in carnival, leaves room for a linguistic harvest. 
Following on from this, we found ourselves in front of Lacan's mirror and his specular 
image and the fragmented body. However, Lacan did not approach the problem of 
fragmented speech, thereby leaving Narcissus alone with his specular image, 
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unaccompanied by his `lover' Echo. Lacan focused upon the problem of aggressivity and 
the statuesque ego, enabling us to make certain assumptions about the possibility of 
fragmented speech accompanying the image of the fragmented body across the Styx to 
Hades. This left us with the problem of drawing Lacan and Bakhtin into a similar field of 
research. Lacan does not deal with the concept of fragmented speech in the unconscious 
and neither does Bakhtin, but together they make the analysis of such a possibility 
probable. 
The entwining of Lacanian and Bakhtinian thought provokes many questions at the level 
of fragmented speech that still remain to be answered. If one can accept the possibility 
that there is a `whole' image of the body and a `whole' image of the word, then it is 
equally possible to argue that they may be opposed in some way in the unconscious. It is 
the lack of permanence of the body image, outlined for us by Schilder, and its destructive 
capability that engaged us. The grandiose speech of psychosis has a counterpoint score 
of intense vulgarity - the fear of the return of the fragmented provokes terrible anxiety. 
If one digs down into the soil of language, one invariably finds the broken crockery of 
fragmented speech at the base. If one digs down hoping to find a statue of language 
intact, one is likely to be disappointed. The future? In psychosis, the `positionality' of the 
unconscious seems to be a crucial issue. The shift in the axis of the unconscious that 
occurs in psychosis needs to be developed much further. Also the interrelationship 
between the unconscious and the imaging of both the body and speech requires future 
research. If we collide the two (fragmented body image and fragmented speech image) it 
ýýý 
seems possible that we shall create a genre, a speech complex that takes into account the 
flash of expression, of energy, that is generated when the two are opposed, perhaps 
similar to matter and anti-matter. Meanwhile, Schreber's discourse fragments 
continuously, which for him, leaves only the silence of the cell. 
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